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1. The Quest for Certitude 
                                 
The focal point of this work is a central feature of early modern
1
 thought, described 
by Stephen Toulmin as the philosophical quest for certainty.
2
 The latter involves 
the endeavor to uncover true and certain ideas of our world on which a body of 
indubitable knowledge can be built. I argue that the response by early seventeenth-
century rationalist philosophers, such as Descartes and Spinoza, to this challenge, 
came in the form of an innovation in their epistemology aimed at acquiring 
adequate ideas of the inmost essence of things.
3
 Generally speaking, the early 
modern notion of essence refers to the metaphysical core of reality, to that which 
determines what things are and how they act in a most fundamental way. The 
knowledge of essences is aimed at disclosing the foundational principles or 
fundamental laws of nature, which are common to all things and the same in all. 
For example, when Descartes famously considers the essence of a particular body, 
such as a melting piece of wax, he is eventually left with only the intellectual 
notion of an extended substance in motion, which he regards as the essence of the 
wax and as something common to all material things. For Descartes and Spinoza, 
as I will show, such essences and their ideas are necessarily involved and expressed 
                                                        
1
 Early modern philosophy is an interval in the history of philosophy at the beginning of the period 
known as modern philosophy. The early modern period in history is roughly 1500-1800, but the 
label early modern philosophy is sometimes used to refer to a more specific period of time. I use 
the term to refer mainly to philosophy of the 1600’s, posited to have started with Descartes and to 
include Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza and Leibniz. Many would stretch this period one generation 
further and to include Hume, Locke and Berkeley.  
2
 In his book Cosmopolis, Stephen Toulmin researches the quite notable development in early 
modern philosophy in which a decisive move, from renaissance humanism to rationalism, took 
place. He describes this development as a decisive shift in philosophical focus, from the particular 
to the universal, the local to the general and the timely to the timeless (Toulmin 2009: 30). He 
argues that the quite radical development that took place in early modern thought is best 
understood as a reaction to the untenable situation in Europe during the religious and other strife of 
the early seventeenth century. In his view a new realization dawned that the ‘time had come to 
discover some rational method for demonstrating the essential correctness or incorrectness of 
philosophical, scientific, or theological doctrines … If Europeans were to avoid falling into a 
skeptical morass, they had, it seemed, to find something to be “certain” about’ (ibid.: 55). 
According to Toulmin ‘all the protagonists of modern philosophy promoted theory, devalued 
practice, and insisted equally on the need to find foundations for knowledge that were clear, 
distinct and certain’ (ibid.: 70). In his view Descartes’s philosophy played a central role in this 
development and his discovery of the single certain thing (the cogito) that made other certainties 
possible, was particularly significant.    
3
 Bolton (1998: 196) associates scientific knowledge or scientia in seventeenth-century philosophy 
with the theory of essence. For Bolton the notion of the ‘essence of a thing is what it is to be that 
thing, or what is expressed in its definition…’ I argue later that in Spinoza an adequate definition 




in all things and can therefore be adequately conceived by the mind. An important 
further reason for them being optimistic about discovering certitude followed from 
a new understanding of the human intellect’s innate ability to think adequately, by 
virtue of it possessing clear and distinct ideas of such essences. According to 
Carriero: ‘Like others of his time, Descartes had confidence in the ability of the 
human mind to fruitfully pursue questions about God, the nature or essence of the 
mind and the nature or essence of the physical world’ (2009: 1).
4
 
      As suggested, the project of discovering a clear and certain foundation for our 
knowledge was seen to be of critical importance in alleviating the untenable social 
situation in Europe in that time. Spinoza, for one, was convinced that it was only 
incontrovertible knowledge, based on adequate ideas of the essence of things, that 
could secure an absolute inception point
5
 to initiate the improvement and continued 
progress of human society. The intention was for this new type of knowledge to 
form an indubitable basis for a new science and also for a new morality, both of 
which could facilitate a more stable society (Huenemann 2008: 94).
 
For Spinoza, 
the seemingly endless bitter social conflict, experienced in that time, was incited 
and flamed by human passions, which followed from an inadequate or imaginative 
understanding of the world. He strongly believed that in order to reduce human 
discontent, which contributed much to social unrest, the human mind must find 
acquiescence. I argue that, although Spinoza’s approach is distinctly rationalist, his 
philosophy has an ethical intention and is primarily aimed at producing joy and 
peace of mind. For Spinoza, such a sense of fulfillment in humans can only be 
found in the full consent of the mind, which follows from a clear understanding of 
things:  
 
For insofar as we understand, we can desire nothing but that which must be, 
nor, in an absolute sense, can we find contentment in anything but truth. And 
so insofar as we rightly understand these matters, the endeavor of the better 
part of us is in harmony with the order of the whole of Nature. (4app S: 362.) 
                                                        
4
 In early modern philosophy such essences or principles are often described in theological terms as 
God’s essence or the divine nature. 
5
 For Huenemann it is a common trait in all modern philosophies that they try to find a way of 






For example, a man’s true happiness and blessedness consists solely in 
wisdom and knowledge of truth. (TTP3 S: 416.) 
 
      I contend that Spinoza’s philosophy is based on a platonic-like distinction 
between the realms of eternal and temporal being. The former refers to an 
immanent divine essence, hidden from the senses, but clearly discernible to the 
intellect and the latter to the durational world of existing particular things, known 
mostly inadequately by means of our sensory ideas. In Spinoza, the very nature or 
essence of our existence is the creative and concurring power of God on which all 
things intimately depend for their essence and existence and without which nothing 
can be or be conceived. For Spinoza the adequate understanding of the essential 
difference between these two orders and how they relate to one another leads to a 
sense of well-being in humans. His project of acquiring certain knowledge must 
therefore start with the discovery of true ideas of God’s eternal and infinite 
essence, in which true light the essence of all other things can be understood. For 
Spinoza human happiness originates in the clear understanding of our place and 
union with the world, i.e. by understanding and consenting that all things are 
necessarily contained in and follow from God’s essence and continually depend on 
his sustaining power. In Descartes and Spinoza, the basis for this belief was a new 
appreciation of the human mind’s given ability to know this inmost essence of 
things adequately. I will show that the concept of essence, and specifically the 
notion of essence monism, plays an all-important role in Spinoza’s task of attaining 
certain knowledge of our world and in ontologically and conceptually unifying the 
eternal and temporal orders, referred to above. In my view, Spinoza’s Treatise on 
the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE), which receives much attention in this work, 




1.1. The nature of the human mind 
 
The European Enlightenment, which took place roughly between 1600-1800, is 
without doubt one of the most important periods in the history of Western 
civilization and its philosophy. The many diverse aspects of this period have been 
the subject of much research over the years and there are many theories as to the 
cause(s) of this great social upheaval that culminated in the French Revolution 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. The renowned intellectual historian 
Jonathan Israel
6
 reaches an interesting and important conclusion that philosophy 
(especially early modern) played a decisive role in this whole process of social 
change that took place:  
 
But whichever view of the philosophical ferment one adopts, there is no 
scope for ignoring the universal conviction during the revolutionary age, 
beginning in the early 1780’s, that it was ‘philosophy’ which had demolished 
the ancien regime, and in particular the ideas, beliefs, and loyalties on which 
it rested, and that it had accomplished this feat long before the first shots 
were fired at the Bastille. (Israel 2002: 715.) 
 
Israel adds it to be exceedingly implausible that a ‘revolution of fact’, which 
successfully demolished such a powerfully embedded world order, could have 
taken place without a prior revolution in ideas or ‘a revolution of the mind’ (ibid.: 
714). He concludes that the radical ideas of the new rationalist philosophers, 
undeniably, helped make the Revolution. 
      The influential role attributed to philosophy in this period seems to have 
coincided with some important changes that take took place within philosophy 
itself, one of which was a general move towards greater independence and self-
                                                        
6
 Jonathan Israel has recently produced some quite monumental works on the European 
Enlightenment. The best known of his books is Radical Enlightenment - Philosophy and the 
Making of Modernity 1650-1750. In this work he convincingly argues for the important role that 
early modern rationalist philosophy played in laying the intellectual foundation (the revolution in 
mind) for the revolution in fact which came about in Europe towards the end of the eighteenth 
century. Of particular interest is the role he attributes to the philosophy of Spinoza in formulating 
the radical ideas that would later form the basis of the values of a modern democratic society. The 
important influence of Spinoza’s thought is something, according to Israel, that modern 




determination that started to take shape in the early modern period. It is notable 
that it was at this very time, the 1650’s and onwards, that philosophy slowly but 
increasingly separated itself from various institutions and became more 
independent. During the Middle-Ages, philosophy was mainly practiced in the arts 
faculties of the schools and colleges, where ethics, logic, metaphysics, and physics 
were taught and also in the theological faculties of the universities. The important 
consequence of this arrangement was that philosophy fell under the direct and 
censorious scrutiny of the Church. By the seventeenth century, although it was still 
the case that anyone who wanted to earn a living by doing philosophical thinking 
and writing had either to belong to a university faculty or to teach in a college, it 
had become more common to find philosophers working outside the strictures of 
the university, i.e. the ecclesiastic framework (Nadler 2002: 1). Many of the best-
known philosophers of the early modern period, figures such as Bacon, Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Hume were largely independent scholars. This 
process in which philosophy became more independent continued and gathered 
momentum, to the extent that by the end of the eighteenth century it was, by and 
large, a secular enterprise.
7
 This development signaled the start of a remarkable 
change in the character and role of philosophy. In prior times, actually since the 
advent of the Christian empire in late antiquity, from the time of Constantine until 
the 1650’s, philosophy was no more than the modest handmaiden of theology 
(Israel 2002: 10). It was only in early modern times, with the revolutionary work of 
philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza and others, that the old hierarchy of 
studies, in which theology reigned supreme - with science and philosophy as its 
serving maids -started to disintegrate quite rapidly. With this development 
philosophy was increasingly released from its previous subordination and became 




                                                        
7
 This is not to suggest a radical discontinuity between early modern thought and what went before. 
These new philosophers did indeed see themselves to be initiating a renewal of philosophy, but it is 
apparent that much of their philosophy was indebted to both the structure and content of their 
scholastic predecessors (Nadler 2002: 2).    
8
 An interesting example of such a controversy between theology and philosophy took place at the 
Dutch University of Leiden in the time in which Spinoza probably undertook some part time 
studies there. The main point of contention was that the philosophy of Descartes was seen by 




      One of best examples of this development in philosophy towards self-
determination is found in the many enquiries that were undertaken by philosophers 
in this time into the nature of human understanding. It is quite remarkable, that in a 
period of about 150 years (1620-1770), the two main philosophical approaches of 
the time, the rationalist and the empiricist, both undertook numerous enquiries into 
the nature of the human mind. On the rationalist side, for example, we find 
Descartes’s Rules for the Direction of the Mind (the Regulae), Spinoza’s Treatise 
on the Emendation of the Intellect and Leibniz’s New Essay on Human 
Understanding. From the empiricist camp in this time we have Locke’s An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding and Berkeley’s A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge.
 
The above is a sample of the better-known treatises on this subject, but 
enough to confirm, that one of the main subjects of philosophical attention in early 
modern philosophy was the nature of the human mind. The important point I make 
is that the seemingly strong desire amongst early modern thinkers for philosophy to 
become more self-determined was closely associated with a new understanding of 
the nature of the human mind. I argue that it was mainly the early modern 
rationalists (such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz) who promoted the view that 
the human mind possessed innate ideas of the inmost essences of things. This type 
of knowledge was seen to be completely different to the universals of the scholastic 
Aristotelians, which were abstracted from particulars.
9
 The rationalists strongly 
denied that the essences of things could be known through sense perception and 
experience. In their view it was only the intellect that could know such 
fundamental essences adequately (Nadler 2006: 176). As suggested earlier, this 
new optimistic view of the human mind played an important role in securing a 
foundation for the new science and philosophy to challenge the prevailing and, in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The result was a ban on the teaching of Cartesianism at that university for a period of time. For 
more information on this controversy see Verbeek (2002: 167-182) and also Cramer (1889: 156-
176) who represents a rather different perspective. Cramer defends the Cartesian Dutch Reformed 
philosopher/theologian, Abraham Heidanus (1597-1678) against the above accusations. He 
describes the work of Heidanus as truly Cartesian and very different to the philosophy of Spinoza, 
which, in his view, did indeed trespass onto the domain of theology and the Church. It is notable in 
the view of Cramer that the philosophy of Spinoza is seen to be a direct onslaught on the 
foundations of Church authority and divine revelation, whereas the work of Descartes was seen to 
still serve the interests of Christian theology and the Church.  
9




their opinion, outdated world-view of Aristotelian-scholastic philosophers, 
theologians and the Church. The latter, of course, still adhered to the view of the 
human mind as corrupt and unable to have certainty about its own ideas, due to the 
fall of mankind into sin. I argue that Spinoza’s TdIE is best understood as 
partaking in and contributing to the endeavor of early-modern philosophy to clarify 
human understanding and to further a rationalist conception of its nature.   
  
1.2. Medicina mentis 
 
Although the early-modern philosophical landscape was quite diverse, I think it 
legitimate to distinguish two main lines of thought found in this time, i.e. the 
rationalist and the empiricist approaches to philosophy. It is important in 
understanding Spinoza’s concept of emending the intellect, to grasp the basic 
difference in approach and method between these two important early-modern 
intellectual currents. I think it essential to briefly compare the basic approach and 
methods employed in early-modern rationalism and empiricism. However, although 
there are important basic differences between them, there are also some important 
common intentions that these philosophical styles shared, which I will discuss first.   
      Although the earlier Reformation had brought about a deep split in western 
Christendom and brought about diverse confessional spheres (Catholic, Anglican, 
Lutheran and Calvinist) in societies in Europe, it still remained a civilization in 
which the essentials of Christianity was unchallenged and still served as the basic 
life and world-view in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, despite some deep-
seated differences amongst the above-mentioned confessions, there was however, 
largely an agreement that Aristotelian-scholasticism offered the best general 
metaphysical and scientific underpinning for their different theologies (Israel 
2002:16). Although Aristotelian-scholasticism was by no means uniform
10
, it was 
the sanctioned philosophy that prevailed in universities throughout Europe and 
strongly influenced philosophical and scientific text-books (Nadler 2002: 21). As 
                                                        
10
 For a good overview of the status of Aristotelianism in early modern philosophy, see Stone 








      The single ingredient of the Aristotelian philosophical heritage that most early 
modern thinkers were, arguably, eager to replace was the celebrated theory of 
substantial forms (Della Rocca 2002: 64). According to this theory all things 
basically consist of matter and form. While matter was regarded as inert, form was 
thought to be an active principle, consisting of certain powers that flowed from the 
soul or nature of something (James 1997: 67). The notion of substantial form was 
mostly utilized as a basis for predicating the properties of things. The power, nature 
and behavior of an individual thing, was thought to follow from its substantial form. 
The problem with this theory, it seems, was that the substantial form ended up being 
rather arbitrarily attributed to unknown and occult-like powers, which were added 
on in an ad hoc manner whenever explanatory difficulties were encountered. The 
basic criticism leveled against this doctrine, by both rationalists and empiricists, was 
that the origin and nature of substantial forms was mysterious and could not be 
clarified sufficiently. According to James, ‘while the opposition of form and matter 
seems to indicate that they are spiritual phenomena, some of their traits suggest that 
they must be physical. As well as being concealed, forms are therefore occult in the 
more derogatory sense of mysterious’ (ibid.). The explanations offered by the 
Aristotelian-scholastic philosophers by appealing to certain powers or faculties were 
mostly only re-descriptions of the latter, and offered little, if any, further 
clarification.  It seems that the underlying problem for the early modern 
philosophers was that no observable or measurable (scientific) distinction could be 
made between the elements of matter and form and that this theory did not further 
knowledge of things at all.
12
 One of the main reasons for rejecting the theory of 
substantial forms was that these notions were seen to be obscure and confused and 
                                                        
11
 The move away from Aristotelianism in early modern philosophy seems to have resulted in a 
return, of sorts, to elements of Platonism by the likes of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. This is 
something that is often overlooked and underappreciated, according to Hutton (2008: 1-8). On the 
other hand, although there was a decided attempt to discard much of the Aristotelian-scholastic 
tradition, the latter still dominated much of the Western thought in the seventeenth century 
(Viljanen 2009: 57). 
12
 The early modern theory of mechanism, which will be discussed later, challenged the traditional 
Aristotelian view that something’s form is the fundamental base for explicating its essential traits. 
In mechanist thinking the explanation of a particular body’s nature and behavior did not depend 




this obscurity indicated that bodies did not have these features and that there was no 
good reason to attribute them to bodies (Della Rocca 2002: 65). The point here is 
that there was a general shared desire in the early modern period to make philosophy 
more scientific and that this underlay the consensus among many early modern 
philosophers to replace or revise Aristotelian-scholasticism. This is in line with what 
was argued earlier, that there was a shared motive amongst most early modern 
philosophers, to become more self-determined and independent in their thinking. 
This undertaking went hand in hand with the added conviction, that in order to 
achieve the desired self-determination, philosophy had to become more scientific 
and had to rid itself of the remnants of a pre-scientific understanding of the world.
 
 
Aristotelian-scholasticism was seen by many early modern philosophers to belong to 
an outdated life and world-view. This shared conviction is well illustrated in the 
words of two of the best-known exponents of the two early modern schools of 
thought, Descartes and Locke: 
 
But there is no way of understanding how these same attributes (size, shape 
and motion) can produce something else whose nature is quite different from 
their own - like the substantial forms and real qualities which many 
<philosophers> suppose to inhere in things; and we cannot understand how 
these qualities or forms could have the power subsequently to produce local 
motions in other bodies. (CSM I: 285.)   
 
But the fault has been, that faculties have been spoken of, and represented, as 
so with many agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in 
our stomachs? It was a ready, and a very satisfactory answer, to say that is 
was the digestive faculty. What was it that made anything come out of the 
body? The expulsive faculty. What moved? The motive faculty: and so in the 
mind, the intellectual faculty, or the understanding, understood; and the 
elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded: which is in short to say, 
that the ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the 
ability to understand, understood. (EHU: 228.) 




Generally speaking, many leading early modern rationalists and empiricists rejected 
one of the fundamental aspects of Aristotelian-scholasticism, the doctrine of 
substantial forms.
13
 The theory that many early modern thinkers, both rationalist and 
empiricist,
 
embraced, in opposition to the largely discarded doctrine of substantial 
forms, was the new rapidly rising mechanist understanding of the natural world.
14
 It 
is the general embracing of this new world-view by most leading early modern 
philosophers, which characterizes the early modern period and distinguishes it from 
the earlier era of Aristotelian scholasticism.
15
   
      A second shared sentiment has to do with the view that the human mind had 
somehow become ill and that philosophy in general needed to act as a kind of 
healing influence or as medicine for the mind, to purify the mind of the many 
infective inadequate ideas that had rendered it ill and prevented it from playing a 
leading role in the envisaged progress of philosophy and of mankind in general. This 
notion of medicina mentis is quite common in early modern thought. Apart from 
Spinoza’s theme of emending the intellect that pervades his works, Descartes also 
employs this notion in his Regulae (CSM I: 30,32). Locke describes irrationality in 
humans as a kind of madness, in need of emendation (EHU: 156, 354). It is further 
notable in this regard that the main philosophical work of Walther Ehrenfried von 
Tschirnhaus (1651-1708), an experimental empiricist and friend of Spinoza, was 
actually named Medicina Mentis.
16
 According to Israel (2002: 379) Tschirnhaus 
influenced the work of Balthasar Bekker, who aimed his writings at ridding the 
world of the notion of all occult type beings (devils, witches, spirits, etc), which 
                                                        
13
 Spinoza seems to reject the theory of substantial forms quite sharply: ‘So one should not expect 
us to say anything about substantial forms and real accidents, for these and things of this type are 
plainly absurd’ (CM2/1 S: 189).   
14
 The early modern mechanist theory will be discussed in chapter three.   
15
 This development is well articulated by Israel: ‘Yet it was unquestionably the rise of powerful 
new philosophical systems, rooted in the scientific advances of the early seventeenth century and 
especially the mechanistic views of Galileo, which chiefly generated that vast Kulturkampf 
between traditional, theologically sanctioned ideas about Man, God, and the universe and secular, 
mechanistic conceptions which stood independently of any theological sanction.  What came to be 
called the ‘New Philosophy’, which in most cases meant Cartesianism, diverged fundamentally 
from the essentially magical, Aristotelian, ‘pre-scientific’ view of the world which had everywhere 
prevailed hitherto and worked to supplant it, projecting a rigorous mechanism which, in the eyes of 
adversaries, inevitably entailed the subordination of theology and church authority to concepts 
rooted in a mathematically grounded philosophical reason – albeit most ‘Cartesians’ of the 1650s 
and 1660s never intended to undermine theology’s hegemony or weaken the sway of the churches 
to anything like the extent which rapidly resulted’ (2002: 14). 
16




were, in his view, one of the main sources of ideas that rendered the human mind ill. 
Spinoza, of course, also denied the existence of devils and such things, in the 
strongest terms as figments of human imagination and the sure sign of an ill mind 
(ST2/18;25). Although, as we shall see in the ensuing chapters, the methods used by 
rationalists and empiricists differed quite radically, there was an important 
consensus that the human mind had to be developed and that the latter entailed the 
emending or purification of its inadequate or irrational ideas.  As said, there was a 
general consensus that the old medieval imaginative world-view needed to be 
replaced by a more modern scientific outlook.
17
 One of the key ingredients of the 
medicina mentis project was the need for adequate ideas, which was sought by 
Descartes and Spinoza in their concept of the intellect as able to think adequately by 
virtue of it possessing clear and distinct ideas.
 
 
      I argue that the important change introduced by the rationalists regarding the 
nature of the human mind, was the view that the intellect is able to grasp the essence 
of things adequately.
 
Descartes, the principal innovator of early modern rationalist 
thought, furthered the view that the intellect, by virtue of having innate
18
ideas, has 
                                                        
17 A positive approach to science was shared by many theologians (especially reformed) and by 
many early modern philosophers (although not all) who maintained their personal religious 
convictions. There was a strong, shared intent in the latter circles to rid Christianity of a host of 
superstitious beliefs that were seen to undermine the pure doctrines taught by Scripture. Van Ruler 
(2000) gives an excellent account of this shared motivation amongst many early moderns to rid 
philosophy and theology of its credulity. In the article of Van Ruler an account is given of the 
classic book by Balthasar Bekker The World Bewitched (1691) in which Bekker offers a wide 
range of theological and philosophical arguments in order to combat the idea that ghosts, devils, 
and angels influence natural or historical events. According to Van Ruler, Bekker draws important 
conclusions from the philosophy of Descartes. It is clear, however, that the motives for his critique 
are religious rather than philosophical. For two centuries it had been a goal of the Protestant 
Reformation to accentuate God’s majesty and to establish the idea of his absolute power over 
creation. Bekker’s denial that ghosts and devils are active in the world is a logical consequence of 
the belief that there is no room for demigods in nature. Bekker thus adds a final touch to the project 
of the Reformation, by removing devils and spirits from nature, his main aim being to distinguish 
superstition from true faith. For Bekker, the Protestantization of Christian dogma could only be 
completed by making everything in nature’s course depend on God’s unique power and 
providence. In particular it was the new philosophy of Descartes that attracted him, according to 
Van Ruler. See also Israel’s discussion of this important and interesting subject (2002: 375-405).  
18 In Descartes and Spinoza the theory of innate ideas is invoked to explain how we can have 
knowledge of certain things that seem to go beyond experience, either because of their universal 
applicability, or because its subject matter transcends experiential reality. The notion of innate 
ideas in Western philosophy goes back to Plato's quite famous theory of anamnesis found in his 
dialogue the Meno. For Plato knowledge is seen to be in the soul from eternity and learning is seen 
as the recovery of what one has forgotten rather than the teaching of something new. This is 
demonstrated in the Meno when Socrates asks a simple boy certain questions about geometry, 
which the boy himself answers, after receiving certain guiding questions from Socrates. The 




adequate knowledge of the fundamental features or natures of the world, from which 
an indubitable system of knowledge (scientia) can be produced. This theory 
included the view that the mind could act quite independently and distinguish 
between its true and false ideas and emend or purify itself from its inadequate ideas. 
Although the mind had somehow lost sight of its inherent ability to know the truth, 
this could be restored, following the new rationalist method. The empiricists, on the 
other hand, had a more reserved view of the mind and mostly denied the theory of 
innate ideas. They saw the mind to be more passive and dependent on the senses for 
its ideas. In their view the mind could make much progress through experience and 
experimentation, but they did not share the optimism of the rationalists that the mind 
could produce certain knowledge of the essence of things and know things as they 
are in themselves. Although the empiricists thought that much of the medieval 
superstition could be removed through the results of experimental science, many of 
them retained the notion of the human mind as subject to man’s fallen nature and 
thus unable to have certainty about its ideas or to have knowledge about the nature 
of God. The latter was seen to belong to the domain of the Church alone, through 
the authority of received learning, official dogma and Scripture.
19 
I understand 
Spinoza’s philosophy in general and in particular his TdIE, to be involved in this 
general endeavor of medicina mentis found in early modern philosophy. His project 
of emending the intellect (henceforth the EIP) can generally be described as 
participating in the project of helping mankind regain active control of the mind by 
discovering how to ‘use reason aright’ (TP2 S: 684).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
his mind. For Plato the role of a true philosopher is likened to that of a midwife, to deliver 
knowledge inherently held.  In early-modern rationalism the theory of innate ideas is mainly 
attributed to Descartes, but is also found in Spinoza and Leibniz. This theory argues for the 
existence of certain inborn ideas in the human mind that are universal to all humanity. Such ideas 
refer to ethical truths, the notions of causality, good and evil, mathematical truths and the idea of 
God. Leibniz emphasized innate mathematical truths and certain truisms, such as the identity of 
indiscernibles. This theory of innatism marks an important difference between the early rationalists 
and the empiricists. The latter thought that all ideas should be attributed to learning and experience. 
Whereas the rationalists conceived the human mind to have a certain given structure, the 
empiricists, such as Locke, argued that the mind was a tabula rasa or a clean slate, without any 
inborn or inscribed ideas. 
19
 See TTP15: ‘I am utterly astonished that men can bring themselves to make reason, the greatest 
of all gifts and a light divine, subservient to letters that are dead, and may have been corrupted by 
human malice; that it should be considered no crime to denigrate the mind, the true handwriting of 
God’s word, declaring it to be corrupt, blind and lost, whereas it is considered to be a heinous 




1.3. Overview and method 
 
After introducing the early modern theme of the quest for epistemological certainty 
and having given some historical and philosophical context to this endeavor in the 
first chapter, the second chapter aims to outline the foundation of Spinoza’s EIP. 
The main focus here is on the close association between the notions of essence and 
conceivability in his thought. I argue that the given adequate conceivability of 
God’s essence forms the crucial starting point for attaining epistemological surety 
in Spinoza. Descartes’s important contribution in developing a rationalist method is 
firstly discussed, the crux of which is his principle of simplicity as found in his 
early work, the Regulae. In a nutshell, his simplicity theory argues for the existence 
of fundamental features in the natural world, which are conceived to be 
ontologically and conceptually simple. This theory forms the basis for Descartes’s 
claim that such simple natures are necessarily adequately intuited by the human 
intellect. An important aspect of his theory is that the intellect contains adequate 
ideas of such simple natures innately. I argue further that Descartes’s philosophical 
method is based on the notion of knowing something on the basis of another, i.e. 
that that which is unknown is inferred or deduced from that which is given as 
known.  I contend in this work, that with regard to method, Spinoza follows 
Descartes quite closely. Hereafter, the attention then turns to Spinoza and I firstly 
establish if his EIP is plausible by considering his account of adequate ideas. 
Although Spinoza does claim that finite minds do have adequate ideas, it has been 
argued that his system does not allow for this. My finding is to the contrary, that 
his theory of adequate ideas is credible and his EIP as well. After this Spinoza’s 
use of the notion of essence in developing his own method is considered. Central to 
his method is the theory of adequate ideas in which he forges a very close tie 
between the notions of essence, cause and conceivability. I argue that, in Spinoza, 
if the essence of something involves existence, the method of knowing it will differ 
from something whose essence does not involve existence. This distinction 
underpins the basic approach in his method that God’s essence, which involves 
existence and is completely simple, can be adequately known through itself, 
whereas, the essences of modes can only be adequately conceived through their 




regard to God’s essence, commits Spinoza to the notion of essence monism, which 
underpins his EIP. The core idea in this regard is that God’s immanent essence or 
power is simple and is necessarily expressed in his attributes and infinite modes 
and in the essences and existence of all things and that this fundamental ontological 
reality forms the foundation for the adequate conceivability of our world. After a 
discussion of the adequate conception of modes, the chapter ends with some 
thoughts on the ethical intent of Spinoza’s work and how this ties in with his task 
of emending the intellect, which seems more like an epistemological project. The 
last matter attended to concerns the question why anyone should undertake 
Spinoza’s arduous task of emending our intellect? I argue that an essential trait of 
being human, for Spinoza, is to think and consequently that our happiness depends 
on the contentment of the mind, which can only follow from having adequate 
ideas. In Spinoza’s view our mind can only be put to rest by fully consenting to its 
true and certain ideas.   
      The third chapter follows on from this last subject and attempts to clarify why 
Spinoza gives preference to the mind, over the body, in his search for a foundation 
for human wellbeing. Spinoza associates the acquiescentia in se ipso very closely 
with self-determination, which for him is only possible when we live in accordance 
with reason. This tenet explains his encouragement to perfect our intellect as far as 
possible. I argue further, that this preference towards the mind has much to do with 
the advent of the mechanist theory of the natural world in the early modern period 
and its view of natural bodies as entities that are wholly externally determined. 
Spinoza views the intellect as self-determined or active insofar as it possesses 
adequate ideas of God’s essence, whereas the type of ideas associated with the 
body, i.e. sensory ideas, are seen to be passively received, incomplete and obscure. 
It is mainly for this reason, I claim, that Descartes and Spinoza turn to the intellect 
in their pursuit of certitude. The primary aim of this chapter is to clarify the early 
modern view, that the mind is seen to be mankind’s better part. I start by 
explaining Spinoza’s notion of the essence of thought. In Spinoza the essence of all 
ideas is to affirm their objects as far as possible. Whereas the mind’s full 
affirmation of a true idea produces a feeling of joy, the partial agreement between 




adequate ideas the mind’s consenting essence is unchecked, but in the case of 
partial sensory ideas the essence of the mind, i.e. its striving to affirm, is restricted, 
which leads to a feeling of discontent. This theory plays a crucial role in guiding 
our minds towards the adequate idea of God’s essence, which is the goal of 
Spinoza’s EIP. The nature of the intellect is considered next and I claim that 
Spinoza conceives the human intellect to be involved in God’s intellect and to 
contain the true idea of God. Seeing that there is a close association between 
adequate knowledge and joy, the reason for Spinoza turning to the intellect in 
search of self-contentment becomes clearer. In the second section of this chapter 
the nature of the body is discussed. Because Spinoza sees it to be beyond the reach 
of a finite mind to conceive the infinite chain of natural causes that determine the 
durational existence of bodies, adequate knowledge of this realm, is regarded as 
incomplete and contingent. In this the body is seen to be very different to the mind 
and gives the reason why the quest for certainty in Spinoza is associated with the 
adequate ideas of the intellect and that, by and large, he and other early modern 
rationalists turned their backs on sensory ideas in their pursuit of certitude.   
      Hereafter the attention turns mainly to Spinoza’s TdIE. In contrast to the more 
general style of the first three chapters, the text of the TdIE is now followed rather 
closely, to provide additional textual evidence for my explication of Spinoza’s 
method given thus far. The fourth chapter aims to uncover the main elements 
comprising Spinoza’s method. Because the subject of method in Spinoza's TdIE 
and Descartes’s Regulae seem to have much in common, I present the basic 
elements of their method in a comparative way. I emphasize however, that despite 
the apparent close affinity between these two great thinkers with regard to certain 
key elements, Spinoza’s own version of a rationalist method does depart from that 
of Descartes in important ways. The matter’s attended to here include the 
relationship between the intellect and certainty, the theory of simplicity, the use of 
deduction and other innate tools, such as axioms. In the final section of this 
chapter, the key role of definitions in Spinoza’s method is discussed. The chapter 
ends with a brief explication of the properties of the intellect. 
      Chapter five continues the theme that Spinoza’s EIP is closely related to the 




search for the best kind of knowledge for its purpose, which is the main subject of 
this chapter. I claim that the attainment of the highest form of knowledge in 
Spinoza, i.e. intuition or knowledge of the third kind represents the very pinnacle 
of certitude in knowledge. The chapter starts off with a discussion of Spinoza’s 
historiola mentis as found in the TdIE, i.e. the survey of knowledge types. The 
main body of this chapter however focuses on the development of Spinoza’s theory 
of knowledge, especially that of adequate knowledge. Whereas Spinoza’s theory of 
inadequate knowledge, as found in the early TdIE, stayed much the same, I argue 
that his theory of adequate knowledge evolved quite a bit in his later thinking. I 
suggest that the supposed development in his theory of adequate knowledge is that 
he conceives two actions of the intellect, namely reason and intuition, which have 
each their own role to play but are also seen to work together to reach the highest 
level of certainty. Whereas reason’s role is to guide us towards that which is best 
for us, it seems that reason on its own, is not able to lead us to our highest good, i.e. 
our intellectual perfection. I argue that Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge of the third 
kind unites us with our highest good, i.e. the most perfect idea of God in us. 
Whereas reason demonstrates this highest truth adequately, it is only by intuition 
that we experience it to be certainly true. This intuitive insight leads to the highest 
level of knowledge, which Spinoza describes in terms of love, the amor Dei 
intellectualis. I argue that Spinoza’s notion of self-contentment is closely 
associated with the discovery of intuitive knowledge of God. The chapter ends with 
a brief discussion of the different roles that reason and intuition play in our struggle 
against the passions, which is an important aspect of the EIP.  
      The amor Dei intellectualis is closely associated with Spinoza’s rather 
problematic theory of the eternity of the mind, which is the subject of the sixth 
chapter. I argue that the successful completion of Spinoza’s EIP depends on 
discovering certainty with regard to the eternal nature of the intellect. I contend that 
the theory of the mind’s eternity is an indispensible element of Spinoza’s search for 
certitude and that it serves mainly this purpose in his philosophy. In my view, 
Spinoza conceives the human intellect, which is a part of human mind, to be eternal 
by virtue of it being involved in and part of God’s eternal and infinite intellect. In 




some notion of personal immortality, but serves mainly to support his project of 
attaining epistemological certainty. The highest form of certitude for Spinoza is to 
know with certainty that the human intellect is part of God’s intellect and is 
therefore continuously dependent on God’s concurring thinking force. This insight 
guarantees that our adequate ideas are certainly true. Some concluding remarks are 
found in chapter seven. 
      With regard to method, the most important element has been the continuous 
reading of Spinoza’s works. In practice, this has amounted to a continuous 
revisiting of his texts over some years and also much meditating on them. Although 
Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is my main focus, I have tried 
to also read, in depth, as many of his other works as possible, such as the Short 
Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, the Ethics, most of his Theological 
Political Treatise and the first two chapters of the Political Treatise. Spinoza’s 
correspondence has also been very important and helpful. When faced with 
interpretational difficulties, which often happens with Spinoza, I have found 
inspiration to continue, from the texts themselves and most of my questions have 
been answered in this way. An important element in my approach stems from the 
method that Spinoza himself develops. He explains this method in the TTP in the 
chapter on the interpretation of Scripture. His method is to firstly ascertain that 
which is universal and forms the basis of all the teachings of Scripture. He argues 
that such doctrines are so clearly taught everywhere in Scripture that no one has 
ever been in doubt as to their meaning. After having acquired a proper 
understanding of the universal doctrine, we can proceed to other matters, which are 
perhaps of less importance. With regard to anything ambiguous or obscure, such 
things must be explained in the light of the universal doctrine (TTP7 S: 460). I 
have found Spinoza’s method to be very useful when confronted with 
interpretational challenges. I have then tried to understand the apparent difficulty in 
the light and guidance of Spinoza’s most important and fundamental doctrine, that 
of substance monism.  I have of course always been abundantly aware of my own 
limitations and have constantly turned to many secondary works on early-modern 
philosophy, Spinoza, Descartes and others. I have mainly focused on the Anglo-




discussed my work with my supervisors, colleagues, associates and friends as 
much as has been possible. One of the challenges has been that the subject of my 
dissertation, i.e. Spinoza’s concept of emending the intellect, has, as such, received 
very little attention in secondary literature. Certain elements of this subject have at 
least been attended to by other scholars, such as the early-modern theory of ideas 
and the theory of essence, and others. This has been helpful. Another important 
aspect in my methodology has been to pay attention to the relevant historic and 
philosophical context of Spinoza’s work. Although philosophy is sometimes 
thought to be more of a theoretical endeavor, I have found that acquiring some 
understanding of the historical background that philosophers worked and lived in 
to be rather helpful in understanding their writings.  I have tried, where relevant, to 
supply such information. As suggested, another extremely important and helpful 
aspect regarding contextualization has been the study of other relevant early 











2. Certainty and Essence 
 
Although the rationalist and empiricist philosophers of the early modern period shared 
some commitments and goals, they differed decisively in basic approach and 
method.
20
 For Spinoza, empiricism as a scientific theory seems to have made little 
sense. In his view scientific knowledge amounted to having certitude, which depends 
on the mind having adequate ideas on which a body of certain knowledge can be 




If anyone, in arguing for or against a proposition which is not self-evident, 
seeks to persuade others to accept his view, he must prove his point from 
premises that are granted, and he must convince his audience on empirical 
grounds or by force of reason; that is, either from what sense-perception tells 
them occurs in Nature, or through self-evident intellectual axioms. Now unless 
experience is such as to be clearly and distinctly understood, it cannot have so 
decisive an effect on a man’s understanding and dispel the mists of doubt as 
when the desired conclusion is deduced solely from intellectual axioms, that is, 
                                                        
20
 A good illustration of the basic difference in approach is found in the controversial exchange 
between the empiricist Boyle and the rationalist Spinoza. Boyle considered the way of experimentation 
as the only reliable basis for knowledge and did not agree with the high regard that Spinoza and others 
had for human reason. Boyle’s aim was to construct, on the basis of purely experimental work, a 
mechanistic type universe, but one lacking inherent creative drive and accommodating, to a certain 
extent, the possibility of the supernatural transcending the laws of nature and allowing for the 
possibility of miracles and divine providence. He was the chief inspirer of the argument from design, 
which was quite popular amongst the more moderate appliers of human reason (Israel 2002: 253). For 
Spinoza, however, experiments can illustrate but never conclusively prove any general proposition. For 
example, no experiment can prove that there are no ghosts or devils or that there are no miracles in 
nature. Nor could an experiment produce knowledge of essences or the theory of substance monism. 
As Israel says: ‘Yet in Spinoza’s view, all these ‘truths’ can be demonstrated by means of 
philosophical reason and must be acknowledged if we wish to attain truth and the highest degree of 
human perfection’ (ibid.: 255).   
21
 Although the development of a rationalist method of knowing the essence of things was his main 
goal, Spinoza was not dismissive of empirical research. It is notable that he rates experimental research 
highly and sees the latter as essential for bringing his whole philosophical project to a conclusion. I 
argue later that experiential knowledge of the body is actually crucial for his EIP. We read in the 
TdIE§103: ‘Before we embark upon an enquiry into our knowledge of particular things, it will be 
timely for us to treat of those aids, all of which will serve to assist us in knowing how to use our senses 
and to conduct experiments under fixed rules and proper arrangement, such as will suffice to determine 
the thing which is the object of our enquiry. From these we may finally infer what are the laws of 
eternal things that govern the things production, and may gain an insight into its inmost nature, as I 
shall duly show.’ Sadly, Spinoza did not get round to completing the final part of his project. He did 
however actively participate in the activities of natural scientists in his time and was himself a keen 
experimenter. For more on Spinoza’s interest and activity in experimental research see Israel (2002: 




from the mere force of the intellect and its orderly apprehensions. (TTP5 S: 
441.)  
 
In this chapter I outline the rationalist method developed and employed by Descartes 
and Spinoza in their search for truth and certainty. The overriding aim here is to 
clarify the very close correlation between the notions of essence and adequate ideas in 
their thought on method. An important task is also to introduce and explain the notion 
of essence monism in Spinoza’s thought and to clarify its vital role in his philosophy 
and especially in his EIP. The relation between the EIP as a seemingly 
epistemological undertaking and the ethical intention of Spinoza’s overall work will 
also be attended to.  
 
2.1. Descartes and his Regulae22 
 
The most important figure, without doubt, leading the emerging early modern 
rationalist movement and developing its inventive method was Descartes.
23
 Certain 
elements of his method play an indispensible role in Spinoza’s development of his 
own version of a rationalist method. In the following I will briefly introduce the most 




      In line with the pursuit of certainty mentioned earlier, Descartes’s method is 
aimed at producing scientific knowledge (scientia) of nature by clearly and distinctly 
conceiving its fundamental aspects or principles. In short, his method is based on 
knowing something on the basis of another. The basic idea is that that which is 
                                                        
22
 I assume only a general understanding of Descartes’s philosophy based mainly on his early Rules for 
the Direction of the Mind or the Regulae, where he first develops his method.   
23
 ‘Indeed, it does not seem too much of an exaggeration to say, paraphrasing Whitehead, that early 
modern philosophy consists largely of footnotes to Descartes’ (Carriero 2009: 1).  
24
 Descartes’s general influence on Spinoza’s philosophy is beyond doubt, although the extent to which 
this is the case is often debated. The most likely source of Spinoza’s Cartesianism is the circle of Dutch 
Cartesians that he became associated with after his excommunication from his Jewish community. This 
association with the Dutch Cartesian coterie lasted for many years and included private tutoring by the 
radical Dutch thinker, Franciscus Van den Enden (1602-74), his private circle of Cartesian minded 
friends and also his exposure to Cartesian academics at the University of Leiden. Spinoza’s Platonist 
traits can also be attributed to the mentioned university, whose academics exhibited some quite strong 
Platonist-Augustinian traits during the time he attended lectures there (Van Ruler 2008: 166-68). In this 
regard see also Klever (1996: 13-60) and Nadler (1999: 102-115). In the view of Steenbakkers: ‘For an 
understanding of Spinoza’s notion of method, we must take into account the crucial Cartesian 




unknown is inferred and concluded from what is clearly and distinctly known or given 
as known. Descartes strongly promoted the theory regarding the human intellect’s 
ability to directly intuit the common features of things with certainty.
25
 He thought the 
human intellect was naturally able to form clear and distinct ideas of the simple 
natures of things (which will be discussed shortly), of which all natural things are 
composed. Now for Descartes, to know something to the highest degree of certainty, 
for human beings, is to clearly understand how such simple natures contribute to the 
basic composition of all things (CSM I: 49). In Descartes’s view, it is to such simple 
natures that the mind relates when it knows things clearly and distinctly and with 
complete certainty. The ideas of such homogenous natures were termed simple ideas 
and were seen to be self-evident, seemingly even to the most basic mind (ibid.: 45). 
Descartes’s commitment to the natural ability of the human intellect to have adequate 




If someone sets himself the problem of investigating every truth for the 
knowledge of which human reason is adequate – and this, I think, is something 
everyone who earnestly strives after good sense should do once in his life – he 
will indeed discover by means of the Rules we have proposed that nothing can 
be known prior to the intellect, since knowledge of everything else depends on 
the intellect, and not vice versa. (CSM I: 30.)  
 
Descartes introduces the secret of his method in Rule 6. His ‘main secret’ is that 
‘some things can be known on the basis of others’ and   the aim of this method is ‘not 
to inspect the isolated natures of things, but to compare them with each other so that 
some can be known on the basis of others’ (ibid.: 21).
 
 According to Rule 12 his 
method consist of two basic elements. The first is to discover ‘what presents itself to 
                                                        
25
 It was mainly this claim of certainty that alarmed many theologians in Descartes’s time. The main 
difficulty stemmed from the claim to be certain of our true ideas. In early modern times, most 
theologians and the Church believed that philosophical reason could never attain certainty in fallen 
man. Reason was seen by them to be valuable for processing data produced by the senses or ideas 
received by revelation. As seen earlier, philosophy was regarded as the handmaiden of theology and 
unable to produce its own true and ideas (Verbeek 2002: 172). Descartes suggested the solution of a 
separation between theology and philosophy. Spinoza did not follow this route and thought all 
knowledge to be about ideas. He saw no reason why a particular class of ideas, such as religious ideas, 
should be treated differently. For him all ideas should be subject to the scrutiny of philosophical 
reason.   
26
 It is highly probable that a copy of this early work was available in the Netherlands during Spinoza’s 
time, although it was only officially published after the death of Spinoza. See Nadler (2006: 181), who 




us spontaneously?’ and the second is to determine ‘how can one thing be known on 
the basis of something else?’ (ibid.: 39). The first element involves intuiting clear and 
distinct ideas of the simple natures. The second refers to the process of deduction, by 
which true ideas of other things are inferred from the given simple ones.
27
 Descartes 
refers to this basic method in his later and more mature work, the Principles of 
Philosophy:  
 
First of all, I would have wished to explain what philosophy is, beginning with 
the most commonplace points.  For example, the word ‘philosophy’ means the 
study of wisdom, and by ‘wisdom’ is meant not only prudence in our everyday 
affairs but also a perfect knowledge of all things that mankind is capable of 
knowing, both for the conduct of life and for the preservation of health and the 
discovery of all manner of skills. In order for this kind of knowledge to be 
perfect it must be deduced from first causes; thus, in order to set about 
acquiring it – and it is this activity to which the term ‘to philosophize’ strictly 
refers – we must start with the search for first causes or principles. These 
principles must satisfy two conditions.  First, they must be so clear and so 
evident that the human mind cannot doubt their truth when it attentively 
concentrates on them; and, secondly, the knowledge of other things must 
depend on them, in the sense that the principles must be capable of being 
known without knowledge of these other matters, but not vice versa. Next, in 
deducing from these principles the knowledge of things which depend on them, 
we must try to ensure that everything in the entire chain of deductions which we 
draw is very manifest.  (CSM I: 179-180.)   
 
To reiterate, Descartes’s method of knowing one thing on the basis of another, 
involves the direct intuition of certain simple natures, which are common to all things 
and clearly and distinctly known to the intellect. These given true ideas are the 
indubitable inception points from which true ideas of the universal principles 
comprising all other things can be deduced. This basic method forms the basis on 
                                                        
27
 See Dear (1998: 158) for a good discussion of philosophical method in seventeenth-century thinking. 
He describes Descartes’s method as essentialist and an example of the early modern rationalist vision 
of the deductive inter - connection of all knowledge, based on the theory of simple natures. In his view, 
the rationalist endeavor was to ‘encompass the essences of things with certainty’, whereas the 
empiricists eschewed essentialism and largely abandoned method and certainty in favor of a program 




which a body of scientific knowledge can be built. I contend that Spinoza employs a 
similar version of this basic Cartesian method
28
 in his own work and that his TdIE is 
specifically tasked with its development.
 
   
      In summary, the starting point for the rationalist method developed by Descartes 
and Spinoza, is the conviction that things are in reality as they are contained in our 
ideas.
 
In their view the human intellect 
 
is endowed with true ideas of the universal 
features of the natural world and that we can know with certainty that such features 
exist in reality. Moreover, they were convinced that from these basic true ideas first 
principles (Descartes) or definitions (Spinoza) can be produced, from which other true 
ideas of the essences of all other things can be inferred. Of crucial importance is their 
claim to have attained certainty with regard to their true ideas, which is indeed a 
radical view to have adhered to, especially in early modern times.
 
As mentioned, this 
rationalist approach is in contrast to the prevailing Aristotelian-scholastic view that 
the human mind is more passive or receptive and almost entirely dependent on sense 
perception for knowledge of the natural world. The epistemological focus in the 
empiricist tradition is based on producing abstract and general knowledge of the 
world (Carriero 2009: 3). The empiricists did not think it possible for the mind to 
know nature as it is in itself and to have complete sureness of its ideas.  
 
2.2. Adequate ideas, simplicity and essence monism 
 
It is important, at the start of this work, to attend to Spinoza’s theory of adequate 
ideas, to establish if it is indeed possible for us to have true ideas at all. Although 
Spinoza states that a finite human mind does have adequate ideas,
29
 important 
questions have been raised in scholarship suggesting that his system does not allow 
for this.
30
 It needs then to be clarified what kind of ideas are adequate for Spinoza and 
to ascertain if a finite mind can indeed possess them. If Spinoza’s account of adequate 
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 See Steenbakkers (2009: 42-53) where he argues that Spinoza’s basic method employs these two 
Cartesian elements and that the methods of Descartes and Spinoza seems to be modeled on the classical 
geometrical method of Euclid (c.a. 300 B.C.E), in which propositions are derived from a few starting 
axioms and definitions. 
29
 In the TdIE§33 Spinoza says (emphasis added): ‘A true idea (for we do have a true idea) is 
something different from its object (ideatum)’. In the Ethics we read: ‘The human mind has an 
adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God’ (2p47).  
30
 Della Rocca (2003: 205) states that it is a problem to see how a finite mind can acquire adequate 




ideas is found to be implausible or inconsistent, his EIP seems doomed to failure from 
the outset.  
      One of the arguments leveled against Spinoza’s claim to have adequate ideas, has 
to do with his stipulation that the ‘knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, 
the knowledge of the cause’ (1ax4). For Spinoza, the certain manner in which a 
particular thing exists is brought about by an infinite chain of preceding finite natural 
causes and seeing that it seems impossible for a finite mind to possess a complete idea 
of such an infinite causal chain, it is argued that his requirement for adequacy cannot 
be met. This outcome, however, is not crippling for Spinoza’s EIP. I argue that 
Spinoza’s pursuit of certainty does not include adequate knowledge of the durational 
existence of finite things, but is primarily aimed at acquiring adequate knowledge of 
the essence of things. I argue that Descartes and Spinoza thought it possible to have 
certitude with regard to the essence of things, but to only have partial knowledge of 
the realm of durational natural phenomena.
31 
The fact that they did not have adequate 
knowledge of both the essence and the durational existence of things did not lessen 
their claim to possess scientific knowledge of the world. For Descartes and Spinoza, 
adequate knowledge of the essence
 
of things amounts to scientia.
32
 It is of more 
importance, for my task, to establish if Spinoza’s theory pertaining to adequate 
knowledge of God’s essence is feasible. In Spinoza’s method the attainment of 
adequate ideas of the essence of things depends crucially on a finite mind being able 
to know God’s essence adequately.      
      Spinoza’s requirement for having adequate ideas has two aspects to it. Firstly, for 
an idea to be adequate in our mind, it must be contained in its entirety in our mind 
(TdIE§73) and secondly, our mind must also possess an adequate idea of the cause of 
this idea (1ax4). As mentioned above these requirements are deemed nigh impossible 
to meet with regard to knowing an existing finite thing adequately. For my purpose, 
the more important question is if a finite mind is able to have an adequate idea of 
God’s essence, i.e. to contain the idea of God’s essence in its entirety and to have 
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 McCracken (1998: 815-818), correctly in my view, emphasizes this point: ‘Note that it is the essence 
of things, including the human mind, that Spinoza here said we could come to know adequately from a 
consideration of God’s attributes, for he did not undertake to deduce the existence of the human mind, 
or indeed of any specific thing from God’s nature alone.’      
32
 A good example of this view is found in Spinoza’s Political Treatise. There he writes (my 
emphasis): ‘Any natural thing can be adequately conceived, whether it actually exists or not. 
Therefore, just as the coming into existence of natural things cannot be concluded from their definition, 
so neither can their perseverance in existing; for their essence in the form of idea is the same after they 




adequate knowledge of its cause.    
      It seems clear that for Spinoza we can, at least, have adequate ideas of the 
common notions: 
 
Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men. For 
(by Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain aspects, which must be (preceding Pr.) 
conceived by all adequately, or clearly and distinctly. (2p38cor.)  
 
In Spinoza, common ideas or notions are ideas of certain properties of things that are 
found universally. Examples of such properties are that all bodies ‘may move at 
varying speeds and may be absolutely in motion or absolutely at rest’ 
(2p13lem2dem). Such properties of motion and rest, and that all bodies are capable of 
being in motion and rest, are common to all bodies and our ideas of them are common 
notions. For Marshall (2008: 62-66) the common notions mentioned above are basic 
principles that play a fundamental role in Spinoza’s physics.
33
 Marshall argues that 
Spinoza’s common notions should be understood to be of properties or characteristics 
that follow directly from a divine attribute. Motion and rest in matter is an immediate 
infinite mode that follows immediately from the attribute of extension. Being a 
universal law of physics the capacity for motion and rest will necessarily be involved 
in every mode of extension, i.e. in every part and in every affection of bodies. From 
this it follows, that this common notion will also be involved in every idea of those 
parts and affections. The result is that, since the common property is completely 
present in each mode of extension, the common notion is also completely present in 
every idea of natural bodies and in the parts and affections of natural bodies and, 
consequently, is necessarily contained in its entirety in the human mind and its ideas 
of natural bodies and their affections. However, for a common notion to be an 
adequate idea, the causal requirement for adequacy in ideas must also be met. Seeing 
that an immediate infinite mode is caused by or follows from the attribute of 
extension, Spinoza’s system stipulates that it must be conceived through the idea of 
its divine attribute. For the mind to do this, it must have an adequate idea of God’s 
essence, which idea we do have: 
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 For Curley (1988: 45-6), common notions are of the immediate infinite modes and those pertaining 




The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the 
essence and the existence of the thing (2p8cor). But particular things cannot be 
or be conceived without God (1p15). Now since they have God for their cause 
(2p6), insofar as he is considered under that attribute of which the things 
themselves are modes, their ideas (lax4) must necessarily involve the 
conception of their attribute; that is (1def6), the eternal and infinite essence of 
God. (2p45dem.) 
 
Spinoza’s argument in this demonstration employs the demand that in order for us to 
form an idea of something it must be formed under a certain attribute. For example, 
when we conceive something mental the idea of the attribute of thought is necessarily 
involved. The same applies when conceiving something of a bodily nature, i.e. we 
cannot form an idea about a body without using the basic idea of extension. Now, for 
Spinoza, having true ideas of God’s attributes amounts to having a true idea of God’s 
eternal and infinite essence. As with the common notions, the ideas of the attributes 
are simple and equal in the part as in the whole
34
and are therefore possessed by the 
intellect in their entirety. As I understand it, for Spinoza, our intellect is constituted by 
such adequate ideas of the attributes and of the common properties pertaining to 
bodies and minds. Moreover, because God’s essence involves existence, he is self-
caused and having an adequate idea of God’s essence is then to also have an adequate 
idea of his cause. Therefore, in having any idea whatsoever, the human intellect 
necessarily has both an idea of God’s essence and of the cause of God. To reiterate, 
when we form ideas, the adequate ideas of the attributes and the common notions 
following from the former must be employed. For example, in forming a sensory idea 
of a soccer ball, it must be conceived under the attribute of extension and we must 
also employ the common notions of size and shape, motion and rest as well as the 
idea that it has the capacity of being in motion and at rest.  
      It is apparent that the principle of simplicity, i.e. the notion of something being 
equal in the part as in the whole plays an important role in the above argumentation 
and this needs further clarification.  The notion of simplicity holds that if the nature of 
something is completely simple, it is homogenous and cannot be divided into parts 
and is therefore incorruptible and eternal. I think it not contentious to claim that 
                                                        
34




Descartes and Spinoza attribute simplicity to God’s essence (CM2/5; Ep12; Ep35).
35
 
Now if something is conceptually simple, one cannot grasp it in part. Something 
simple is either understood completely, that is adequately, or not at all.
36
 Even if we 
do have only a partial idea of something simple, it will necessarily be adequate, 
seeing that its nature is equal in the part as in the whole. Now what does the simple 
idea of God amount to in Spinoza? According to 1p34, God’s power is his very 
essence and I argue that this divine power is conceived to be both ontologically and 
conceptually simple.
 
The attributes express God’s power in a certain way, but all 
attributes necessarily express the simplicity of God’s essence, albeit in a certain basic 
way. I argue that it is the simplicity of God’s power, which secures the simplicity of 
the attributes and that this ensures their adequate conceivability. The simplicity 
principle seems to also follow through to the immediate infinite modes, which 
Spinoza describes as being equal in the part as in the whole (2p38cor). For Marshall, 
the common notions have to do with the immediate infinite modes and should be seen 
to also have simple natures, although they are dependent on their attributes (2008: 
70). Seeing that Spinoza’s system stipulates that particular things must be conceived 
by employing the true ideas of the attributes and the common notions, all particular 
things can therefore be adequately conceived. However, I argue later that such a 
conception of particular things conceives only their essence adequately, i.e. that 
which is common to all things and not the particular natures of such things pertaining 
to their durational existence.  
      Furthermore, for Spinoza the intellect knows with certainty that things are in 
reality as they are contained in the intellect in the form of thought (TdIE§108). 
Therefore the intellect has certainty that its adequate idea of God’s very essence 
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 As mentioned earlier, the notion of simple natures and ideas, is used by Descartes in his Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind (CSM I: 43-46). He also refers to such simple natures as true and immutable 
natures (ibid.: 198). Spinoza, in my view, follows Descartes’s theory quite closely in this, as is 
apparent in his TdIE, which will be discussed in chapter four.   
36
 In my view, the notion of simplicity grounds Spinoza’s theory of a true idea, i.e. that it agrees 
completely with that of which it is an idea (1ax6). Spinoza seems to follow Descartes in this regard. In 
the synopsis to the Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes says ‘that everything that we clearly and 
distinctly understand is true in a way which corresponds exactly to our understanding of it’ (DSPW: 
73).  In my view, the true ideas of God’s essence have a priority in Spinoza’s epistemology and are 
used to form the absolute starting points for his system. For a different view see, Steinberg (2009: 155-
160) who argues that Spinoza employs a holistic notion of adequacy in his epistemology in which 
‘there are no ideas or bits of knowledge that are certain or justified independent of, or prior to, the 
justification of other, and from which the certainty or justification of all others is derived’. For Nadler 
Spinoza’s idea of truth ‘clearly amounts to a correspondence theory of truth’ (2006: 161). For Curley 





correlates to an eternal and infinite power, which actually exists in reality. If this were 
not the case, we would have no surety of a real ontological basis for the universal 
laws and principles in nature and, consequently, there would be no real basis for our 
ideas of such fundamental things.
37
 In my view, Spinoza’s EIP is grounded in God’s 
very essence or power, which is conceived to be completely simple in nature. The 
simple idea of God’s essence provides the basis for the mind being able to possess 
adequate ideas of the essence of all things and to know with certainty that such ideas 
are not fictitious.
 
 The adequate idea of God’s eternal and infinite essence, i.e. his 
power is necessarily involved in all our ideas (2p46):  
 
Therefore, that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God is common to all things, and equally in the part as in the whole. And so 
this knowledge will be adequate (2p38). (2p46dem.)   
 
Seeing that the intellect knows with certainty that things are in reality as they are 
contained in its adequate ideas (TdIE§108), God’s eternal and infinite power is 
therefore known with certainty to be necessarily involved in the existence of all 
things, even in those finite things that have only a durational existence. In Spinoza, 
God’s eternal and infinite power is the inmost reality or essence in our universe, 
without which nothing can be or be conceived. This is the focal point of the notion of 
essence monism in Spinoza, which I argue for. The above explication of Spinoza’s 
theory of adequacy forms the basis for much of the argumentation in this work and 
the gist of it will be used again whenever relevant.
38
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 The real existence of simple natures is a crucial point in the early modern theory of ideas. For 
Descartes and Spinoza their existence is not discernible to the senses, but only to the intellect. Such 
simple natures do not exist durationally, in the same way as particular things, although they are not 
nothing, nor are they mere entities of reason. The early rationalist tenet states that whatever is true is 
something. For Spinoza, the intellect ‘involves certainty; that is, it knows that things are in reality as 
they are contained in the intellect in the form of thought’ (TdIE§108). The importance of this 
conviction for Spinoza’s whole rationalist philosophical endeavor cannot be overstated.  
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 I am indebted to the fine account that Marshall (2008) gives of this matter and for the key elements 




2.3. Self-evidence and certainty 
 
A very important and interesting early rationalist conviction is that our true ideas are 
known self-evidently, that is, through themselves and without reference to other ideas 
(TdIE§70). For Spinoza, our adequate ideas, such as the ideas of God’s attributes 
cannot be derived from other ideas, but must be known independently and directly, 
i.e. through themselves. Other true ideas are seen to be contained in these 
foundational ideas and can be inferred from them. For example, the idea of infinite 
extension is formed independently, whereas the idea of infinite motion in matter is 
seen to be contained in the former and to follow from it (TdIE§108). The idea of what 
constitutes the natures of finite bodies, i.e. that all bodies are a certain ratio of motion 
and rest, can be seen to follow from the idea of infinite motion. All possible ratios or 
speeds of motion are seemingly contained in the idea of infinite motion itself.
39
    
      A crucial further question is how the intellect can have certainty of its adequate 
ideas. Descartes and Spinoza seem to think that we are not always conscious of our 
adequate ideas. Furthermore, how does the intellect distinguish between its adequate 
and inadequate ideas? This is important, seeing that their rationalist theory of ideas 
seems to demand that a true idea should be known and certified through itself and that 
no additional outer verification is needed or could be added to this intellectual 
validation (TdIE§36). The answer seems to be that our primary adequate ideas carry 
their clarity and distinctness on their sleeve, so to speak and cannot be reduced to 
more basic ideas. Recall, according to Descartes and Spinoza, a simple idea is 
regarded to be completely homogenous and even the slightest grasp of it will be 
adequate. As said, both Descartes and Spinoza admit that we are not always fully 
aware or conscious of our true ideas, hence the need for the emendation of the 
intellect. An important element in attaining certainty is that true ideas seem to have 
more reality than other ideas and impress this on the mind more than inadequate ones. 
For Spinoza our partial sensory ideas, being not clear and distinct, check or impede 
the mind and this leads to a feeling of restriction or pain. In the case of true ideas, the 
mind affirms or gives its full consent to them, without any restriction and this 
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 Descartes thought about this in much the same way. In Rule 12 of the Regulae he writes about the 
necessary conjunction between simple ideas and writes that ‘shape is conjoined with extension, motion 
with duration or time, etc., because we cannot conceive of a shape which is completely lacking in 
extension, or a motion wholly lacking in duration. Similarly, if I say that 4 and 3 make 7, the 
composition is a necessary one, for we do not have a distinct conception of the number 7 unless we in a 




produces a completely different feeling of intellectual joy, which seems to facilitate 
certainty.
 
 The fact that there is complete agreement between the idea and its object or 
ideatum in true ideas produces a certain feeling, which assists in our becoming certain 
of them.
40
 As discussed above, in early rationalism, ideas are seen to have a reality of 
their own and to exist in the mind (TdIE§33,108). Spinoza attends to the subject of 
certainty in his Short Treatise, which is worth quoting:    
 
Now the reason why the one is more conscious of his truth than the other is, 
because the Idea of (his) affirmation (or denial) entirely agrees with the nature 
of the thing, and consequently has more essence. 
 
Now when someone, in consequence of the whole object having acted upon 
him, receives corresponding forms or modes of thought, then it is clear that he 
receives a totally different feeling of the form or character of the object than 
does another who has not so many causes (acting upon him), and is therefore 
moved to make an affirmation or denial about that thing by a different and 
slighter action (because he becomes aware of it only through a few, or the less 
important, of its attributes). From this, then, we see the perfection of one who 
takes his stand upon Truth, as contrasted with one who does not take his stand 
upon it. Since the one changes easily, while the other does not change easily, it 





It is this theory of the ability of the intellect to attain certainty of its true ideas that 
gave Descartes and Spinoza the confidence to claim that the essence of the world is 
within our cognitive grasp. By using our given primary true ideas in combination with 
some equally true basic axioms, they thought that certain basic principles or 
definitions could be established which could ground other true ideas and that the 
essence of our existence could so-doing become certainly known to us.   
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 This important subject will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five, when Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge will be attended to.  
41




2.4. Essence in Spinoza 
 
The notion of essence
 
occupies a central place in Spinoza’s overall thought and 
certain aspects of his theory of essence are important in this work. However, 
Spinoza’s use of the term essence in his various writings is very rich and it is quite a 
challenge to understand and to do justice to the many ways in which it is used. In my 
view, there are at least four different ways in which Spinoza employs the notion of 
essence in his philosophy. There is an ontological, a psychological-behavioral, an 
epistemological and a moral use of the term essence. Firstly, Spinoza uses the notion 
of essence to explain the basic nature of existence, to indicate what fundamentally 
different kinds of things exist in the world. In his ontology there are basically two 
kinds of things that exist, substance or God and modes. Now this distinction follows 
from their respective essences being quite different from one another. Whereas God’s 
essence involves existence, in the case of modes, it does not (1ax7; 1p24). Secondly, 
in his philosophy of action, regarding how things act or behave, he also utilizes the 
notion of essence. For Spinoza, the conatus of all things is the striving to persist in 
their being, which he refers to as the actual essence of all things. Thirdly, as indicated 
already, the notion of essence plays an important role in his theory of knowledge. His 
project of attaining certainty in knowledge depends crucially on the mind having 
adequate ideas of God’s essence. Spinoza’s fourth use of the notion of essence, 
related to morality, has to do with his theory of our highest good, or perfection. In this 
regard, the notion of essence is sometimes used to indicate the best way in which we 
can achieve our summum bonum, which in Spinoza, is linked to self-determination. In 
early modern rationalist thinking, human agency is often closely associated with the 
mind insofar as it has adequate ideas. My main concern, in attending to Spinoza’s 
theory of emending the intellect, is to explicate the role that the notion of essence 
plays in Spinoza’s method of attaining true and certain knowledge. My focus will 
therefore almost exclusively fall on Spinoza’s idea of God’s essence and its role in 
acquiring adequate knowledge of the essence of all things.
42
 I understand Spinoza’s 
idea of God’s eternal and infinite essence to refer to the foundational principles or 
laws found in nature, which determine, in a fundamental way what things are and how 
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 To avoid confusion, when using the term essence in this work I refer in the main to God’s eternal 
and infinite essence. I will mostly use the term nature when referring to Spinoza’s other uses of the 




they act. The critical role that God’s essence plays in Spinoza to enable a finite human 
mind to have adequate ideas of such basic things will also be investigated.    
      With regard to the use of the notion of essence in his theory of knowledge, 
Spinoza forges an extremely important and close tie between the ideas of essence, 
cause and conceivability. As mentioned, one of the most important axioms in his 
epistemological method is that ‘the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, 
the knowledge of the cause’ (1ax4). Now if something is self-caused, then its essence 
involves existence and the method of knowing it will differ from something that is not 
self-caused and whose essence does not involve existence. The following passage is a 
good example of this stipulation in his method: 
 
As to the first point, our ultimate aim, as we have already said, requires that a 
thing be conceived either through its essence alone or through its proximate 
cause. That is, if the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, self caused, then 
it will have to be understood solely through its essence; if the thing is not in 
itself and needs a cause for its existence, then it must be understood through its 
proximate cause. For in fact knowledge of the effect is nothing other than to 




The two basic elements in his method in the above citation recur later as two 
foundational definitions in part one of the Ethics: 
 
By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that 
is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing 
from which it is to be formed. (1def3.) 
 
By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something 
else and is conceived through something else. (1def5.)  
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 See also TdIE§19, where the definition of the most perfect knowledge is given. Spinoza writes: 
‘Finally there is the perception we have when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or through 
knowledge of its proximate cause.’ Another good example is found in 4pref: ‘For nothing belongs to 
the nature of anything except that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause; 
and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause must necessarily be so’ (S: 




Note the demand in the above citations, that if something is self-caused and self-
conceived, it is to be known through its essence alone, or solely through its essence. 
However, something that is not in itself and conceived through itself cannot be 
adequately known through itself, i.e. through its own essence and must therefore be 
known through its cause.
44
 This method of conceiving things adequately 
acknowledges a fundamental distinction in Spinoza’s ontology between the essence of 
God and that of modes. In Spinoza, God’s essence is understood to involve existence 
whereas the essences of modes do not involve existence (1ax7; 1p24). Another way in 
which Spinoza formulates this important distinction is that God’s essence cannot be 
distinguished from his existence. He actually goes so far as to say that God’s 
existence and his essence are one and the same (1p20). However, in the case of 
modes, essence and existence should be distinguished from one another (CM1/2; 
CM2/1). Spinoza conceives God to be a completely self-subsisting being, whereas 
modes are understood to be wholly dependent things, totally reliant on God for both 
their essence and their existence.
 
This strong ontological distinction between God’s 
essence and that of modes forms the basis for Spinoza’s method of conceiving things 
adequately. God’s essence is conceived through itself and the essences of modes are 
conceived through something else that is conceived through itself, namely God. The 
aim here is to bring attention to how closely the notions of cause, essence and 
conceivability work together in Spinoza’s method. Spinoza’s method establishes the 
adequate ideas of God’s essence as the basis for adequately conceiving all things. The 
important and fundamental role that the notion of essence plays in Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge is that the adequate idea of God’s essence forms the foundational source 
for all true and certain knowledge. In Spinoza, adequate knowledge of the essences of 
modes is possible for us, because of their adequate conception being contained in and 
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 I understand proximate cause here to refer to God as the efficient cause of the essences and existence 




2.4.1. Substance and essence monism    
 
Of primary importance in Spinoza’s philosophical system is his famous doctrine of 
substance monism.
45
 This theory argues for the existence of a single self-subsisting 
substance that is the sole cause of its own essence and existence and that of all things. 
For Spinoza, substance or God is a ‘… Being existing through its own sufficiency or 
force’ (Ep36 S: 857). I argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of substance monism includes 
the notion of essence monism, which claims that the only substance or God has its 
own unique essence, to which all the so-called divine properties of eternity, infinity, 
simplicity, immutability and indivisibility are necessarily assigned. For Spinoza: 
 
… Substance is not manifold; rather there exists only one Substance of the 
same    nature. (Ep12 S: 788.) 
 
Spinoza conceives the essence of God as involving necessary existence:  
 
Substance cannot be produced by anything else (1p6cor) and is therefore self-
caused (causa sui); that is (1def1), its essence necessarily involves existence; 
that is, existence belongs to its nature. (1p7dem.) 
  
The essence of a self-subsisting Being, that it involves existence, entails that it is both 
self-caused and conceived. That God is by nature, both self-caused and conceived is 
very important in Spinoza’s system and for his EIP. He often refers to the essence of 
God as his very essence, which denotes his eternal and infinite power (1p34). God is 
defined as an absolutely infinite being (1def6), which entails (my emphasis)‘…the 
unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature…’ (1p8sch1) and ‘…the 
infinite enjoyment of existence…’ (Ep12 S: 788). Consequently, such a Being, 
infinite by nature, cannot be conceived as limited or determined at all, without 
contradiction. To do so, for Spinoza, would amount to annulling our conception of it 
(ibid.). In Spinoza ‘… certain things are infinite by their own nature and cannot in any 
way be conceived as finite, while other things are infinite by virtue of the cause in 
which they inhere…’ (S: 790). The other things to which Spinoza refers in the above 
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 I will not here discuss Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. For very good recent discussions 





citation are the modifications that follow from God. Spinoza’s system does allow for 
modes to be perceived by the senses as finite and manifold, without contradiction, 
although he does regard such a perception to be superficial and abstract. In Spinoza, 
to be limited, qualified, modified, determined or, which is the same, finite, involves a 
negation of some sort and this is seen to be contradictory with regard to the infinite, 
that is, the unqualified essence of God. In Spinoza, the divine essence cannot involve 
any negation at all (1def6expl) and modes should therefore not, in my view, be 
regarded as ways in which God, himself, is modified or determined. Spinoza writes in 
this regard to John Hudde in 1666: 
 
…it is a contradiction to conceive under the negation of existence something 
whose definition includes existence, or (which is the same thing) affirms 
existence. And since ‘determinate’ denotes noting positive, but only the 
privation of existence of that same nature which is conceived as determinate, it 
follows that that whose definition affirms existence cannot be conceived as 
determinate. (Ep36 S: 858.)   
 
That Spinoza defines God as infinite by nature is clearly and firmly set out in the 
opening definitions of the Ethics (1def1; 1def6;) and also in 1p32dem. Furthermore, 
God’s absolutely infinite essence is also, necessarily, ‘indivisible and one alone’ 
(Ep12 S: 789). As suggested earlier Spinoza ascribes all the traditional attributes of 
God, i.e. his infinity, eternity, simplicity, immutability and indivisibility to his essence 
(1def6; 1def8; 1p13; 1p14 cor1; 1p20cor2). I argue that the notion of essence monism 
in Spinoza follows from the definition of God as an absolutely infinite Being, whose 
essence involves existence, that is, a being that is in itself and conceived though itself 
and whose essence, consequently, is eternal, simple, immutable, indivisible or one
46
. 
Importantly, Spinoza assigns these divine properties exclusively to God’s essence. 
Spinoza largely maintains the traditional conception of God in his thought, except of 
course that he sees the divine nature to be immanent and intelligible.
47
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 See Ep34 (S: 854), where Spinoza argues for the unity of God on the basis of his necessary 
existence.   
47
 The claim to know the nature of God with certainty was extremely radical in early modern times. 
The nature of God was traditionally seen to be off limits to human reason and, in fact, unknowable. 
God’s nature was only knowable to some extent through God’s own revelation in scripture, which 




      For Spinoza, God’s very essence or power involves conceivability. Substance or 
God is not only in himself, he also conceives himself.  It is important for Spinoza’s 
project of acquiring adequate knowledge that the definition of God includes that he is 
self-conceived. For Spinoza, God is a being of infinite power and this includes that he 
wills or affirms (understands) his own essence and everything that follows from it 
perfectly. This rationalist conception of God’s power, will and intellect as one and the 
same, is clearly at work in Spinoza’s thought (CM2/7,8) and is also found in 
Descartes. In the first part of his Principles of Philosophy, he writes that in God ‘there 
is always a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of which he 
simultaneously understands, wills and accomplishes everything’ (CSM I: 201). 
Spinoza defines God as self-caused and conceived and this, in my view, rules out any 
notion of the divine essence as a brute force or as an inconceivable or unfathomable 
abyss. As said above, there is no privation or negation at all in God and he 
understands and affirms his essence positively. God, in Spinoza, is an absolutely 
perfect self-subsisting being in want of nothing at all. In my view, the modes that 
follow from the divine essence do not assist or complete God at all and God is not in 
any way dependent on modes. Modes or effects should be seen to follow from God as 
positive expressions of his power and are always dependent on him (1p16).  
      That God’s essence includes both the power to exist necessarily and to understand 
his own essence and all that follows from it is of critical importance for Spinoza’s 
project of emending the intellect. The adequate conceivability of God’s essence and 
that of all things is grounded in God’s self-conception. For Spinoza, it is only God 
that can conceive and reveal his essence adequately (ST2/24 S: 98).
48
 It should be a 
bit clearer now why the notion of essence monism is so important in Spinoza’s 
thought and, specifically for his EIP. Without the necessary existence of God’s 
essence that is also adequately conceivable, the cause of all things would remain 
unknown and Spinoza’s project and method of knowing the essence of things with 
certainty would collapse with brute facts abounding. This method is explained quite 
clearly by Spinoza in 1p8sch (my emphasis): 
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 As Della Rocca puts it: ‘…the essence of a substance is to be conceived through itself. So God’s 
essence is just the fact that he is conceivable or intelligible through himself and thus God’s essence is 




For by substance they would understand that which is in itself and is conceived 
through itself; that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the 
knowledge of any other thing. By modifications they would understand that 
which is in another thing, and whose conception is formed from the thing in 
which they are. Therefore, in the case of non - existent modifications we can 
have true ideas of them since their essence is included in something, with the 
result that they can be conceived through that something else, although they do 
not exist in actuality externally to the intellect.  
 
For example, based on the above method, the actual essence of anything in the 
universe can be known with certainty to express God’s eternal power and that it will 
act in accordance with its received conatus, which is to persist in its being to the 
utmost of its power, i.e. in accordance with its own nature or perfection (1p34dem; 
3p6dem). This universal or common essence of all things is contained or included in 
God’s essence and is inferred or deduced from the true idea of God’s very essence as 
power. This basic method echoes in Spinoza’s words that whatever is, is in God, and 
that nothing can be or be conceived without God (1p15). Because Spinoza’s EIP 
hinges crucially on the adequate intelligibility of God’s essence any tampering with 
the adequate conceivability of the divine essence would, for Spinoza, lead to the loss 
of all adequate ideas and, in his view, would amount to atheism (TTP6 S: 447). 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the Cartesian notion of simplicity plays a crucial 
role in Spinoza’s method of securing the adequate conceivability of God’s essence. 
Any weakening of the absolutely simple nature of God’s essence by conceiving it as 
having parts or distinctions or as manifold, in such a way, that the simplicity of God’s 
essence is compromised, will annul its adequate conceivability.
49
 Moreover, in the 
same vein, any weakening of the eternal and infinite nature of God’s power, by 
introducing certain limiting notions to its nature, threatens the eternal power whereby 
all modes are created and continuously sustained. In Spinoza, nothing can exist by its 
own nature or by anything else that has a determined nature. All things are wholly 
dependent on God’s power to exist and to persist in their being. The total dependence 
of all things on God is the very nature of existence and it is the notion of essence 
monism, in my view, which secures this foundational element in his thinking. I argue 
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 It is quite notable and understandable that Spinoza defends the indivisibility of God’s essence 




that becoming aware of this very essence of reality is also the final aim of the EIP. I 
claim that without God’s unlimited power, he himself cannot exist, nor anything else 
and that nothing can be adequately known to be true with certainty.  
 
2.4.2. The expression of God’s essence 
 
In Spinoza’s system God’s essence is expressed in his attributes, which constitute the 
divine nature (1def4; 1def6; 1p10sch). First and foremost, it is the absolutely infinite 
nature of God, i.e. God’s very essence or power, which is expressed in the attributes. 
For Spinoza ‘…all the attributes are attributes of One infinite Being’ (STapp2 S: 105).  
      Now each attribute does also have its own way
50
in which God’s essence is 
expressed. Spinoza defines an attribute as ‘…that which the intellect perceives of 
substance as constituting its essence’ (1def4) and also as ‘…whatever expresses 
essence…’ (1def6expl). According to Ep9 the intellect ‘…attributes to substance a 
certain specific kind of nature’ (S: 782). In the STapp2 Spinoza says that all attributes 
‘…have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension’ and in 1p10sch we read 
that each attribute expresses a ‘…definite essence, eternal and infinite’. How are 
things that express essence, such as extension and thought, conceived to be attributes 
of God? According to1def4, this is an intellectual insight and is not discernible by the 
senses. The intellect is seemingly able to adequately discern the common nature, 
essence or form of extension from its ideas of bodies and also that of thought from its 
perception of ideas.
51
 How is this possible? For Spinoza this takes place necessarily 
because the ideas of the attributes are necessarily involved in all our ideas of things. 
Nothing can be conceived without the adequate ideas of God’s attributes. When we 
form an idea of a body this must happen under the attribute of extension and when we 
form an idea of something mental this must be done under the attribute of thought.  
Another important element in this is that the intellect has innate ideas of God’s 
attributes, which enables it to recognize and affirm those ideas that are common to all 
things. In Spinoza ‘…the human mind contains the nature of God within himself in 
concept and partakes thereof, and is thereby enabled to form certain basic ideas that 
explain natural phenomena and inculcate morality’ (TTP1 S: 395). These true ideas of 
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 The view of an attribute as a basic way of being is suggested by Bennett (1984: 61).  
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 In the CM2/5 (S: 195) it seems as if Spinoza comes close to regarding the attributes as distinctions of 




the attributes are clear and distinct in the mind and from a consideration of the nature 
of these adequate ideas, it is concluded that such a divine simple nature necessarily 
exists outside the mind. This is quite a well-known argument in early modern 
rationalist thinking and is also found in Descartes. In the fifth meditation Descartes 
writes ‘… for it is obvious that whatever is true is something; and I have already 
amply demonstrated that everything of which I am clearly aware is true’ (DSPW: 
106). He continues a little further to say that such a true idea ‘…is not something 
fictitious which is dependent on my thought, but is an image of a true and immutable 
nature’ (ibid.: 108).  
      It has been pointed out by Spinoza scholars (Curley and Wilson) that a plurality of 
attributes each possessing its own unique nature, which Spinoza appears to regard as 
substances in their own right (1p10), could pose a threat to his theory of a single 
substance and then also to the notion of essence monism, that I argue for.
52
 This raises 
the question if there is something in Spinoza’s philosophy that counters this possible 
threat against the unity of God’s essence?  Is there something to unify the infinity of 
attributes into the One infinite Being mentioned above?  I suggest that the solution to 
this supposed difficulty could be found in the notion of essence monism. Although 
God’s attributes do, in a sense, really differ from one another, they do all have 
something intrinsic in common in that God’s eternal and infinite power is their very 
essence, which seems to be more fundamental and the same in all attributes. I argue 
that for Spinoza, God’s very essence is his eternal and infinite power (1p34), which is 
attribute-neutral
53
 and the inmost essence of all attributes and, in this sense, they all 
have the same very essence. In this view, God’s power is conceived as a simple 
nature, which is expressed in all attributes and modes.
54
 In the text, Spinoza does 
make a distinction between God, who is absolutely infinite and his attributes, which 
are only infinite in their kind (1def2; 1def6). This view is also found in 1p32dem, 
where he differentiates between God as an absolutely infinite substance and an 
attribute, which expresses the infinite and eternal essence in a certain way, such as 
thought. The important point is that all attributes express God’s power and seeing that 
there are infinite attributes there is no limitation to God’s power nor is there a threat 
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 See Nadler (2006: 70) for a discussion of this difficulty.  
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 The term attribute-neutral is also used by Schliesser (2011: 65), although in a somewhat different 
context. 
54
 Spinoza’s theory of modes will be discussed in the following section of this chapter and in greater 




against the unity of God’s essence. To reiterate this important point, God’s very 
essence or power is expressed in infinite basic ways through the attributes and seeing 
that the essences and existence of modes are contained in God, all modes will, when 
conceived correctly, express God’s essence in infinite ways in accordance with their 
own essence or perfection. Here we see the powerful notion of essence monism at 
work to unite the absolutely infinite Being, both ontologically and conceptually.   
      In summary, I argue that the notion of simplicity is applicable to God’s power. 
For Marshall (2008: 70) the ‘…idea of a uniform, infinite power, for Spinoza, is a 
simple idea, one that is not composed of simpler ideas’. God’s power is a simple 
nature or essence that really exists and is expressed in his attributes and in the 
essences and existence of modifications. Being completely simple in nature, God’s 
power cannot be broken down into parts, which are simpler and is therefore 
incorruptible and eternal. In this view, Spinoza conceives God’s power to be 
ontologically and conceptually simple. Seeing that the idea of God’s power is 
necessarily simple it can only be conceived adequately. I contend that this notion of 
simplicity forms the important basis for his claim that we can have adequate 
knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence (2p47). A further consequence is that 
the inmost essence of all of God’s attributes will be simple and also their ideas, which 
in turn, secures the adequate conceivability of the attributes. Furthermore, God’s 
power is expressed in the conatus or desire of all things to preserve and further their 
own being (1p36dem; 3p6). Being an expression of God’s power is the inmost 
essence of all particular things and is what all things are in themselves. God’s infinite 
power is the very essence of all things and all things express the very same essence, in 
proportion to their own perfection or individual natures. Seeing that God’s power is 
simple, all expressions of his power must also be simple and I claim, therefore, that 
the conatus of all natural things should be understood to be a simple nature. The fact 
that God’s power is expressed in accordance with something’s particular nature does 
not, in my view, change or individuate God’s power, which is simple and therefore 
immutable. Although the conatus of a particular horse or a woman may express God’s 
power differently, the nature of the conatus of all things is the same, i.e. to persist in 
their being as best they can. In this sense, all things express the very same essence and 
have the same simple nature.
 
Seeing that an infinite number of modes follow from 
infinite attributes, God’s power is necessarily expressed in all possible ways and is 




certain manner by other finite things (1p28), their inmost essence and their existence, 
i.e. their coming into and persisting in their existence (1p24cor), follows directly from 
Gods very essence or his power (2p45sch). Finally, as discussed earlier, Spinoza’s 
theory of adequacy depends on our minds having adequate ideas of God’s essence, 
which I understand to be ideas of the universal principles or laws of nature and their 
common properties. However, what could the ontological basis be for such 
fundamental principles or laws (such as the principle of sufficient reason), which 
prevent them from being mere entities of reason or the imagination? I claim that 
God’s very essence or power, conceived as a simple nature, which is expressed in all 
such universal and fundamental laws or principles in nature and in our ideas of them, 
fulfills this role in Spinoza’s thought.   
 
2.4.3. Adequacy and finite modes 
 
The focus thus far has been on Spinoza’s idea of God’s essence and on the important 
role that it plays in his epistemology and theory of adequate ideas. I argue that the 
adequate conceivability of God’s essence forms the foundation for his project of 
emending the intellect. However, Spinoza’s aim is not to only have adequate ideas of 
God, but to also conceive particular things adequately. As argued earlier, in 
accordance with Spinoza’s method, modes are in something else and must therefore 
be conceived through something else (1def5). In Spinoza finite things can only be 
adequately conceived through our adequate ideas of God. This means that we must 
make use of our true ideas of God’s essence in order to conceive finite things 
adequately. However, seeing that our adequate ideas of God’s essence are of a 
universal or common nature (the ideas of extension, thought and the common 
notions), adequate knowledge of finite things will amount to the conception of the 
universal and fundamental aspects, which constitute all finite things. The unavoidable 
outcome of this method is that the individual aspects related to the durational 
existence of finite things will largely be squeezed out of the picture.
55
 As is the case in 
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 This is not to say that the individual natures of particular things are not important in Spinoza and for 
the EIP. Much important work has recently been done to bolster the apparent rather weak ontological 
status of particular things in Spinoza’s philosophy. I refer here to the work of Martin (2008), Garrett 
(2009), Melamed (2010) and Viljanen (2011) with regard to Spinoza’s use of the notions of formal and 
actual essence in his theory of individuation. In the following chapter I argue for the importance of a 




Descartes, Spinoza’s rationalist method aims at adequately conceiving that which is 
common and timeless in all finite things. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Spinoza’s EIP is therefore not aimed at acquiring complete knowledge pertaining to 
the durational existence of finite things.
56
 For Spinoza an infinite chain of finite 
natural causes is involved in the certain manner in which finite things are determined 
to exist, the comprehension of which is beyond the ability of a finite mind. Spinoza’s 
rationalist aim is not to pursue adequate knowledge of the durational existence of 
finite things, but rather, to conceive their essence adequately.
57
 In Spinoza’s 
terminology, we can have adequate knowledge of finite things only insofar as they are 
conceived to be modes or expressions of God’s essence. For example: 
 
Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, that is, 
modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and 
determinate way. (1p25cor.)  
 
As is apparent in the above citation, Spinoza’s method of conceiving finite things 
adequately as modes of the attributes, does not explicate the certain manner in which 
finite things exist. An adequate conception of finite things in Spinoza aspires to 
conceive them as expressions of God’s essence, which is to conceive their simple and 
common features. To briefly restate, as argued earlier in this chapter, Spinoza deems 
it possible for a finite mind to have adequate ideas of God’s essence. Such ideas are of 
God’s essence as expressed in the attributes and in the immediate infinite modes, 
which inhere in God.
  
Our adequate ideas, for Spinoza, then amount to the ideas of 
extension and thought and the common ideas or notions pertaining to the fundamental 
laws of physics and psychology. The reason for such ideas being adequate in the mind 
is that they are necessarily involved in the forming of all our ideas and are therefore 
wholly contained in all finite minds. These are the ideas of the attributes and common 
aspects or properties that are always present in bodies and minds and their affections 
                                                                                                                                                              
idea of itself, depends largely on the individual nature of the body of which it is the idea. It is however 
not necessary for my purposes to discuss the importance of attributing essences to individuals in further 
detail.   
56
 Spinoza readily admits this and does not claim to have comprehensive knowledge of the durational 
existence of particular things (TdIE§100, 101; 1p33sch1; TTP4 S: 427; Ep 30; Ep 32).   
57
 Towards the end of his life Spinoza was questioned by Tschirnhaus how he conceived that a ‘variety 
of things’ could follow from the notion of extension alone (Ep82, 83). In his reply Spinoza writes that 
he had ‘not yet had the opportunity to arrange in due order anything on this subject.’ To me this is an 




and are therefore always present in our ideas of bodies and minds and their affections. 
In Spinoza, the ideas of the intellect or reason necessarily explicate that which is 
common to all things:  
 
Therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things in this light of eternity. 
Furthermore, the basic principles of reason are those notions (2p38), which 
explicate what is common to all things, and do not explicate (2p37) the essence 
of any particular thing, and therefore must be conceived without any relation to 
time, but in the light of eternity. (2p44cor2dem.)  
 
In Spinoza there are two ways of conceiving particular finite things. They can either 
be perceived superficially or abstractly through our sensory ideas or they can be 
conceived adequately, by reason or the intellect (5p29sch; Ep12). Whereas sensory 
ideas perceive finite things under a form of duration, the intellect conceives them 
under a form of eternity (TdIE§108).
 
Sensory ideas relate to the particular durational, 
time and place, existence of finite things, i.e. to the certain manner (2p45sch) in 
which such things exist. In contrast, the intellect conceives the eternal and infinite 
essence of God, which finite things express (2p44cor2dem; 2p47dem). When 
particular things are conceived in this second way, they are conceived as modes of 
God’s essence in which the attributes of God find expression in a definite and 
determinate way (1p25cor). This second way of conceiving finite things, in the light 
of eternity or sub quadam specie aeternitatis (2p44cor2), produces adequate 
knowledge of them, i.e. of their essence. 
 
   
      However, Spinoza does not regard sensory ideas as worthless and, as seen, 
perceiving things in this way is not completely false. However, even though sense 
perception is a normal way for us to form ideas and beliefs, it does not produce 
adequate knowledge of the inmost essence of finite things. The latter refers to God’s 
essence, without which nothing can be or be conceived (1p15). For Spinoza, we 
cannot understand the durational realm of Natura naturata adequately through the 
senses alone:  
 
Nor again can the Modes of substance ever be correctly understood if they are 
confused with such mental constructs (entia rationis) or aids to the imagination. 




their efflux from Eternity, and in such isolation they can never be correctly 
understood. (Ep12 S: 789.)  
 
For Spinoza, the aids to the imagination, referred to above, are sensory notions such 
as time, place, measure and number, which are used to: 
 
…delimit Duration and Quantity as we please, conceiving Quantity in 
abstraction from Substance and separating the efflux of Duration from things 
eternal, there arise Time and Measure: Time to delimit Duration and Measure to 
delimit Quantity in such wise that enables us to imagine them easily as far as 
possible. Again from the fact that we separate the affections of Substance from 
Substance itself, and arrange them in classes so that we can easily imagine them 
as far as possible, there arises Number, whereby we delimit them. Hence it can 
clearly be seen that Measure, Time and Number are nothing other than modes of 
thinking, or rather, modes of imagining. (Ibid.)  
 
In Spinoza’s view, ‘there are many things that can in no way be apprehended by the 
imagination but only by the intellect, such as Substance, Eternity and other things’ 
(ibid.). Our sensory ideas are unable to grasp the universal aspects, which constitute 
all things and are inclined to perceive finite things superficially as really distinct 
individual things,
 
which exist by their own power.
58
 The following citation is a 
striking formulation of the mentioned two ways of conceiving the corporeal world: 
 
So if we have regard to quantity as it exists in the imagination (and this is 
what we most frequently and readily do), it will be found to be divisible, 
finite, composed of parts, and manifold. But if we have regard to it as it is in 
the intellect and we apprehend the thing as it is in itself (and this is very 
difficult), then it is found to be infinite indivisible, and one alone, as I have 
already sufficiently proved. (Ibid.) 
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 I understand Spinoza to employ the theory of concurrence in his philosophy, that finite things are 
dependent on God for both their essence and existence. I will argue later that, although this is proven 
beyond doubt by reason in the first part of the Ethics, it is only by intuition that we can experience this 
to be certainly true, i.e. that particular things are in God (2p45sch). Texts that support this most 
important of the notion of concurrence in Spinoza’s thought are: CM2/1 (S: 191); CM2/7 (S: 199); 




When perceived by the senses, corporeal nature is seen as consisting of quite different 
separate finite things. For the rationalist minded Spinoza this is a legitimate albeit 
inadequate understanding of things. When adequately conceived by reason, which 
disregards all particular aspects of bodies, corporeality is found to be essentially 
one.
59 
 The above citation from Ep12, which is very similar to 1p15sch, refers to 
Spinoza’s second way of conceiving finite things, in which the intellect employs its 
adequate ideas to conceive the essence of the corporeal world. When conceived in this 
way by reason, particular things are conceived in the light of eternity, which involves 
the idea of God’s eternal and infinite essence. This second intellectual way conceives 
the eternal and universal aspects of things. For example, when particular bodies are 
conceived in the light of eternity, the focus is not on the actual nature of any particular 
one, but shifts to that which all bodies have in common with one another. Such 
common notions or ideas of bodies are, for example that all finite bodies ‘involve the 
conception of one and the same attribute’ and that ‘they may move at varying speeds, 
and may be absolutely in motion or at rest’ (2p13lem2dem) or that bodies are 
‘nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest’ (STapp2 S: 106). To this 
can be added the adequate idea of God’s essence or power, which is the conatus of all 
bodies to persist in their own being (3p6). The EIP aims to conceive the eternal, 
universal and timeless aspects of our world. Spinoza’s core insight is that although 
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 Spinoza’s method of acquiring adequate knowledge is grounded in the adequate conceivability of the 
idea of God. In Spinoza we can only have adequate ideas of God’s essence and of that which follows 
immediately from God. The EIP is primarily aimed at uncovering the divine decrees or universal 
principles and laws that govern our universe. I have argued that this method does leave adequate 
knowledge of the durational existence of particular things largely out of the picture. As shown, 
although our adequate ideas are necessarily involved in our sensory knowledge of finite durational 
things, this kind of knowledge will always be incomplete and imaginative. The harsher point that I 
make here is that, in the rationalist approach of Descartes and Spinoza, our ideas reflect much about the 
ontological reality of their objects (TdIE§108). Inadequate ideas reflect that the ontological reality of 
finite durational things, of which they are ideas, is rather weak. The possibility of perceiving finite 
things as individual entities, which exist in a certain manner, seems to necessitate the use of sensory 
notions such as time, measure and number and this way of perceiving is seen by Spinoza to be abstract 
and superficial. This view could suggest that Spinoza considers the durational realm of finite things as 
illusionary. Schliesser (2011: 76-80) argues that ‘according to Spinoza there ‘are’ finite modes if and 
only if there is imaginative conceiving. That is to say, imaginative conceiving and modes are co-
constitutive’. In Schliesser’s view, for Spinoza, the ‘striving and reality of finite things is in some 
important sense illusionary.’ I agree that Spinoza does seem to assign a lower level of reality to 
durational things and does employ a rather weak notion of individuality in the Natura naturata. 
However, I agree with Youpa (2011: 328-9) that this does not commit Spinoza to view the realm of 
duration as illusionary or that he holds an a-cosmist view. As argued there is an adequate component to 
sense perception in that our adequate ideas (which do relate to the reality of God’s essence) are 
necessarily employed when forming sensory ideas. The notion of essence monism that I argue for 
should not be seen to completely eliminate individuality in Natura naturata. To the contrary, without 
God’s essence nothing could be or be conceived. I argue later, some notion of individuality, albeit not 




finite things are determined to exist in a certain manner by other finite things, their 
inmost essence (simple nature) and their existence follows from the eternal and 
infinite essence or power of God. When we conceive particular things in this light of 
God’s essence, we conceive the very nature of their existence, i.e. that they are in God 
(2p45sch).   
 
2.5. Ethics and certitude 
  
There is consensus amongst most scholars that Spinoza’s philosophy has an ethical 
intention.
60
 Spinoza seems to have even regarded ethics to be the final goal of 
philosophy itself (Aalderdink 1999: 68). 
 
In this regard his philosophy has a somewhat 
different focus to that of Descartes, which, although containing a rich ethics,
61
 seems 
to lack a fully developed ethical theory.
62
 In his Discourse on Method, Descartes 
formulates a moral code consisting of a few maxims. His third maxim is actually quite 
similar to a line of thinking found in Spinoza’s writings (my emphasis): 
 
My third maxim was to always try to master myself rather than fortune, and 
change my desires rather than the order of the world. In general I would become 
accustomed to believing that nothing lies entirely within our power except our 
thoughts, so that after doing our best in dealing with matters external to us, 
whatever we fail to achieve is absolutely impossible so far as we are concerned. 
(CSM I: 123.)  
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 For Koistinen (Forthcoming: 1) it should not come as a surprise that the aim of Spinoza’s Ethics is 
ethical. He says that ‘Spinoza provides the reader with a fully developed ethical theory which consists 
of a critique of objective intrinsic values, of a naturalistic normative ethics, and of ways to improve us 
so that we could live up to requirements of that ethics.’ Koistinen continues and says that Spinoza’s 
ethical theory is backed by a solid metaphysics and states that Spinoza even goes so far as to see the 
right ethics as deductively following from the metaphysics. 
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 According to Shapiro (2008: 445) ‘While Descartes’s writings do not include any systematic and 
definitive presentation of this area of philosophy, his writings are permeated with a concern for the 
conduct of life, and they do include some developed pieces that can guide us as we try to figure out just 
in what Descartes’s moral philosophy consists.’ In her opinion Descartes’s writings show he is best 
understood as a kind of virtue ethicist. A virtue ethics takes the good to consist in virtue; which is to act 
in the right way under the guidance of reason in any given set of circumstances.  
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 Van Ruler (1999: 89-101) points out that some Dutch Cartesian theologians, such as Cornelius 
Bontekoe (1644-1685) thought that Descartes’s philosophy lacked an ethical theory. There seems to 
have been quite a strong intention in the Cartesian circles of the Leiden University to try to fill this gap. 
It is thought that the Leiden theologian Abraham Heidanus had some intention that the Ethics of 
Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669) could be a candidate to fill the gap. Van Ruler speculates quite 
interestingly, but not conclusively, on the possible influences between Geulinx and Spinoza, who were 
contemporaries and both linked to the Leiden University. Geulincx’s Ethics was published before 





The similarity between these thoughts and Spinoza’s in 4app32 is indeed quite 
striking: 
 
However, we shall patiently bear whatever happens to us that is contrary to 
what is required by consideration of our own advantage if we are conscious that 
we have done our duty and that our power was not extensive enough for us to 
have avoided the said things and that we are a part of the whole of nature whose 
order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly understand this, that part of us 
which is defined by the understanding, that is, the better part of us, will be fully 
resigned and will endeavor to persist in that resignation. And insofar as we 
rightly understand these matters, the endeavor of the better part of us is in 
harmony with the order of the whole of Nature.  
 
Note, in the above, the importance assigned by Descartes and Spinoza to the role of 
the mind in early rationalist ethical thinking. Spinoza’s ethical aim is clear from the 
outset in his writings. In the opening passages of the early TdIE he writes: 
 
I resolved at length to enquire whether there existed a true good, one which was 
capable of communicating itself and could alone affect the mind to the 
exclusion of all else, whether in fact, there was something whose discovery and 
acquisition would afford me a continuous and supreme joy to all eternity. 
(TdIE§1.)   
  
It is notable that Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well – Being is 
described as an Ethica or Moral Science (S: 34). The first title page of this treatise, 
which was most likely composed by Spinoza’s publisher friends, gives a clear 
indication of the ethical intention of Spinoza’s philosophy (my emphasis):  
 
Previously written in the Latin tongue by B.D.S. for the use of his disciples who 
wanted to devote themselves to the study of Ethics and true Philosophy. And 
now translated into the Dutch language for the use of Lovers of the Truth and 
Virtue: so that they who spout so much about it, and put their dirt and filth into 




mouths stopped, and cease to profane what they do not understand: God, 
themselves, and how to help people to have regard for each other’s well – 
being, and how to heal those whose mind is sick, in a spirit of tenderness and 
tolerance, after the example of the Lord Christ, our best Teacher.   
  
The undertaking by Spinoza to develop an ethical theory on the basis of philosophical 
reason alone was extremely radical in early modern times, seeing that most things 
pertaining to human morality and destiny was still firmly under the control of the 
Church.
63
 By taking this step, Spinoza moved quite boldly away from the view of 
philosophy as the handmaiden of theology and the Church. With Spinoza’s work, 
ethics takes a decisive step forward in becoming an independent scientific endeavor 
based on reason alone. 
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     An important question is how the ethical intention of Spinoza’s philosophy lines 
up with his task of emending the intellect, which seems to be more of an 
epistemological project. One of the most striking aspects of Spinoza’s approach to an 
ethical theory is the close connection that he forges between ethics and knowledge. 
The following short citations, taken from his early and mature works, indicate that 
this close relation is an essential feature of his thought, especially the important theme 
of attaining peace of mind or self-contentment: 
 
Therefore, this doctrine, apart from giving us complete tranquility of mind, has 
the further advantage of teaching us wherein lies our greater happiness or 
blessedness, namely in the knowledge of God alone, as a result of which we are 
induced only to such actions as are urged on us by love and piety. (2p49sch.) 
 
Self-contentment (acquiescentia in se ipso) can arise from reason, and only that 
self-contentment which arises from reason is the highest there can be. (4p52.) 
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 This could have been a contributing factor in Descartes not developing a complete ethics. He did not, 
seemingly, want to trespass onto the accepted domain of the Churches. Descartes was quite hesitant in 
applying his method of methodical doubt to the knowledge of God’s nature and the destiny of man. His 
main focus was on having clear and distinct knowledge of the natural world.   
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 For Toulmin, practical ethics took second place in early modern thinking. As he says: ‘Rather than 
pursue the minutiae of moral practice, philosophers concentrated on clarifying and distinguishing the 
concepts of ethics, and formulating the universal, timeless axioms that (for a rationalist) must lie at the 




And since true salvation and blessedness consist in true contentment of mind   
and we find our true peace only in what we clearly understand, (TTP7 S: 467.) 
 
One of the most important recurring themes in Spinoza’s thought is that eternal joy
65
 
and self-contentment follow from adequate knowledge of God’s essence. In his view, 
the primary source of human discontent is inadequate knowledge, which leads to the 
passions. He writes in this regard that: ‘blessedness is nothing other than that self-
contentment that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God’ (4app4). I argue that the 
ethical intention of Spinoza’s philosophy coincides with his epistemological goal of 
achieving the highest form of knowledge. In Spinoza the relation between discovering 
contentment, finding joy and knowing God is very intimate and we find peace of 
mind by conceiving the true idea of God’s essence. For Spinoza, at bottom, God and 
adequate knowledge are, in a sense, the same:  
 
But the third is God, or, what we regard as one and the same, Truth. (ST2/5 S: 
68.) 
 
The discovery of the true idea of God is nothing less than uniting intellectually with 
God. This is the highest form of knowledge or the amor dei intellectualis which leads 
to eternal peace of mind and joy (5p32). In Spinoza, our highest perfection and good 
as humans is the joy of knowing with certainty that we are eternally united with God. 
In Spinoza this is possible in that our intellect is involved in God’s intellect and 
possesses the true idea of God.   
      However, as said earlier, Spinoza and other early modern thinkers viewed the 
human mind to be suffering from a serious mental ailment and that it had somehow 
lost its way and no longer related to its own innate and natural ability to have 
adequate ideas. The task of emending the intellect is not easy and is a difficult and 
enduring struggle, involving both mind and body (5p42sch). The denial of the human 
mind’s innate ability to know the truth was one of the main instruments used by the 
Church to place and hold mankind in bondage (TTPpref). For Spinoza, this slavery or 
bondage of the mind could only be overcome by means of the demanding process of 
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 This close connection between joy and the mind is clearly Stoic and this notion is also found in 
Descartes (Curley 1988: 88). See also Susan James (1993) who has done much work on showing some 




emending the intellect. Spinoza’s ethical theory, which is closely linked to the 
discovery of the highest form of knowledge, includes the difficult process of 
emending the intellect.
66
 I contend that the emendation of the intellect is one of the 
most important themes in his philosophy and is present in all his writings.
67
 All 
Spinoza’s efforts seem to be directed at bringing the EIP to a successful conclusion. 
      An important question is why should the arduous task of emending our intellect be 
undertaken at all?  An important proposition in this regard is (4p36): 
 
The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can 
equally enjoy it. 
 
In 4p36dem Spinoza adds: 
 
To act from virtue is to act by the guidance of reason (4p24), and whatever we 
endeavor to do in accordance with reason is to understand (4p26). So (4p28) the 
highest good of those who pursue virtue is to know God; that is (2p47 and 
2p47sch) a good that is common to all men and can be possessed equally by all 
men insofar as they are of the same nature.  
 
I argue that Spinoza deems it possible for all humans to live by the guidance of 
reason, to successfully undertake the EIP and to discover and enjoy our highest good. 
This optimism, I argue, is grounded in his rationalist conviction that the human mind 
has the idea of God innately. I will contend later that our intellect is involved in God’s 
intellect, which follows directly from the attribute of thought and has both the power 
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 A suitable English term for the Latin term ‘emendatione’ has been somewhat of a discussion point in 
Spinoza literature in the past (Joachim 1940:1). The term emendation of the intellect can be understood 
to include the notions of perfecting, developing or improving it. One of the possible meanings of this 
term is that of purifying. Emending the intellect would then involve its purification to reveal its pure 
nature. The project would, in part, involve identifying and ridding the mind of the somewhat sick and 
infectious ideas of the imagination that find their way into the human mind and obscure its true nature. 
Spinoza seems to understand emendation in this way: ‘But our first consideration must be to devise a 
method of emending the intellect and of purifying it, as far as possible, so that it may succeed in 
understanding things without error and as well as possible’ (TdIE§16). See also Eisenberg (1971) for 
an interesting discussion of this subject. 
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 The theme of emending the intellect runs through Spinoza’s entire body of work. For example in the 
Ethics in 4app4: ‘Therefore it is of the first importance in life to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as 
we can, and the highest happiness or blessedness for mankind consists in this alone.’ In the TTP4 we 
find the following: ‘Since our intellect forms the better part of us, it is evident that, if we wish to seek 
what is definitely to our advantage, we should endeavor above all to perfect it as far as we can, for in 




and the true ideas to think adequately. The same reasoning is found in the TTP where 
Spinoza says that the knowledge and love of God is of universal application and 
common to all of mankind because it is deduced from human nature as such (TTP4 S: 
429). For Spinoza our highest human perfection is closely associated with the mind, 
which has the idea of God innately and is able to be active. It seems then that, for 
Spinoza, humans are able to emend their intellect, but what claim does he have on us 
to undertake his demanding EIP?  In other words, why should we do this? Seeing that 
Spinoza, in my view, discards any notion of Aristotelian substantial forms, there is 
also no human or individual essence against which we can be measured. Spinoza 
seems to teach that we can live as we please and that it is our natural right and also in 
accordance with our very essence, i.e. the conatus, to preserve our wellbeing in any 
way we are able or see fit: 
 
Desire is the very essence of man insofar as his essence is conceived as 





Is Spinoza’s EIP perhaps aimed at only intellectuals, who for some personal reason, 
wish to develop their intellect?  Spinoza does seem to be thinking along these lines in 
the last passages of his preface to the TTP:  
 
Such, learned reader, are the topics which I here submit for your 
consideration…To others I seek not to commend this treatise, for I have no 
reason to expect them to approve it in any way. I know how deeply rooted in 
the mind are prejudices embraced under the guise of piety. I know, too, that the 
masses can no more be freed from their superstition than from their fears. 
Finally, I know that they are unchanging in their obstinacy, that they are not 
guided by reason, and that their praise and blame is at the mercy of impulse. 
Therefore I do not invite the common people to read this work, nor all those 
who are victims of the same emotional attitudes. Indeed, I would prefer that 
they disregard this book completely rather than make themselves a nuisance by 





These are indeed strong words that cause us to question whether the EIP is indeed 
important for Spinoza. Nevertheless, Spinoza does also clearly hold that not only is 
the development of reason the best way for humans to preserve and further their well 
being, but that we are under a divine obligation to do so and that our human salvation 
and blessedness, depends on it (TTP4 S: 429).
 
 This notion of a divine law or 
obligation, in Spinoza, refers to the innate idea of God or the intellect, which, as I will 
argue later, possesses the adequate idea of God’s essence that is needed for us to find 
contentment and happiness. In a moral sense, for Spinoza, our highest good is seated 
in the mind. Viewed in this way, the obligation to undertake the EIP is then dictated 
to us by our intellect, which is the highest possible expression of our power. For 
Spinoza, the emendation of the intellect is therefore a project that should be 
undertaken by all human beings for the furtherance and perfection of our own 
wellbeing. This demand is in accordance with the conatus of all things to further their 
well being to the utmost level of their perfection.   
      The purpose of this second section of this chapter was to establish the ethical 
nature of the EIP and the central role that the EIP plays in Spinoza’s whole 
philosophical undertaking. I started by firstly establishing that Spinoza regards ethics 
to be a central aim of his philosophy. Secondly the close link between ethics and 
certitude is indicated and thirdly that the true knowledge of things entails a process of 
emending the intellect which demands nothing less than the development and 
transformation of man’s basic striving nature into that of a rational being. The 
successful achievement of the EIP is the highest form of human perfection and is 
mankind’s summum bonum. Although this process is an extremely challenging 





3. Mind, Body and Essence 
 
I argue in this work that the rationalist thought of Descartes and Spinoza is best 
understood against the background of the seventeenth-century pursuit of 
epistemological certitude. The response to this challenge came in the form of an 
innovation in their epistemology that is based on attaining adequate knowledge of the 
essence of things. Their basic method is to firstly intuit the true ideas of God’s 
essence and to secondly, infer other true ideas of the essences of all things from these 
foundational ideas. In Spinoza, from the adequate idea of God’s very essence as 
power, the universal nature or conatus of all things can be inferred as the endeavor to 
persist in their being as far as possible (3p7). Spinoza appears then to have conceived 
God’s essence and that of all things adequately and to have reached his philosophical 
goal.  
      Strangely enough, this is not the case and this result, albeit very important, is not 
the final goal of his task of emending the intellect. For Spinoza the notion of striving 
alone, which does adequately depict the way in which bodies and minds act, does not 
express the highest form of human power. As stated earlier, Spinoza also uses the 
notion of essence in a moral sense of our highest good or perfection,
68
 which he 
associates with being self-content:  
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 The idea of striving towards perfection includes some notion of having a final goal or an end in 
mind, which seems to run up against Spinoza’s view that the idea of final causes is deeply misguided 
and imaginary. Carriero goes so far as to say that one of Spinoza’s main aims is to eliminate all notions 
of final causation from the universe (2005: 106). Can Spinoza’s EIP be understood without the notion 
of a final cause?  In my view, Spinoza’s EIP does not employ any notion of a natural inclination or 
essence in humans that directs us towards the goal of becoming rational. When Spinoza says that ‘man 
thinks’ (2ax1), this is not to say that he deems man to have a rational nature. For Spinoza we must 
learn how to use reason aright, which has much to do with becoming self-determined. That the essence 
of man, for Spinoza, is constituted by modes of thinking (2p11dem) means only that humans naturally 
form and employ ideas. Spinoza’s method of emending the intellect is based on understanding the 
nature of our ideas, distinguishing between our inadequate and adequate ones and following the latter. 
The aim is to progress from living passively under the influence of our inadequate ideas and the 
ensuing passions, towards actively following the dictates or ideas of reason. Whereas our incomplete 
sensory ideas restrict the mind’s affirming conatus (which leads to pain), we experience pleasure when 
the mind is unchecked by its adequate ideas and consents fully to them. That which leads us forward in 
the EIP is not the notion of an end, but rather the active emotion of joy and self-contentment of the 
mind, which follows from acquiring adequate ideas. This process is, I argue, not driven by any natural 
bent to live in accordance with reason and should be understood as largely ‘blind’ (ibid.: 121). The EIP 
is a human endeavor for intellectual perfection that is successfully achieved by adequately conceiving 
the most perfect idea, that of God. The EIP is a constant hard struggle to overcome the passions that 




Self-contentment (acquiescentia in se ipso) can arise from reason, and only that 
self-contentment which arises from reason is the highest there can be. (4p52.) 
 
On the other hand the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, suffers 
scarcely any disturbance of spirit, but being conscious, by virtue of an eternal 
necessity, of himself, of God and of things, never ceases to be, but always 
possesses true spiritual contentment. (5p42sch.) 
 
For the rationalist minded Spinoza, the acquiescentia in se ipso comes about when we 
live in accordance with reason. This sense of self-contentment is also the highest 
expression of human activity and it is for this reason that the emendation of our 
intellect is of the highest importance for our wellbeing. For Spinoza, ‘it is of the first 
importance in life to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and the highest 
happiness or blessedness for mankind consists in this alone’ (4app4). Living in 
accordance with reason, which he sees to be our better part, amounts to being self-
determined and therefore also self-content.  
      But why is the above the case? Are we not a union of mind and body and why 
should the mind have preference with regard to the question of human perfection? 
Spinoza attends to this matter in the opening paragraphs of the appendix to the fourth 
part of the Ethics:  
 
1. All our endeavors or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in such a 
way that they can be understood either through it alone as their approximate 
cause, or insofar as we are a part of Nature, a part that cannot be adequately 
conceived through itself independently of the other individual parts. 
2. Desires that follow from our nature in such a way that they can be 
understood through it alone are those that are related to the mind insofar as the 
mind is conceived of consisting of adequate ideas. The other desires are related 
to the mind only insofar as it conceives things inadequately; and their force and 
increase must be defined not by human power but by the things external to us. 
So the former are rightly called active emotions, the latter passive emotions. 
For the former always indicate our power, the latter our weakness and 





For Spinoza, all our endeavors stem from two basic sources, either from our own 
nature (adequate ideas) or from the fact that we are an inextricable part of nature 
(inadequate ideas). Desires that are associated with our own nature are related to our 
adequate ideas, which enable us to think and to act adequately. Desires that follow 
from the fact that we are a part of nature are related to the inadequate sensory ideas, 
which stem from external affections received due to the body being continuously 
exposed to and influenced by external forces.
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      In this third chapter I will show why the intellect is regarded by Spinoza to be the 
locus of our self-determination and contentment and not our sensory knowledge, 
which is related to the body. To understand this more fully, we need to explain the 
basic difference between the nature of the mind and that of the body. I claim that 
Spinoza regards a part of human mind, the intellect, to be active, whereas the other 
part of the mind, the imagination, which is associated with the body, is seen to be 
passive. I will firstly consider Spinoza’s theory of the mind and secondly that of the 
body.  
  
3.1. Mind        
 
3.1.1. The essence of thought 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that God’s very essence, i.e. his eternal and infinite 
power, is expressed in his attributes, which are basic ways in which the divine essence 
is manifested. The attribute of thought is an eternal and infinite expression of God’s 
power in thought, to which Spinoza also refers as absolute thought (1p31dem). In this 
section I will attempt to clarify what the essence of thought amounts to in his theory 
of mind.  
      Firstly, the essence of thought in Spinoza is not itself an idea, nor is it constituted 
by ideas. The attribute or essence of thought is not a compositional entity at all, in my 
view (1p13). I claim that the essence of thought is completely simple in nature. Ideas 
or minds are modes of thought, which follow from or are caused by the essence of 
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 We find a very similar line of thinking in the TdIE§84: ‘Thus we have distinguished between the true 
ideas and other perceptions, and we have established that the fictitious, the false, and other ideas have 
their origin in the imagination, that is, in certain sensations that are fortuitous and unconnected, arising 
not from the power of the mind but from external causes, in accordance as the body, dreaming or 




thought and come to pass when their objects actually exist.
70 
Spinoza makes an 
important ontological distinction between the attribute or essence of thought and the 
modes of thinking that are caused by and inhere in the former:   
 
As regards the Understanding in the thinking thing, this, like the first is also a 
Son, Product, or immediate creation of God, also created by him from all 
eternity, and remaining immutable to all eternity. It has but one function, 
namely to understand clearly and distinctly all things at all times; which 
produces invariably an infinite or most perfect satisfaction, which cannot omit 
to do what it does. (ST1/8,9 S: 58,9.)  
 
The understanding, mentioned in the citation above, refers to the infinite intellect, 
which is the immediate infinite mode of thought, created and sustained by God and 
situated in the durational realm of Natura naturata, where there are objects to think 
about. As suggested above, by being a mode, the infinite intellect is essentially 
different to its attribute. The most important difference being that the infinite intellect 
is a mode of thought and its essence does therefore not involve existence (1p24). 
Spinoza holds the same theory in this regard in the Ethics: 
 
By intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought but only 
a definite mode of thinking which differs from other modes such as desire, love, 
etc., and so (1def5) must be conceived through absolute thought – that is (1p15; 
1def6), an attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of 
                                                        
70 For Spinoza, a finite mode of thought, such as a particular human mind, cannot exist prior to the 
existence of its body in nature (2p11dem). Spinoza does however say that the ideas of non existing 
individual things must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way as the formal 
essences of particular things are contained in the God’s attributes (2p8). In my view, the 
comprehension of singular ideas in God’s intellect and the containment of particular things in the 
attributes should not suggest any real distinctions in the divine essence, which is completely simple by 
nature. Spinoza attends to this matter in the Short Treatise and in the Ethics (1p8sch; 2p8). In the Short 
Treatise all modes ‘…even when none of them exists, are nevertheless equally comprehended in their 
attributes; and as there is no inequality whatever in the attributes, nor yet in the essences of the modes, 
there can be no particularity in the idea when there is none in Nature’ (app2 S: 105,6). In 2p8, with its 
subsections, Spinoza employs an example from geometry to further illustrate how finite modes are 
contained in the attributes. In my view, his view here is much the same as that found in the Short 
Treatise. Nevertheless, certain scholars find in 2p8 a development in Spinoza’s view on the 
attribute/mode ontology and see it as an attempt on his part to strengthen the ontological status of finite 
modes. See Jarrett (1990: 162); Martin (2008: 489) and Viljanen (Forthcoming). As said, I do agree 
that Spinoza’s EIP requires the individual natures of bodies to have a stable ontological basis. However 




thought – in such a way that without this attribute it can neither be nor be 
conceived; and therefore must be related to Natura naturata, not to Natura 
naturans, just like the other modes of thinking. (1p31dem.)  
  
It is quite notable that Spinoza even denies that God, strictly speaking, has an intellect 
at all: 
 
If intellect and will do indeed pertain to the eternal essence of God, one must 
understand in the case of both these attributes something very different from 
the meaning widely entertained. For the intellect and will that would constitute 
the essence of God would have to be vastly different from human intellect and 
will, and would have no point of agreement except the name. They could be 
no more alike than the celestial constellation of the Dog and the dog that 
barks. (1p17sch.)  
 
In 1p17, cited above, Spinoza is mainly considering God as an absolutely infinite 
substance, that is, as a free cause. In this respect God’s power, will and intellect are 
understood to be one and the same (CM2/7,8). Conceived as a free cause, there seems 
to be no place in God for any deliberation or reasoning, as suggests some lack or 
shortcoming, which cannot be in God. Spinoza’s God is in himself and conceives 
himself and has perfect and immediate clarity of his essence. Any suggestion that God 
first thinks and plans his creation and thereafter sets about producing it would be, for 
Spinoza, a typical example of the anthropomorphism, which he strongly dismisses. 
For Spinoza, all is perfectly comprehended and contained in God and follows solely 
from the necessity of God’s essence (1p17; 1p33dem). This outcome is no different to 
the basic picture of the metaphysical structure of Spinoza’s system argued for thus 
far. With regard to the attribute of thought, Spinoza maintains the ontological 
distinction between substance or God and modes. This refers to the distinction 
between the essence of thought and the modes of thought that follow from it. The 
important distinction in Spinoza between the active naturing essence of God (Natura 
naturans) and the dependent natured modes (Natura naturata) echoes the ontological 
distinction mentioned above. Now the infinite intellect or God’s intellect is the first or 
immediate infinite mode of thought that follows from absolute thought and is itself 




The infinite intellect cannot be or be conceived without the eternal and infinite power 
or very essence of thought. The first point then, with regard to the essence of thought, 





It is however not immediately clear how the essence of thought expresses God’s 
eternal and infinite power and this needs further clarification. I have shown that in 
Spinoza’s rationalist thinking, God’s power, will and intellect are regarded as one and 
the same. I argue that this view leads to a very close association between the notions 
of affirmation and thought in his theory of mind. For Spinoza we cannot have an idea 
of something without affirming it and we cannot affirm something without having an 
idea of it (2p49dem).
 
For example, we cannot affirm certain properties of a triangle 
without having a true idea of a triangle. In Spinoza, the affirmation of something 
always involves the conception or idea of the thing. For Spinoza, to will or to affirm 
some thing is nothing other than having its idea and he concludes that all ideas are, in 
essence, affirmations of their objects. This essence of thought as affirmation appears 
to be grounded in God’s affirmation or idea of his essence.
 
 Since there is no privation 
in God there is nothing in his essence or in that which follows from it that he denies 
or negates. In God there is only a positive affirmation of or love
71
 for his own perfect 
being, i.e., of his essence and existence and all that ensues from it. I argue that 
affirmation is the eternal and infinite essence of thought and that all modes of thought 
(ideas) will necessarily express this essence. The conatus of any idea is therefore the 
striving to affirm, to love or, which is the same, to understand the object of which it is 
the idea.
72
 As suggested above, all ideas are positive affirmations of their objects, 
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 The notion of affirmation or love as the essence of thought is important in Spinoza and is especially 
apparent in his Short Treatise (ST2/22 S: 93-95). See in this regard also CM2/8: ‘We do not know how 
God’s essence, his intellect by which he understands himself, and his will by which he loves himself, 
are distinguished. God’s will, by which he wills to love himself, follows necessarily from his infinite 
intellect, by which he understands himself’ (S: 200). The notion of love seems to play an important role 
in Spinoza’s theory of the union between mind and body, which will be discussed in more detail 
shortly.   
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 See Della Rocca (2003) and Steinberg (2005) for an interesting discussion of Spinoza’s theory of 
affirmation in ideas. Della Rocca suggests that this theory commits Spinoza to accept that all ideas are 
beliefs. Steinberg thinks that Spinoza employs some notion of degree with regard to beliefs. In my 
view all ideas are affirmations, but all ideas will not have the same level of certainty or belief. As 




even in the case of inadequate sensory ideas. In this respect all ideas have the same 
essence, that of affirmation. In Spinoza, falsity and uncertainty in an idea stems from 
the complex and obscure nature of the object that is cognized and not from a lack of 
affirmation. True and false ideas are distinguished from one another through certainty 
or uncertainty. In a true idea there is complete agreement or affirmation between the 
idea and its object or ideatum and this results in a complete or adequate understanding 
of the object, from which certainty follows. As argued earlier, in Spinoza, adequate 
ideas can only be acquired of God’s essence. Although a false perception will also 
positively strive to affirm its object as far as it can, like the boy imagining a winged 
horse and affirming its wings, there will no be certainty about this (2p49sch).
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 In 
Spinoza then, thought is conceived to be an eternal and infinite intellectual essence or 
thinking force that strives to affirm or to understand its object. I argue that affirmation 
is the essence of thought and is necessarily common to all ideas (even our sensory 
ideas) and must be in every single idea and the same in all. The essence of thought is 
therefore simple in nature.  
 
3.1.3. God’s infinite intellect 
 
However, in order to affirm or understand something, conceptualization and thinking 
is required. Because the forming of ideas and reasoning is not applicable to God, 
Spinoza situates this activity in the realm of Natura naturata, in God’s infinite 
intellect. In Spinoza’s system, the immediate infinite mode of thinking that follows 
from the attribute of thought is God’s infinite intellect (1p30dem; 2p4dem; Ep64). 
The essence of thought (affirmation) will necessarily be involved and expressed in 
this infinite mode of thinking, which purpose is to conceive God’s essence and all that 
follows from it adequately: 
 
Therefore, the finite intellect in act or the infinite intellect in act must 
comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God and nothing else. 
(1p30dem.)  
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 The partial affirmation of incomplete sensory ideas checks the mind and is accompanied by the 
feeling of pain. When the mind has clear and distinct ideas of God it is active and unchecked and this 





For Nadler ‘Infinite thinking would thus be the first actualization of the attribute of 
thought generated by the power that is essential to Nature or substance’ (2006: 90).
 
 
      Now seeing that God’s infinite intellect or infinite idea
74
 is a mode that follows 
immediately from the attribute of thought, it is by virtue of its cause, eternal, infinite, 
simple, immutable and indivisible and must therefore involve and express God’s 
essence. I have argued previously for the simplicity of God’s essence and claim 
therefore that the idea of God, contained in his infinite intellect, is conceived by 
Spinoza to be a completely simple idea:   
 
In God there is only one simple idea. Finally, before bringing this discussion to 
a close, we ought to deal with the question as to whether there is in God more 
than one idea or only one most simple idea. To this I reply that God’s idea 
through which he is called omniscient is unique and completely simple. (CM2/7 
S: 199.)  
 
But God is one, and one only. Therefore, the idea of God, from which infinite 
things follow in infinite ways, must be one, and one only. (2p4dem.)    
 
The above claim is rather difficult to understand and one wonders how the principle 
of simplicity should be understood with regard to God’s infinite intellect, which does 
contain the idea of God, but seems also to contain other adequate ideas: 
 
In God there is necessarily the idea of both of his essence and of everything that 
necessarily follows from his essence. (2p3.)  
 
I have argued that the immediate infinite modes have to do with the common 
properties, universal features or fundamental laws pertaining to their attribute. God’s 
intellect should then contain the adequate ideas of the common properties involving 
motion and rest in matter and also the common ideas of the fundamental laws 
pertaining to its own attribute, i.e. Thought. The common notions governing God’s 
intellect are perhaps the universal laws of cognition, which should include universal 
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axioms and certain principles, such as the principle of sufficient reason, the identity of 
indiscernibles and others.
75
  It is helpful that Spinoza describes the common notions 
pertaining to reason in 2p40sch as ‘those notions that are called “common” and which 
are the basis for our reasoning processes.’ The second kind of knowledge or reason is 
described as certain ‘common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things.’ 
It seems then that God’s infinite intellect contains the adequate ideas that express 
God’s essence, i.e. the ideas of the attributes and the common notions or fundamental 
laws pertaining to physics and psychology.
 
Now, how does this line up with Spinoza’s 
claim that God’s intellect must be conceived as simple? Following the discussion of 
adequacy and simplicity given earlier, simple ideas are necessarily involved whenever 
we form ideas of anything, or in Spinoza’s terminology, such ideas are equal in the 
part as in the whole in all our ideas. In order to form the sensory idea of a body and 
think about it, the adequate idea of extension, the common notions pertaining to 
motion and rest, etc. are necessarily involved as well as the idea of thought and 
certain common notions universal and fundamental to reasoning. The essence of 
thought, that of affirmation, is also a simple idea, seeing that it is necessarily involved 
and expressed in all thought and this adequate idea would also be included in God’s 
intellect. I argue then that the simplicity of God’s intellect does not suggest that it 
contains only one idea of God, but that the ideas contained in God’s intellect all 
express God’s eternal and infinite essence and are therefore all of a universal nature 
and are basic adequate ideas that are necessarily involved and expressed in all our 
ideas, even our sensory ones. As argued earlier, such ideas that express God’s essence 
and which are involved in all our ideas are the ideas of the attributes and the common 
notions.  
      How should Spinoza’s view be understood, that a finite intellect is part of God’s 
eternal and infinite intellect?  
 
Hence it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; and 
therefore when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying 
nothing less but this: that God – not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is 
explicated through the nature of the human mind, that is, insofar as he 
constitutes the essence of the human mind – has this or that idea. (2p11cor.)    
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 For Marshall (2008: 66 note 38), ‘there is no reason to believe that we cannot form common notions 





According to the above citation, Spinoza conceives the human intellect as part of or 
involved in God’s intellect. The argument seems to be based on the simplicity 
principle, that if our intellect is a part of God’s intellect and God’s intellect is equal in 
the part as in the whole, our finite intellect must then be equal to the whole and also 
contain the idea of God’s essence in its entirety. A finite human intellect will then 
also contain the adequate ideas, which express God’s essence. As suggested above, 
these are the ideas of the attributes and the common notions, which are necessarily 
involved in all our ideas. The essence of the mind referred to in above citation refers 
to the essence of thought to affirm the object of which it is the idea. This affirming 
essence is also necessarily present in all our ideas and must therefore also be equal in 
the part as in the whole and will be the essence of God’s intellect and therefore also of 
ours.   
      I will show in the following chapter, in accordance with Spinoza’s method, that 
the true idea of God can only be recovered by producing a true definition of it 
(TdIE§94). Definitions are required, for Spinoza, because God’s idea in us has been 
weakened by forceful infective imaginary ideas. The process of medicina mentis or 
the EIP is to uncover the true idea of God’s essence by putting our innate intellectual 
tools to work. Spinoza refers to this in an important note to his TTP (emphasis 
added): 
 
Now in order that we may conceive God’s nature clearly and distinctly, we 
have to fix our attention on certain very simple axioms called universal axioms, 
and connect to them those attributes that belong to the divine nature. Only then 
does it become clear to us that God necessarily exists and is omnipresent, and 
only then do we see that all our conceptions involve God’s nature and are 
conceived through God’s nature, and, finally, that everything that we 
adequately conceive is true. (S: 574.) 
  
Spinoza’s well known definition of God is found in the opening passages of the 
Ethics:  
 
By God I mean an absolutely infinite Being possessing infinite attributes each of 





3.1.4. The innate idea of God 
 
In my opinion Spinoza employs the theory of innate ideas in his philosophy in much 
the same way as Descartes and other seventeenth-century innate ideas theorists.
76
 In 
Spinoza, this theory claims that the human intellect is naturally endowed with the 
adequate idea of God’s essence.
 
The ideas contained in the intellect are of God’s 
attributes and the common notions, which provide us with the basic adequate 
intellectual tools needed for forming ideas and thinking. The important role of our 
innate ideas is to enable us recognize and to affirm the adequate ideas of the attributes 
and the common notions. Moreover, it seems that without such innate tools we would 
not be able to form any ideas at all. For Spinoza, the innate idea of God also contains 
other true ideas, which can be deduced or inferred from it, such as the basic principles 
pertaining to morality and politics. God’s idea in us is perhaps then much like a basic 
kit of intellectual tools (ideas) that enables us to think adequately. However, Spinoza 
thought that most human beings, take thinking for granted and are unaware of their 
dependence on their given innate ideas in order to form basic ideas of things and to 
think about things.       
      Some interesting formulations
 
 of the theory of the innate idea of God are found in 
the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP):  
 
Since, then, the human mind contains the nature of God within itself in concept, 
and partakes thereof, and is thereby enabled to form certain basic ideas that 
explain natural phenomena and inculcate morality, we are justified in asserting 
that the nature of the mind, insofar as it is thus conceived, is the primary cause 
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 The theory of innate ideas does not receive much attention in Spinoza scholarship and there even 
seems to be some doubt in attributing this theory to him at all. Della Rocca (2008: 133) and also 
Steinberg (2009: 157) seem to think that Spinoza did not hold that the mind has any inherently certain 
ideas that are validated through themselves, independently of other ideas. Margaret Wilson does 
however think that Spinoza ‘is best thought of as aligned with the innatist camp’ (1996:137n36). 
Nadler (2006: 175-176) does acknowledge that Spinoza’s common notions are somewhat like the 
innate ideas of other seventeenth-century thinkers, but states that Spinoza is not entitled to a distinction 
between innate ideas and ideas caused externally. Marshall (2008: 81-87) clearly does take the notion 
of innateness in Spinoza seriously. One of the reasons for the theory of innate ideas being undervalued 
in Spinoza is perhaps that the term innate idea does not appear in the Ethics, although it does feature 
strongly in the TdIE and is also found in the TTP. In the Ethics (5p18dem) Spinoza does refer to God’s 
idea in us and also says that our clear and distinct ideas are in us (5p28dem). In the TTP Spinoza writes 
that ‘the mind of God and his eternal thoughts are inscribed in our minds’ (TTP1 S: 403) and ‘the 
Divine Law, which makes men truly blessed and teaches the true life…must be considered as innate in 




of divine revelation. For, as I have just pointed out, all that we clearly and 
distinctly understand is dictated to us by the idea and nature of God - … (S: 
395.)  
 
Now the mind of God and his eternal thoughts are inscribed in our minds, too, 
and therefore we also, in Scriptural language, perceive the mind of God. But 
since natural knowledge is common to all men, it is not so highly prized, as I 
have already said, and particularly in the case of the Hebrews, who vaunted 
themselves above all men – indeed despising all men and consequently the sort 
of knowledge common to all men. (S: 403.) 
 
The divine law (i.e. the idea of God)…must be considered as innate in the 
human mind and inscribed therein, as it were. (S: 435.) 
 
In my opinion, Spinoza’s theory of the innate idea of God plays a crucial role in his 
pursuit of certainty in knowledge and in his EIP. However, I cannot here undertake a 
detailed explication of this theory and will suffice with a few suggestions as to the 
role that the innate idea of God might play with regard to the EIP.  Firstly, God’s idea 
in us is seen by Spinoza to be the means by which we can achieve our highest 
perfection, which is to acquire the true knowledge of God (TTP4 S: 428). For 
Spinoza, it is only God himself who can reveal or give his idea to us (ST2/24), and it 
is his idea that dictates (TTP1 S: 395) other true ideas to us, and truth is told us by the 
idea of God (TTP4 S: 428). The importance of this theory should be apparent from 
the above and I suggest that Spinoza regards God’s idea in us as much more than a 
single unassociated adequate idea, amongst many others, in the composite idea that 
the human mind is. As suggested earlier, a human intellect, which possesses the 
adequate idea of God’s essence, should perhaps be understood to be more like an 
adequate mind, which possesses the basic ideas needed to think adequately and is 
thereby enabled to produce other true ideas. Spinoza does actually say that ‘the mind 
of God and his eternal thoughts are inscribed in our minds (TTP1 S: 403). Although 
the formulations referred to above are quite metaphorical, they do give some 
indication of Spinoza’s line of thinking in this regard. This subject does warrant 
further research, in my view.  Secondly, I suggest that the subject of human agency in 
Spinoza be associated with his theory of the innate idea of God.
 




matter of human agency is very important for the EIP, which demands quite forceful 
intellectual action from our side. In order for the mind to undertake the task of 




      I started this chapter by discussing Spinoza’s use of the notion of essence in the 
sense of our highest good and asked why he associates our self-determination and 
contentment with the mind? My conclusion is that Spinoza turns to our mind, more 
specifically to the intellect or the innate idea of God, because it affords us the 
possibility of becoming more self-determined and self-content by discovering 
adequate ideas. This all depends crucially on discovering God’s idea in us, and 
partaking thereof. In Spinoza, the innate idea of God plays a critical role in 
                                                        
77 Koistinen (2009a) addresses the issue of subjecthood in Spinoza and correctly thinks that Spinoza’s 
demand on human agency needs a strong notion of individual action, which does not seem to follow 
from the interpretation of the human mind as a bundle of ideas. This matter is important for this work 
in that the EIP is something that we need to undertake ourselves. In this process we need to know that 
we are on the right track by following our true ideas. I agree with much in this interesting paper, but 
differ from his take on the way in which Spinoza conceives the constitution of God's power and his 
intellect. Koistinen (ibid.:153) makes the point that agency cannot be reduced to ideas alone. Some 
individual identity and thinking force is also required. He seeks the latter in the power of substance 
(ibid.:155). To secure power for individual minds, without compromising the infinite nature of God, he 
turns to the Kantian notion of intensive magnitudes and sees God’s intellect as constituted by infinite 
intellects that differ from one another in terms of intensity of thinking force. He writes: ‘once an 
infinite intellect is given…all the others are ipso facto given, as being embedded into one infinite 
intellect’ (ibid.:158). His proposal is enticing, but I am not sure that this reading does not compromise 
the simple nature of God’s power. The notion of degree does introduce some limitation to God’s 
power. The thought of degree seems at odds with the simplicity of the God's power, which must be 
equal in the part as in the whole. I do not see how something that is definite and determinate by nature 
can be imbedded into something that is by nature infinite and undetermined. Seeing that human agency 
is important in making sense of the EIP, I suggest a different approach to this matter. I propose 
Spinoza’s theory of the innate idea of God as an alternative solution to the question of agency. I 
suggest the theory of innateness as a candidate in that it holds the key elements required for adequate 
thinking. Firstly, the infinite intellect possesses adequate ideas of God’s essence and inheres directly in 
God’s power of thought. A human intellect is involved in God’s intellect and also possesses adequate 
ideas and thinking power. Spinoza claims the innate idea of God can be deduced from the nature of 
man and is therefore common to all mankind. For Spinoza ‘man thinks’ (2ax2) and seeing that the idea 
of God is given when thought is given (1p21dem), the idea of God is common to all human minds. 
Secondly, that Spinoza regards the idea of God to be innate to particular human beings suggests that he 
accepts some singularity of the idea of God. This is important for the EIP, which requires that we 
produce our own true ideas. In Spinoza an actual mind is the idea of its existing body. Being innate, the 
idea of God must then in some way firstly (ST2/22 S: 95; 2p11dem) identify itself with its body and, in 
a sense, become a singular intellect. The body does play a role in developing the notion of a self in 
Spinoza (STapp2 S: 107). However, does this not compromise the simple nature of God’s idea? I argue 
that all intellects are the same in that they all possess the idea of God’s essence in its entirety 
(TdIE§73). In this view then, a finite intellect is seen to be a powerful eternal, singular, thinking thing, 
with nothing personal attached to it. In this view God’s intellect is constituted by such modes of 
thinking (5p40). However, for Spinoza, the infinite intellect is a mode of thinking and therefore always 
depends on God’s power for its essence and existence. Although the innate idea of God does seem to 
be the means by which we can be active and confidently undertake the EIP, the intellect is never 




establishing the very basis for acquiring adequate ideas and securing epistemological 
certitude:
78
   
 
… all that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us by the idea and 
nature of God – not indeed in words, but in a far superior way and one that 
agrees excellently with the nature of the mind, as everyone who has tasted 




The so-called doctrine of parallelism plays an important role in Spinoza’s 
epistemology and also in his method of emending the intellect. Spinoza’s theory 
pertaining to parallelism is an extensive subject and I will only say something brief 
about its relevance of for the EIP. In the corollary to 2p7 Spinoza says:  
 
Hence it follows that God’s power of thinking is on par with his power of 
acting. That is, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, all 
this follows from the idea of God as an object of thought in God according to 
the same order and connection.  
 
In the early modern theory of ideas, the notions of objective and formal essence play 
an important role. In this theory of cognition the ideas in the mind are understood to 
be objective essences that exist in the mind and represent or contain the formal 
essences of the objects existing outside the mind that are cognized. In Spinoza the 
abovementioned theory is associated with his theory of parallelism, which claims that 
the essence of the absolutely infinite substance or God is necessarily and 
simultaneously expressed, both formally (external to the mind) and objectively (in the 
mind). For Spinoza ‘thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same 
substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that. So, too, a mode of 
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two 
ways’ (2p7sch). The idea of God or the infinite intellect contains, objectively (in the 
                                                        
78 I argue in chapters five and six, that the theory of the innate idea of God, in my view, also sheds 
some light on Spinoza’s difficult notion of intuitive knowledge of the third kind and has also to do with 




form of thought), the adequate ideas of the attributes and common properties of 
immediate infinite modes that exist externally to the mind or formally, in Nature. The 
ideas of God in the mind will be clear and distinct whereas the ideas of other objects, 
such as particular things will be obscure and confused. Such partial sensory ideas are 
not contained in the intellect but form part of the imagination, which is based on sense 
perception. The theory of parallelism is also found in Spinoza’s earlier work: 
 
…the most immediate mode of the attribute, which we call thought, contains 
objective the formal essence of all things … And since, as a matter of fact, 
Nature or God is one being of which infinite attributes are predicated, and 
which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily follows 
that all of this there is produced in Thought an infinite Idea, which 
comprehends objective the whole of Nature just as it is realiter. (STapp2 S: 
104.) 
 
In Spinoza, God’s intellect contains the adequate ideas of God’s essence as expressed 
in his attributes and in the immediate infinite modes, i.e. extension and thought and 
also other adequate common notions. In accordance with parallelism this happens 
necessarily, since God expresses his essence in all the attributes simultaneously 
(1p10sch; 2p7cor). Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism is then clearly of importance for 
his method and EIP. The notion of parallelism is grounded in the causa sui nature of 
substance, that it is self caused and conceived. God expresses his essence in all 
possible ways, both formally (outside of the mind) and objectively (in the mind) and 
this arrangement guarantees that God’s essence is adequately expressed in the human 
mind: 
 
Therefore, that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God is common to all things, and equally in the part as in the whole. And so this 
knowledge will be adequate. (2p46dem.) 
 









3.1.6. The nature and constitution of the mind 
 
We should now be in a position to answer the question regarding the nature and 
constitution of the human mind.
79
 Firstly, as argued earlier and following from the 
essence of thought, the essence or nature of a human mind is the endeavor to 
positively affirm or understand an actually existing human body (2p11dem).  
In accordance with the notion of parallelism, when a finite body actually exists in 
nature there will necessarily also be an idea of this body.
80
 For Spinoza: ‘The idea 
which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of 
very many ideas’ (2p15). The mind is the idea of the body, which is composed of a 
great number of very composite individual material parts and since, in accordance 
with the doctrine of parallelism, there must necessarily be an idea of every component 
part, the human mind must be composed of the many ideas of all the component parts 
(2p15dem). Spinoza seems to regard the human mind as a composite idea, made up of 
many ideas, which include the ideas of the many parts of the body (Nadler 2006: 
157). This does not mean to say that the idea of the body or the mind is produced by 
or arises from the body (3p11sch). The affirmation of an existing body follows or 
results from antecedent idea, which includes the idea of the existence of the body and 
so on: 
 
For (2p6) the cause of the mind’s affirming the existence of the body is not 
that the body began to exist; therefore, by the same reasoning, it does not 
cease to affirm the existence of the body on account of the body’s ceasing to 
be. This results from another idea, which excludes the present existence of the 
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 Although Spinoza says that all things are animate to a degree, I will only consider human minds, 
which is also Spinoza’s main concern. 
80
 In Spinoza scholarship the union between mind and body is often explained in terms of the double 
aspect theory. For Nadler, Spinoza is a ‘property dualist’ who claims that there is one substance, but 
this substance has mental modes or ideas and physical modes or bodies. A human being, in this view, 
has a mental and a material aspect (2008: 143).  Della Rocca (2008: 99-108) seems to hold a similar 
view. Koistinen (2009a: 2011a) argues convincingly against the double aspect theory as a sufficient 
explanation of the union between mind and body in Spinoza. Although the double aspect theory is 
important in this regard, it does clearly fall short in explaining the idea of a quite intimate union 
between mind and body that Spinoza seems to hold. In the TdIE Spinoza says if we understand the 
essence of the soul or mind, we will know that it is united to the body (§22). I have argued that the 
essence of thought or mind is that it affirms or loves its object. The essence of the human mind is to 
affirm its body and it is this essence of the mind, in my view, which strengthens its union with a body. 




body and consequently that of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the 
idea that constitutes the essence of our mind (2p8). (3p11sch.)  
 
Actual minds are however finite modes of thought and are not produced directly or 
immediately by God. They are brought about by other universal and finite causes 
pertaining to thought, as is the case with particular bodies, which are also produced by 
both universal and finite natural laws pertaining to motion and rest (1p28; 2p9; TP2 S: 
684).   
      Now an actual human mind is conceived by Spinoza to consist of two parts, 
namely the imagination and the intellect (TdIE§84; 2p11cor; 5p40cor). The former 
refers to ideas arising passively from sense perception due to the body being 
fortuitously affected by external causes, whereas the latter refers to the adequate ideas 
of God’s essence. The composite human mind is then made up of two kinds of ideas - 
inadequate sensory ideas and the adequate ideas of the attributes and the common 
notions. The objects correlating to the sensory ideas in the mind are the many parts 
making up the complex durational body and the objects to which the adequate ideas 
relate are the attributes of God and the immediate infinite modes. Recall that 
according to Spinoza’s theory of innateness, the idea of God’s essence is directly 
communicated to all actual minds and is adequate. An actual mind will then have two 
kinds of ideas existing in it, some of which are wholly possessed or contained, and 
others only partially.
81
 In the EIP Spinoza turns mainly to the adequate ideas of the 




      In closing, with regard to the intellect, I refer to the TdIE where Spinoza gives a 
well-known description of his conception of the composition of a human mind. He 
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 Although Spinoza does distinguish quite strongly between the intellect and the imagination, I do not 
think they should be understood to be separate parts or faculties in the mind. A more fruitful approach 
is perhaps to think that all our ideas are comprised of adequate elements and inadequate or incomplete 
elements. The adequate ideas in the mind are necessarily involved whenever we form ideas of things. 
In order to form a sensory idea of some thing the adequate ideas of the attributes and the common 
notions are necessarily employed. If, for example, we have an idea of a certain dog we must conceive it 
under the attribute of extension and utilize the common notions of size, shape, motion and rest and the 
like. These common elements of our idea of the dog will be adequate. The other more particular 
aspects of the dog, such as its particular nature, breed and coat type will however be partial and 
inadequate. We are able to discern the adequate and inadequate elements in such an idea and assign the 
former to the intellect and the latter to the imagination.   
82
 The body is not completely devalued in Spinoza and it does also have an important role to play. See 
Nadler (2006: 176) who writes: ‘…and it may be that for Spinoza, as for the innate idea theorists, 
sensory input is needed to stimulate the mind to actually think of these ideas of the common features of 




writes, our minds ‘…are part of some thinking being, some of whose thoughts 
constitute our mind in their entirety, and some only in part’ (§73).
83
 As argued, I 
understand this passage to say that a finite intellect contains the idea of God’s essence 
in its entirety. This is possible by virtue of the simplicity principle, which stipulates 
that the idea of God’s essence is simple and cannot be divided into different parts, nor 
can it be of different intensities. The ideas expressing God’s essence (the ideas of the 
attributes and common notions) must be adequately impressed, i.e. in their entirety in 
our minds. The innate idea of God will undoubtedly have more effect than the partial 
sensory ideas in the mind, but seeing that the idea of God is entirely possessed in 
different human minds, it should have the same force in all humans, in my view. I 
contend therefore, that all human minds will have the adequate idea of God’s essence 
innately. The
 
 project of emending the intellect depends on the ability of the mind to 
produce adequate ideas and in my view it is the intellect or the innate idea of God that 
plays a crucial role in making this possible. It is: 
 
For the eternal part of the mind (5p23 and 5p29) is the intellect through which 
alone we are said to be active (3p3), whereas that part which we have shown to 
perish is the imagination (5p21), through which alone we are said to be passive 
(3p3 and Gen. Def. of Emotions). (5p40cor.)  
 
      An important remaining question is how the different kinds of minds are to be 
explained? How does, for example, the mind of Paul differ from Peter’s or the mind 
of a dog from that of a human being? We have established that the very essence of 
thought and that of all ideas or minds is the positive affirmation or idea of its object, 
which is the same in all minds. In this respect all minds have the same nature or 
essence, i.e. affirmation. In Spinoza’s view, the difference between actual minds is 
based on the difference between the objects of which they are the ideas. In the case of 
extended things, the difference in their ideas or minds follows from their bodies 
differing from one another (2p13sch). The following texts are important in this 
regard:  
                                                        
83
 Craig (1996: 49), in a comment on this passage, suggests a connection between the innate ideas of 
the intellect and Spinoza’s knowledge of the third kind. He writes: ‘It is presumably those thoughts 
which it is given to us to think in their entirety which provides us with our tantalizing taste of 
Spinoza’s third and most perfect type of knowledge, scientia intuitiva’. This will be discussed in 






Yet we cannot deny, too, that ideas differ among themselves as do their objects, 
and that one is more excellent and contains more reality than another, just as the 
object of one idea is more excellent than that of the other and contains more 
reality. (2p13sch.)   
 
For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking are measured by 
the excellence of the object. (Gen. def. of Emotions 3.)  
  
As argued earlier, finite modes (bodies and their ideas or minds) are not produced 
directly by their respective attributes. Particular things are also brought about to exist 
in a certain manner by an infinite chain of finite causes (1p28). This is the case with 
regard to finite minds as well: 
 
The idea of an individual thing existing in actuality has God for its cause not 
insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is considered as affected by another 
idea of a thing existing in actuality, of which God is the cause insofar as he is 
affected by a third idea, and so on ad infinitum. (2p9.) 
 
This is confirmed in TP2:    
 
They hold that the mind is not produced by natural causes and is directly 
created by God and is so independent of other things that it has an absolute 
power to determine itself and to use reason in a correct way. But experience 
teaches us only too well that it is no more in our power to have a sound mind 
than to have a sound body. (S: 684.)  
 
As to how an actual mind is actually produced by finite causes
84
, Spinoza does not 
say. I assume this is a task for the natural sciences to undertake. Spinoza does seem 
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 Edwin Curley (1988: 78) reads Spinoza’s philosophy as materialistic. He argues that in Spinoza ‘to 
understand the mind we must understand the body, without which the mind could not function or even 
exist. In spite of all the materialistic talk, the order of understanding never proceeds from mind to 
body’. Nadler (2006: 146-153) seems to agree with this line of thinking. I do not think Spinoza’s 
philosophy is materialistic. In Spinoza, God’s very essence is his power, which is expressed in all 
possible ways and not only in corporeality. Furthermore, for Spinoza, this motion and rest inheres in 




however quite adamant to express that an actual finite mind is not formed by God 
directly, is not a separate substance and not eternal. As argued, only a part of it is, the 
intellect, which is involved in God’s intellect. Moreover, Spinoza is very clear that the 
mind or idea and its object must exist together.
85
 Spinoza states this quite clearly in 
ST2/20: 
 
Between the Idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the 
one cannot exist without the other: for there is no thing whose idea is not in the 
thinking thing, and no idea can exist unless the thing also exists. (note 21 S: 
91.) 
 
      Hopefully, it has become clearer in the course of this chapter, why Spinoza 
regards the intellect to be our so-called better part. For Spinoza, our intellect is part of 
or involved in God’s intellect
 
and is the source of our adequate ideas (2p11cor). To 
live in accordance with reason is the highest expression of human power and is also 




In the following section I will consider Spinoza’s theory of the body, with regard to 
his method of emending the intellect. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
Spinoza also employs the notion of essence in a moral sense of our highest good or 
perfection as human beings. In this sense, the concept of essence is associated with 
the question of human agency or how human power is best expressed. As argued in 
the previous section the highest expression of human power is when we live in 
accordance with reason. In Spinoza’s own words:   
 
To act from virtue is to act by the guidance of reason (4p24) and whatever we 
endeavor to do in accordance with reason is to understand (4p26). So (4p28) the 
                                                                                                                                                              
power, which is not only identified with corporeal matter. Spinoza also writes that ‘by Nature, I do not 
mean simply matter and its modifications, but infinite other things besides matter’ (TTP6 S: 446).  
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 This was an important issue in the seventeenth century, which was a time of superstition and 
credulity. The theory of the necessary union between body and mind is an important critique of such 
imaginative thinking. It is, for Spinoza, only philosophy that can prove that spirits, ghosts and devils, 




highest good of those who pursue virtue is to know God; that is (2p47; 
2p47sch) a good that is common to all men and can be possessed equally by all 
men insofar as they are of the same nature. (4p36dem.)    
 
I argue that it is a hallmark trait of early rationalist philosophy of Descartes and 
Spinoza to turn to the innate adequate ideas in the mind in the search for certainty and 
the ensuing joy and peace of mind. It is quite notable that these philosophers seem to 
largely exclude the body from the above task. This important matter will be attended 
to in this section and I argue that this has much to do with the dawning of a new 




The early modern period is the time in our history in which a major shift took place in 
the way in which the natural world was understood. This refers to the advent of the 
new mechanist theory of nature, which formed an integral part of the new emerging 
science of the day. Spinoza clearly employed much of the new mechanist view of the 
natural world in his philosophy, although he did also depart quite decisively from his 
contemporaries in some aspects of this theory, which will be discussed shortly.
 
 
Although Spinoza did not regard himself as a natural scientist (2p13sch), he saw his 
philosophy as very much part of the new science of that time (Klever 1996: 33). 
Spinoza saw his work as contributing towards the development and furthering of a 
new worldview in accordance with the scientific discoveries of his time, which could 
replace the prevailing one that, in his view, was based on mainly inadequate religious 
ideas.
86
 His rationalist mindset saw no disparity between philosophy and physics and 
he was convinced that nature could not contravene reason and vice versa. His 
rationalist dictum states that ‘…whatever is contrary to nature is contrary to reason, 
and whatever is contrary to reason is absurd, and should therefore be rejected’ (TTP6 
S: 452). His rationalist conviction is that the adequate ideas of the mind, contained in 
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 In his important work Radical Enlightenment (2002: 3-13), Jonathan Israel distinguishes between a 
radical and a more moderate approach to the general desire for renewal in early modern society in 
Europe. The moderate approach attempted to insulate the traditional and largely religious based 
prevailing worldview from the discoveries and of the new science. I agree with his assessment that 
Spinoza saw his work to form part of the radical wing of the early enlightenment, which was firmly 




the intellect, are in complete agreement with the inmost essence, i.e. the fundamental 
aspects or universal laws governing our universe (TdIE§108).   
      Spinoza was quite rigorous in the thoroughgoing application of the new mechanist 
concepts and differed from the Cartesians and also empiricists such as Boyle and 
Newton, who were somewhat hesitant in applying the mechanist view to all spheres 
of reality.
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 In broad terms, Spinoza accepted the new mechanist theory of the natural 
world and his views on this subject, are largely in accordance with those of Galileo, 
Descartes, Gassendi, Boyle and later, Newton.
 
 What was of particular importance for 
Spinoza was to develop the mechanist theory in such a way as to accommodate his 
quite revolutionary immanentist conception of God. This was an extremely radical 
move in early modern times and sets his views regarding God and corporeality 
distinctly apart from most of his contemporaries.
88
 Spinoza was seemingly not 
committed to uphold or to protect the traditional view of the Church or those of any 
other traditional institutions (Mason 2003: 43). He was evidently quite stringent in 
this regard and showed a consequent and firm commitment to bring all of human 




In general, the early modern mechanist theory is based on the conception of the 
natural world as a machine that works largely independently from intervention from 
the outside, by its own means
 
 and in accordance with its own order and laws. One of 
the best-known metaphors from this period used to illustrate this new vision of the 
natural world was that of a clock (Downing 2002: 343). Our universe was 
increasingly understood to be much like an independent substance, with its own 
universal and fixed order and laws that governed all aspects of its existence. What 
Spinoza stressed more than others was the thoroughgoing application of this theory, 
without exception. Reason’s certain conception of the natural world as a single 
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 According to Israel (2002: 243): ‘Cartesians postulated a dichotomy of substance, conceiving reality 
to operate within two totally separate spheres or sets of rules governing reality, only one of which was 
mechanist and subject to the laws of physical cause and effect. Boyle, Newton, and other English 
empiricists insisted that only what is proven to operate mechanistically, by experiment, is definitely 
known to be subject to cause and effect, leaving much else beyond what is humanly knowable.’   
88
 ‘All (the new and great early modern thinkers) except Spinoza and Bayle sought to accommodate the 
new advances in science and mathematics to Christian belief (if not always to that of one or other 




corporeal substance, demanded that none of its aspects (such as its power) could stand 
outside or above it. He regarded traditional and religious notions, such as the 
supernatural as inadequate ideas and figments of human imagination.  
      In Spinoza’s view, our universe consists of two domains. He discerns, firstly, the 
realm of Natura naturans, the fundamental divine essence that creates and sustains all 
things and secondly, the realm of Natura naturata, the durational world of particular 
things which inheres in and depends wholly on the former as its cause. Although 
Spinoza patently rejects the traditional view of God as a transcendent creator, he does 
not at all, in my view, summarily dispatch the entire traditional notion of God from 
his philosophy. To the contrary, as argued earlier, the notion of God continues to play 
an important role in his thought and especially so, for his main philosophical task, that 
of attaining epistemological certitude. In my opinion, Spinoza aimed to develop a new 
vision or understanding of things in which the traditional idea of God and the role 
assigned to him was mostly maintained, but that God was now seen to be immanent in 
his creation and no longer separate from it. This conception, however, was regarded 
as extremely radical in his time and as an almost complete departure from the 
traditional Judeo – Christian conception of God as a transcendent creator who causes 
a world, quite distinct from his own nature, to come into being by creating it out of 
nothing.  
      What was especially distasteful to Spinoza’s more traditional thinking 
contemporaries was his inclusion of corporeality into the divine essence.
89
 Most of the 
early modern mechanists (both rationalist and empiricist), such as Descartes, Boyle, 
Newton and others continued to ascribe power or motion in corporeal nature to God 
in the traditional way. As suggested above, Spinoza did not discard the notion of God 
from his thought and simply assign the important notion of power to matter itself. 
Following from his doctrine of substance monism, Spinoza conceives God to be 
immanent in our world as an eternal naturing essence, that is, a creative and 
sustaining or concurring power, from which all things follow and on which they 
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 This is one of the most defining radical features of Spinoza’s thought. Spinoza conceives the 
immediate mode of motion in matter to follow directly from the attribute of extension, thereby 
including corporeality directly into God’s essence (1p15sch). Although the mediate infinite mode of 
finite corporeal things follows only indirectly from God, the fact that Spinoza’s system includes 
corporeality as such in the divine nature was enough evidence to rouse suspicions against the intentions 
of his philosophy. His view was fiercely rejected by the Church and by most early modern 
philosophers and regarded as synonymous with atheism. For a fine discussion of this subject see Van 




intimately depend. For Spinoza ‘whatever is, is in God and nothing can be or be 
conceived without God (1p15) and this includes corporeality. However, his 
immanentist thinking did, no doubt, conceive power to somehow be inherent in our 
world and this notion was fiercely spurned and deemed to pave the way towards 
atheism (Downing 2002: 341).
 
It is notable that Spinoza consistently rejected such 
accusations of atheism (Ep30). He did however stand firm in his rationalist conviction 
that the essence of the corporeal world could not be at odds with reason and one of the 
consequences of his theory of substance and essence monism was that corporeality 
had to be conceived as somehow contained in and following from God’s essence and 
as having something essential in common with it (1ax5).   
 
3.2.3. Motion in matter 
 
In Spinoza’s system, motion and rest in matter, is conceived to be the first or 
immediate infinite modification
 
that follows from or is caused by the absolute nature 
of the attribute of extension (Ep64).
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 Seeing that this mode follows directly from 
God, it is understood to be infinite or powerful, by virtue of the cause in which it 
inheres. Spinoza held this view from early on in his career as seen in the following 
citation from the Short Treatise: 
 
Now, as regards the general Natura naturata, or the modes, or creations which 
depend on, or have been created by, God immediately, of these we know no 
more than two, namely motion in matter, and the understanding in the thinking 
thing. 
All that specially concerns Motion, such as it has been from all eternity, and to 
all eternity it will remain immutable; that it is infinite in its kind; that it can 
neither be nor be understood through itself, but only by means of Extension…, 
(ST1/9 S: 58,9.) 
 
In his later Theological-Political Treatise Spinoza seems to hold the same view 
regarding this matter: 
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 This is an intellectual insight that is formed by considering the true idea of extension or quantity. The 
concept of motion (in matter) is seen to be contained in the idea of an infinite extended substance and 





Now, in examining natural phenomena we first of all try to discover those 
features that are most universal and common to the whole of nature, to wit, 
motion-and-rest and the rules and laws governing them which nature always 




That Spinoza conceives the immediate infinite mode of motion in matter
91
 to be 
infinite by virtue of the cause, in which it inheres, is an important point. Spinoza does 
not, in my view, regard matter itself as inherently powerful. Its power or motion 
follows from God’s very essence, which is its cause and in which it continually 
inheres. For Spinoza, without God’s immanent eternal power, the durational realm of 
corporeal things cannot exist nor continue in existence. Although particular bodies are 
brought about by other bodies to exist in a certain manner, the power whereby this 
takes place and by which bodies persist in their existence, follows from God’s eternal 
and infinite power. A further point, that has been discussed in some detail earlier, is 
that the divine properties of eternity, simplicity, immutability and indivisibility are 
also assigned to this immediate mode of motion and rest in matter, by virtue of it 
following directly from its attribute (1p21). This has been justified earlier and the 
argument will not be repeated here. 
 
3.2.4. Particular bodies 
 
With the above as background, I will now attend to Spinoza’s theory of particular 
bodies in more detail.
 
 The main aim here is to explain why Spinoza deems the body 
to be unsuited to the task of attaining our highest perfection as human beings, which 
is to become as self-determined and active as possible. For Spinoza: ‘The essence of 
man (2p10cor) is constituted by definite modes of the attributes of God, to wit (2ax2), 
modes of thinking’ (2p11dem). The axiom to which he refers, states that ‘man thinks’. 
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 With regard to interpreting Spinoza’s notion of the infinite immediate modes there is of course much 
uncertainty. Nadler (2006: 87-98) gives a good discussion of some ways in which this matter can be 
approached. In my view, Spinoza’s own explanation of this mode, as motion in matter (cited above), 
seems best. He means to say that the inmost essence of the durational world of corporeal phenomena is 
just motion (and rest) in matter. The durational mode of motion in matter is an eternal, infinite, 
immutable and indivisible expression of God’s very essence or power. All particular bodies, produced 
by this eternal and infinite motion in matter are, in essence, just certain ratios or proportions of motion 





With regard to our human essence, Spinoza seems by and large, to disregard the body 
and one would like to know why this is the case.  
      With regard to particular bodies, of which we experience a great variety, Spinoza 
seems to follow Descartes’s mechanist approach that: ‘All the variety in matter, all 
the diversity of its forms, depends on motion’ (CSM I: 232).
92
 For both Descartes and 
Spinoza, particular bodies are produced in accordance with the laws governing 
motion-and-rest in matter.
93
 It is mainly in the second part of the Ethics, in the well - 
known ‘Physical Digression’, after 2p13 that Spinoza attends to these matters. For 
him the variety found in natural bodies is brought about solely by motion and rest in 
matter and particular ‘bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion 
and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance’ (2p13lem1). That 
which differentiates particular material things from one another is motion and rest in 
matter and different bodies are formed when certain speed-ratios of motion in matter 
are brought about.
94
 For example, the difference between a man and a horse is 
attributed to their bodies differing in terms of quickness and slowness, i.e. motion in 
matter. As Nadler says, ‘what distinguishes one parcel of extension from another can 
be only the relative motive differences between the two parcels’ (2006: 138). This of 
course signifies a telling departure from the traditional hylemorphic view.
95
 As 
claimed above, Spinoza employs this mechanist view throughout his writings, as can 
be seen from the following citation: 
 
… extension contains no other modes than motion and rest, and … every 
particular material thing is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and 
rest.., (STapp2 S: 106.)   
 
When a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude form close contact 
with one another through the pressure of other bodies upon them, or if they are 
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 For Thiel (1998: 229) Spinoza’s theory of the individuation of bodies takes up mechanist ideas from 
Descartes.  
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 See for example Descartes’s three laws pertaining to natural bodies (CSM I: 240-242). Spinoza does 
not claim to have precise knowledge of how material things are produced in accordance with these 
laws (Ep32; TTP4 S: 427).    
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 With regard to the EIP, as discussed earlier, a relatively stable individual nature that can be known to 
an extent by the mind is very important. This helps the mind to form an idea of itself. Although the 
individual natures of bodies, i.e. the exact ratio of motion and rest in matter cannot be adequately 
known, we can have some experiential knowledge that a body does indeed have such a nature and that 
the possibility of it’s construction is contained and follows from God.   
95




moving at the same or different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvarying 
relation of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be united with 
one another and all together to form one body or individual thing, which is 
distinguished from other things through this union of bodies. (2lem3ax2def.)  
 
It is evident that, for Spinoza, particular bodies are formed by internal and external 
causes (speed-ratio from within and pressure from without) and that these factors give 
rise to a certain stable ratio of motion and rest between the many parts, which the 
individual body, thus formed, endeavors to maintain. Apart from the two elements 
mentioned, Spinoza seems to also attribute a natural tendency to the parts to 
harmonize or cohere with one another to form a particular body and to preserve its 
nature: 
 
By coherence of parts I mean simply this, that the laws or nature of one part 
adapts itself to the laws or nature of another part in such wise that there is the 
least possible opposition between them. (Ep32 S: 848.) 
 
It is quite clear then that, for Spinoza, particular things are determined to exist in a 
certain manner by other finite causes (2p45sch). This certain manner refers to the 
individual natures of different bodies and to durational aspects, such as, when, where 
and for how long finite things exist. Seeing that the immediate infinite mode of 
motion in matter inheres directly in God and that particular bodies are conceived to be 
finite expressions or modes that arise from motion and rest in matter, particular 
bodies, once formed to exist in a certain manner (2p45sch), do have the means or their 
own
96
 power to preserve their nature and to strive for the improvement of their being. 
Furthermore, Descartes and Spinoza both thought that there are some given basic 
ways in which corporeal matter can be shaped to form particular bodies of different 
sizes. Such possible shapes or structures of corporeal matter are seen to come about in 
accordance with the laws governing motion and rest (STapp1p4 S: 103).  
      Being necessarily part of mobile matter, particular material things are continually 
exposed to the affections of other bodies that constitute the whole of motion and rest. 
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 As argued this is a legitimate albeit inadequate view. A particular thing’s apparent own power is 




Spinoza writes about this in his quite famed letter 32 to Henry Oldenburg of the 
Royal Society:  
 
Now since the nature of the universe is not limited … but is absolutely infinite, 
its parts are controlled by the nature of this infinite potency in infinite ways, and 
are compelled to undergo infinite variations. (S: 849.)  
 
In this mechanist view, particular bodies, in order to survive, need then to continually 
adapt (as far as they can) to the ever-dynamic motion of the world of natural things of 
which they are an inextricably small part. If however, the affect from external forces 
is too strong and a body’s own ratio of motion and rest is disrupted and overpowered, 
it will perish. In Spinoza’s mechanist view, particular bodies are understood to be part 
of the eternal and infinite mode of motion in matter and therefore continually at the 
mercy of external forces. An important point now is that all the trials and tribulations 
of particular bodies, caused by the many affects on them, brought about by this 
dynamic interaction with other things, cannot be known with complete certainty. Such 
knowledge depends on understanding the totality of causes by which a body is 
determined to exist in a certain manner and is clearly beyond the grasp of a finite 
human mind. The immediate infinite mode of motion in matter is seen by Spinoza to 
be infinite, by virtue of its cause, and its infinite affections or expressions cannot be 
determined or comprehended by a finite human mind:  
 
… if anyone were to attempt to determine all the motions of matter that have 
ever been, reducing them and their duration to definite number and time, he 
would surely be attempting to deprive corporeal Substance, which we cannot 
conceive as other than existing, of its affections, and to bring it about that 
Substance should not possess the nature which it does possess. (Ep12 S: 790.) 
 
An example of an attempt to determine all the motions of matter, cited above, would 
be to think that motion in matter produces its finite modes according to a fixed and 
pre-determined plan. Such an anthropomorphic view would rob the extended 
(corporeal) substance of its divine nature. As argued earlier, the single very essence of 
God is expressed as a corporeal substance and also in the mode of motion in matter. 




some experiential knowledge of the complex durational existence of natural 
phenomena, but this will always be incomplete. One of the most important reasons for 
this situation is that the sensory ideas that arise passively in the mind due to the 
body’s affections are partial and incomplete.
97
  For Spinoza, a particular body is part 
of nature and ‘a part … cannot be adequately conceived through itself independently 
of the other individual parts’ (4app S: 358).  
      The inevitable consequence, in my view, of this mechanist theory is that particular 
bodies, despite seemingly having individual natures (unique speed ratios of matter), 
are not conceived to be strictly individual at all, but are seen as parts of a larger body, 
i.e. the whole of motion and rest in matter (2p13sch):  
 
We shall readily conceive the whole of Nature as one individual whose parts – 
that is, all the constituent bodies – vary in infinite ways without any change in 
the individual as a whole. (2p13sch.)  
 
In Spinoza the above conception is counter intuitive and a rather unnatural and a 
difficult way of perceiving things (1p15sch). Most people are accustomed to 
perceiving things in a common sense manner, by sense perception (2p29cor). 
However, if we accept that the natural world, in essence, amounts to motion and rest 
in matter, then the many different material bodies (which are varying speeds of 
matter) must cohere and harmonize with one another to form a unified body of motion 
and rest. Garber (1998: 591) describes Spinoza’s view as stretching mechanism and 
amounting to perceiving the corporeal world as a whole, i.e. as a complex body, made 
up of simpler bodies. In this mechanist conception of the natural world, a particular 
body simply cannot stand outside of this whole body of motion or not cohere with it 
and with other bodies, without immediately perishing. To perceive bodies in this way, 
for example, would be to think that we can remove (and keep intact) a certain wave in 
the ocean from the body of mobile water or that the wave in question has its own 
unique shape and motion because of its own nature and to disregard the continuous 
determining influence of the motion of the whole body of water and that of 
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 A detailed explication of Spinoza’s theory of sense perception will not be given here. For the 
purpose of explaining his theory of emending the intellect it suffices to know that ideas based on sense 
perception arise in the mind due to the body being passively affected by things external to it. For 
Spinoza, perceiving things through the senses is to follow the common order of nature and such 





surrounding motions or waves on it. As argued quite extensively thus far, particular 
material things are superficially conceived as separate parts through the senses, which 
Spinoza sees to be quite a natural, albeit inadequate, way to understand things. The 
true intellectual conception of corporeality is however very difficult for us, seeing that 
we too are embodied limited things: 
 
If therefore we consider quantity insofar as we represent it in the imagination – 
and this what we more frequently and readily do – we find it to be finite, 
divisible, and made up of parts. But if we consider it intellectually and conceive 
it insofar as it is substance – and this is very difficult – then it will be found to 
be infinite, one, and indivisible, as we have already sufficiently proved. This 
will be quite clear to those who can distinguish between the imagination and the 
intellect, especially if this point is stressed, that matter is everywhere the same, 
and there are no distinct parts in it except insofar as we conceive matter as 
modified in various ways. Then its parts are distinct, not really but only 
modally. (1p15sch.) 
 
It has been discussed in chapter two that a key element in Spinoza’s view of particular 
things is the conception of particular things as modes of the undivided extended 
substance in motion and not as separate individual bodies that exist by their own 
means. This view does not aim to devalue particular material things, but seeks to 
uncover their inmost essence, which is received from God’s power on which they 
wholly depend. Conceiving the Natura naturata in this way is, in my view, the 
unavoidable consequence of Spinoza’s commitment to his doctrine of substance and 
essence monism.
98
 At bottom, the consequence of the notion of essence monism is 
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 Han van Ruler (2009: 172) articulates this development in early modern rationalist thought very 
well: ‘Not only did Spinoza remain faithful to the Cartesian idea that mind and matter are irreducible 
metaphysical categories, he also accepted the distinction between being as it is in itself and the ‘modes’ 
of finite duration - a distinction Spinoza presents in terms of an active substance of natura naturans on 
the one hand, and natura naturata on the other, consisting of infinite series of successive modi. 
Geulincx’s Body-as-such was thus included into the essence of God, and the divine attributes of 
thought (Cogitatio) and extension (Extensio) were combined into a single substance that functioned as 
an absolute individual. By distinguishing this single ‘substance’ from its temporal ‘modes’, Spinoza 
only furthered the Platonic division between eternal and temporal being. The similarities between 
Geulincx’s and Spinoza’s analyses illustrate in what way the Cartesian onslaught on Aristotelian 
metaphysics initiated a new ontology. Geulincx’s and Spinoza’s point was not so much to identify 
substance and attribute, as to emphasise the gulf between the substance-attribute conglomerate and its 
modal effects. Ultimate ‘natures’ or ‘forms’ of existence, whether ‘Body’ or ‘Mind’ in Geulincx’s case, 




that God is understood to be the sole cause (first and concurrent) of the essences and 
existence of all things in the universe and this essence or power is eternal, infinite, 
indivisible and immutable (2p10cordemsch). However, this view does, no doubt, lead 





      It should, hopefully, now be more apparent why our self-determination cannot be 
sought in the realm of corporeality. All ideas that arise from the body’s inevitable 
affections, that is sense perception, will always be partial and inadequate. For 
Spinoza, our pursuit of self-determination, perfection and joy cannot be based on such 
uncertainty and contingency. Our self-contentment is to be discovered in the true 
contentment of the mind, which can only follow from that which we clearly 
understand.  
                                                                                                                                                              
the Aristotelian ontology of individual natures, this shared strategy is no coincidence. Once substantial 
forms had been dismissed, the notion of individuality had lost its force within the natura naturata, so 
that post-Cartesian metaphysics had to search for an alternative notion of individuality and identity 
beyond the world of natural objects - a notion of individuality, moreover, that preserved all its 
traditional causal characteristics. Not surprisingly, the net result was identified by Geulincx as a 
basically Platonic solution’. 
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 The ontological status of particular material things is a well-known difficulty in Spinoza. For some 
discussion of this problem in Spinoza scholarship, see Nadler (2006: 76-80) and Viljanen (2009: 75,6). 
The basic difficulty seems to be how the notions of the infinite (unlimited) and the finite (limited) are 
to be reconciled on his thought. If particular things can be conceived as not existing, which they clearly 
can, then their essences do not involve existence and cannot therefore be included in God’s essence. I 
have argued for the simplicity of God’s essence and this seems to preclude any introduction of 
differentiation into the divine essence. The challenge is to explain how the finite expressions of God’s 
essence are related to the infinite divine nature in Spinoza’s thought. In my view, there are two routes 
that can be taken to solve this problem. The first is to accommodate some differentiation or limitation 
in God’s essence and the second is to accept a weaker notion of the ontological reality of particular 
finite things. In my view, Spinoza rules out the first option quite decisively and I, therefore, opt for the 
second. Although particular things do express the divine essence in accordance with their perfection, 
and their essences are somehow contained in God and they do exist through God’s power, they still do 
not ‘pertain to the essence of substance’ (2p10). As argued, the perception that particular things exist 
by there own power and are really distinct from God and each other is a conception that Spinoza 
attributes to sense perception. In sense perception notions such as time and measure are needed and in 
Spinoza’s view such notions are entis imaginationis (Ep12). I argue that, when conceived by the 
intellect, which reveals the true reality of our being, the mediate infinite mode of motion and rest, i.e. 
the realm of particular natural things, is conceived to be infinite, indivisible and one. For Spinoza, 
particular things can be conceived in two ways, by sense perception or by using reason. When 
conceived by reason, that which is common to all bodies is conceived and the individual aspects do 
largely fall out of the picture (2p44cor2dem). This view does attribute a rather weak ontological status 
to particular things in Spinoza. As further support for this reading, I refer to another important theme in 
Spinoza’s thought, that the emendation of the intellect leads us to a resignation (4app32) or a 
detachment from our own transient individual being (ST2/19 S: 89). When we use reason aright it 
directs us to detach from our fleeting particular being and to attach ourselves to God’s intransient 
essence (ST2/23 S: 95). A weak notion of individuality in Spinoza’s conception of particular things, as 
only indirect finite expressions of God’s essence, is then to be expected. In my view, Spinoza 
reconciles the infinite and the finite in his philosophy by conceiving finite things to be only modal and 
not real differentiations in God’s infinite essence. See Melamed (2010) for an interesting discussion of 
Spinoza’s apparent weak notion of individuality in modes. His suggestion, with which I agree, is that 
‘it may well be the case that Spinoza intentionally designed the building blocks of his finite world as 
fuzzy units, in order to stress their inferiority to the self-subsisting, self-explaining, and well-defined 




      What then is the importance, if any, of particular bodies in Spinoza’s task of 
emending the intellect? According to Spinoza we can have some degree of certainty 
that our bodies do exist, through sense perception (my emphasis).  
 
Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and the human body exists 
according as we sense it. (2p10cor.)  
 
It is apparent in Spinoza that our knowledge of the body has much to do with sense 
perception and not the intellect.
 
 In order to know some particular thing, such as our 
body, we need to perceive it as related to a fixed time and place. To do this, the 
sensory notions of time, measure and number are required. It seems then possible to 
have some idea of the nature of our body through experience. For Spinoza we should 
not doubt the existence of our body and it is not seen to be completely unknowable, 
although such sensory knowledge will always be incomplete. Now with regard to the 
role of the body in the task of emending the intellect, it does seem that without 
durational bodies there would be no actual minds that think about their bodies.  
Koistinen makes this very important point and says that the point ‘Spinoza a bit 
unclearly makes is that all thinking is launched by our bodies being affected by 
external things. Without this kind of affection we could not have knowledge of the 
common notions nor of the infinite essence of God, which is the starting point of the 
third kind of knowledge, that is, of intuitive knowledge. Thus the route to these 
adequate ideas is bodily based’ (2009b: 187). Furthermore, the somewhat confused 
and obscure notion that we do have of our own body’s nature, does give us some 
sense of identity or an idea of a self (STapp2 S: 107). As argued, this is an extremely 
important matter with regard to becoming more active and self-determined and plays 
an important role in the EIP. This matter will be taken up again in the final chapter.  
      In closing, Spinoza’s mechanist view of the natural world can perhaps be likened 
to the ocean.
100
 The oceans of the world can be conceived as a single undivided body 
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 Koistinen (Forthcoming b: 1) uses the same analogy to describe the relation between human beings 
and God in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Spinoza himself uses the analogy of water in explaining the nature 
of extended Substance. In 1p17sch he writes: ‘For example, we conceive water to be divisible and to 
have separate parts insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is a material substance. In this latter 
respect it is not capable of separation or division. Furthermore, water, qua water, comes into existence 
and goes out of existence; but qua substance it does not come into existence nor go out of existence 
(corrumpitur)’. See also 3p59sch where Spinoza writes that human bodies are in many respects at the 
mercy of external causes and like waves that are tossed around by others when the sea is driven by the 






with its own eternal and infinite motion. There are some necessary and 
eternal features that are always related to the ocean, such as water, motion, waves, etc. 
The relation of particular bodies to the mode of motion in matter is then perhaps 
similar to that between particular waves and the ocean as a whole body of water in 
motion. Individual waves are not entities that can be or be conceived separately from 
the ocean and are in essence just different motions of water. A wave is both a 
modification of water that follows necessarily from the motion in the ocean as a 
whole and also from the many actions or causes in the ocean water surrounding it. A 
wave cannot cause itself to exist and to continue to exist and consider itself as 
undetermined or as an autonomous individual thing. A particular wave is determined 
to exist in a certain manner by external causes and can only exist if the ocean exists 
and the ocean cannot exist without having some motion or waves in it. There is an 
infinite variety of wave types caused by the motion of the ocean, which cannot be 
known to us. The ocean necessarily has waves, but it can exist and be understood 
without a specific wave type being present at a particular time.
101
 Although the 
appearance or face of the ocean changes all the time, in essence it is always the same, 
that is, just motion in water. No wave, however, can be or be conceived without the 
ocean and its idea.   
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 In Spinoza, God’s essence is expressed in his attributes and in the modes that follow from them, 
both the immediate infinite and the mediate infinite modes. Both modes are absolutely necessary 
properties of God’s attributes. However, the particular finite modes arising from the immediate mode 
of motion and rest seem not to be absolutely necessary. In my view, God will always have the attribute 
of extension, the immediate infinite mode of motion in matter and the mediate infinite mode of finite 
bodies that arises from the former. However, not all kinds of finite bodies will exist all of the time. If 
this were the case, the natures of finite modes would involve existence. Even if particular things exist 
necessarily when they do exist, this does not mean that their essence involves existence. Human beings, 
for example, have not always existed and they might go out of existence at some time, like other 
species before them. There will, however always be a mediate infinite mode of finite bodies, but its 
appearance or face will continuously change. This change in appearance, due to the absence of certain 
finite expressions of God’s essence does not threaten Spinoza’s demand that God’s essence must 
always be fully expressed. I argue, that all particular material things, existing or not, have the same 
essence, in that they are a certain ratio of motion and rest. Any specific finite body, say a human one, 
cannot be or be conceived without the true ideas of the attribute of extension and that of motion and 
rest in matter, but the former can be and be conceived without a particular body. God can exist and be 
understood without me, but I cannot exist or be understood without God. For McCracken (1998b: 638), 
Spinoza undertakes to deduce a priori only that there are infinitely many bodies that follow from God’s 




3.2.5. Body and essence 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I undertook to explain why Spinoza turns to the mind 
and not to the body, with regard to our highest good. I argue that the possibility for 
self-activity does not lie in the body, which seems to be wholly determined by 
external causes, which cannot be conceived adequately.
102
 In this, the body is very 
different to the mind and also the reason why the body in early modern thinking is 
understood to be at the mercy of chance. This important difference between mind and 
body is what I set out to explain in this chapter. I argue that our essence as humans 
lies in our mind (2p11dem) and the undertaking of the EIP is the endeavor to perfect 
our intellect by attaining the highest level of knowledge, which is to know God 
intuitively. This insight produces our highest good and joy. In Spinoza, human self-
contentment lies in the true contentment of the mind, i.e. that which we know with 
certainty to be true.  
      It is understandable that, for some early moderns, the new emerging mechanist 
vision was somewhat gloomy, especially from the perspective of human beings, when 
compared to the traditional prevailing worldview. In the new mechanist view there is 
a tremendous shift from the traditional view of humans as having a rather unique and 
privileged status in the world of natural material things. Human beings were 
traditionally seen, to be, in some sense, the image of God, with some even chosen and 
destined to an eternal life of bliss. The mechanist theory introduced a radically new 
view of human bodies as being merely a tiny part in the huge machinery of nature and 
saw no essential difference between the human body and any other material thing. 
                                                        
102 Spinoza’s EIP is focused on perfecting the human mind and it seems that it is only human minds 
that can be developed or emended. Why is this the case? The mind is the idea of the body and a mind 
that is able to know God and many other things adequately (2p47sch) must have something to with the 
nature of its body. In Spinoza not all bodies are the same and some are more independent than others. 
When discussing the human body in 2p13sch, Spinoza says that in some bodies ‘the actions of one 
body depend on itself alone’ and is less reliant ‘that other bodies concur with it in its actions’. Seeing 
that Spinoza is dealing with human bodies in this passage, I think it fair to suggest that he deems 
human bodies to be of the kind that are more independent than others. The picture in Spinoza regarding 
bodies is actually quite positive and the body is not conceived as something completely negative to be 
escaped from or as a prison for the mind. It seems then that the ability of a mind to become self-
conscious and active is related to the type of body that it is united to. The more self-determined a body 
is the more suited its mind will be to become active. In the General Definition of Emotions Spinoza 
writes: ‘For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of 
the object’ (S: 319). The minds of snails are rather dull, following the passive nature of snails. Minds 
of humans are more powerful following their body that is more self-determined. As argued, for 
Spinoza, the human body does have an important role to play in the development of a highly conscious 
and intuitive mind. This seems to have also to do with the complexity of the human body and its 




Following the analogy of the ocean, Spinoza’s philosophy could be interpreted as 
saying that the human body is like any other body, like a wave in the ocean, just 
coming and going in a short matter of time. It is hardly surprising then, that Spinoza’s 
philosophy, which implemented this mechanist theory rigorously and also introduced 
the radical immanentist conception of God, was fiercely opposed and regarded as a 
vision leading to atheist materialism.
 
   
      For Spinoza however, the essence of being human is not only about being a mind. 
The human body is regarded as quite exceptional in that it is able to function more 
independently than most other bodies. The positive upshot of this is that the idea of 
this body will also be quite special and Spinoza’s philosophy is very focused on the 
human mind as the main tool for achieving our highest perfection, which is to be self - 
determined through our given true ideas. However, although the body has an 
important role to play in us having adequate ideas, the essence of being human does 
not lie in the body, but in the mind. As argued, it is through the development of the 
mind or the emendation of the intellect that mankind can achieve its highest 
perfection and happiness and even some form of salvation and eternity.
103
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4. Essence and Method in the TdIE 
 
In the first three chapters I have outlined certain key elements in Spinoza’s EIP, 
which I argue, is primarily aimed at devising the best method for discovering 
certainty in our knowledge. A second task, thus far, has been to clarify the crucial role 
of the notions of essence and essence monism in his method of emending the intellect. 
My focus and procedure in the following section of this work (chapters four, five and 
six) will change somewhat and the attention will mainly turn to the text of Spinoza’s 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE). 
 
My aim in this fourth chapter is to 
uncover the main elements of Spinoza’s rationalist method as it is developed in this 
early treatise.
104
 Spinoza’s theory of knowledge also starts to emerge in the TdIE, 
which will be attended to in chapter five. His theory of the mind’s eternity, which he 
does seem to consider towards the end of the TdIE, will be the subject of chapter six. 
As suggested, the procedure will change somewhat in this section, in that I will now 
follow and discuss certain relevant sections of Spinoza’s text quite closely. I aim to 
support my interpretation of Spinoza’s method, which I have outlined in the previous 
chapters, with some strong textual evidence from the TdIE. 
      The TdIE will then be the main focus in this section, but where necessary I will 
also look to Spinoza’s other writings for clarification on certain matters. As is known, 
the TdIE is an unfinished work and it is therefore necessary, to sometimes follow the 
further development of his thought on certain subjects, i.e. his theory of knowledge, in 
his other works.
105
 I will also present somewhat of a comparison between Spinoza’s 
TdIE and Descartes’s Regulae in this section.
 
 These two early works have much in 
common, which I think justifies the decision to present their theories pertaining to 
method and knowledge in a side-by-side manner. I have indicated thus far that I 
understand Spinoza’s method of philosophy to be a typical example of the early 
rationalist approach to the philosophical challenges of the early modern period, which 
came about largely due to the important work of Descartes. Although Spinoza does 
follow Descartes quite closely in certain respects, there are also some important 
differences in their method, which will also be attended to.
 
  
                                                        
104
 Spinoza does also discuss the fictitious, the false and doubtful ideas in some detail in the TdIE. I 
will not attend to this matter in any detail. For my subject it suffices to know that all such ideas 
originate in sense perception and should be distinguished from the true ideas of the intellect (TdIE§84).  
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 This said, I am however of the opinion that the basic elements of Spinoza’s method and 




   
4.1. Intellect and certainty  
 
The hallmark theory, held by early modern rationalists such as Descartes, Spinoza and 
also Leibniz, which distinguished them quite decisively from their empiricist 
contemporaries, is that of innate ideas. I have spent some time explicating this theory 
and will not repeat the same here. It is widely accepted that it was mainly Descartes 
who promoted an inventive theory of the mind, which signaled a strong departure 
from the view of the mind held by his Aristotelian-scholastic predecessors. As 
discussed, a most important aspect of Descartes’s theory of the human mind was his 
conviction that the mind is much more self-determined than what was previously 
thought to be the case. This belief in the mind’s natural ability to produce adequate 
ideas and certain knowledge is the main thrust behind the desire in early modern 
philosophy to shed its traditional humility and to become more independent, through 
the true ideas of the mind. An important trait of the early rationalist view of the mind 
is its determination to form its own true ideas and not to accept and follow a given or 
a traditional understanding of things. The following citation from the Regulae 
captures this rationalist sentiment in Descartes quite well: 
 
The natural bent of my mind, I confess, is such that the greatest pleasure I have 
taken in my studies has always come from not accepting the arguments of 
others but from discovering arguments by my own efforts. It was just this that 
attracted me to the study of the sciences while I was still in my youth. (CSM I: 
35.)  
 
The Regulae is filled with declarations reflecting Descartes’s appreciation of the 
human intellect and his conviction of its pivotal role in the pursuit of certitude is 
evident. I have gathered a few short citations from this work to illustrate this central 
belief, which so characterizes early rationalist thought (my emphasis):   
 
… nothing can be known prior to the intellect, since knowledge of everything 










Within ourselves we are aware that, while it is the intellect alone that is capable 
of knowledge
106
, it can be helped or hindered by three other faculties, viz. 
imagination, sense perception, and memory. (Ibid.: 32.)   
       
If we now turn to Spinoza’s TdIE, the likeness with Descartes’s view of the intellect 
is quite striking. I will illustrate this in what follows with a sampling of important 
texts from the TdIE. The first citation gives a good illustration of the commitment 
among these early rationalists to the intellect and it also contains an analogy that was 
commonly used in this period with regard to the human mind. This text is rather 
important in that all the basic elements of Spinoza’s method of emending the intellect 
are found in it:  
 
But the fact is that at first, with the tools they were born with, men succeeded, 
however laboriously and imperfectly, in making some very simple things; and 
when these were made they made other more complex things with less labor 
and greater perfection; and thus advancing gradually from the simplest works to 
the making of tools, and from tools to other works and other tools, they have 
reached a point where they can make very many complex things with little 
labor. In just the same way the intellect by its inborn power makes intellectual 
tools for itself by which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works, 
and from these works still other tools – or capacity for further investigation – 
and thus makes steady progress until it reaches the summit of wisdom.  
That this is the case with the intellect will readily be seen, provided we 
understand what is the method of seeking the truth, and what are those innate 
tools which are all the intellect needs for making other tools from them as to 
progress further. (TdIE§31-32.)   
 
The key distinction between the intellect and the imagination or sense perception, so 
common in early modern rationalist thought, is also evident in Spinoza:   
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 Scientia is the term used in the original text, which is Descartes’s term for certain, or scientific 





Or if you wish, you may understand by imagination whatever you please, as 
long as it is something different from the intellect, and that the soul is passive 
to it. It matters not how you understand it, now that we know that it is 
something random, and that the soul is passive to it, while we also know how 
we may be delivered from it with the aid of the intellect. (Ibid.§84.) 
  
One of the clearest commitments of Spinoza to the early rationalist theory of the mind 
is found towards the end of the treatise, where he lists the properties of the intellect. 





That it involves certainty; that is, it knows that things are in reality as they are 
contained in the intellect in the form of thought. (Ibid.§108.)  
 
The above is enough confirmation that the theory of the true innate ideas of the 
intellect is a core belief in early rationalist thought and that Descartes and Spinoza 
both employ it quite strongly and in much the same way in their early work. I argue 
that Spinoza’s TdIE is specifically tasked to further develop this theory and to 
incorporate it as a key doctrine in the very heart of his philosophical program.   
      The early modern philosophical quest for certainty has been introduced and I 
argue that Descartes and Spinoza participated in this overall project. There were at 
least two main issues in the early modern period that fuelled this search and need for 
epistemological certitude. I have referred to the research of Toulmin and to his 
finding that the untenable situation arising from the serious religious and other strife 
in this time called for some direction in order to discover truth and certainty.
108
 There 
was however also a second concern, that arose and followed in the wake of the new 
mechanist view of the natural world, which also figures rather strongly in the 
development of the new rationalist theory of the mind. It was mentioned towards the 
end of the last chapter, that the new mechanist theory of the material world delivered 
a quite telling blow to the long-standing way in which the position or status of human 
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 Spinoza’s complete list of the properties of the intellect will be dealt with later on in this chapter.  
108
 This matter was briefly introduced in the introductory chapter. See Toulmin (2009) for more detail 




beings in the world was understood. With the steady weakening of the customary 
view of God’s providence, that was furthered eroded by the discoveries of the new 
science, an unsettling view started to emerge in this period that the human body was 
like any other material thing. The human body was seen to also be a small and 
insignificant part of the huge machinery of the corporeal world and as largely at the 
mercy of powerful natural forces.
109
 As seen, the new mechanist view of corporeality 
challenged the established view of human beings (body and mind) as having a 
somewhat privileged place in our world. This development in the early modern world-
view, raised the question if the human mind was able to supply some form of 
certainty to perhaps counter the apparent precarious position of the body in the 
material world, or was the mind itself also at the mercy of external forces? To better 
understand the response of Spinoza to the situation described above, we need to turn 
to a very important letter that he wrote in 1666 to a close friend of his, Johan 
Bouwmeester, who was a medical doctor and also an interested member of Spinoza’s 
close philosophical discussion group (Nadler 1999:173). Bouwmeester was, 
seemingly, perplexed by similar thoughts to those mentioned above and wrote to 
Spinoza in this regard. It is in letter 37 that we find Spinoza’s response. This 
correspondence is quite important in my opinion in that it gives some interesting and 
relevant contextual background information, which helps to better understand the 
important philosophical questions of the day and also gives a clear and concise 
explanation by Spinoza of his method of philosophical enquiry.
110
 It is therefore 
worth quoting a section of the letter in full: 
 
I pass on to your question, which is as follows: whether there is or can be a 
method such that thereby we can make sure and unwearied progress in the study 
of things of the highest importance; or whether our minds, like our bodies, are 
at the mercy of chance, and our thoughts are governed more by fortune than by 
skill.  I think I shall give a satisfactory answer if I show that there must 
necessarily be a method whereby we can direct and interconnect our clear and 
distinct perceptions, and that the intellect is not, like the body, at the mercy of 
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 There were many practical problems threatening human society in early modern times and the 
human mind was seen as a key element in discovering scientific knowledge that could help to alleviate 
them. Social problems such as credulity, a lack in education, poor health, poverty and natural disasters 
were some of the challenges of the day (TdIE§15,17). 
110
 Letter 37 is also important for a better understanding of the TdIE, with which it is associated 




chance. This is established simply from the following consideration, that one 
clear and distinct perception, or several taken together, can be absolutely the 
cause of another clear and distinct perception.  Indeed, all the clear and distinct 
perceptions that we form can arise only from other clear and distinct 
perceptions which are in us, and they acknowledge no other cause outside us.  
Hence it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions that we form depend 
only on our nature and its definite and fixed laws, that is, on our power itself 
alone, and not on chance, that is, on causes which, although acting likewise by 
definite and fixed laws, are yet unknown to us and foreign to our nature and 
power.  As for the other perceptions, I do admit that they depend in the highest 
degree on chance.  From this it is quite clear what a true method must be and in 
which it should especially consist, namely, solely in the knowledge of pure 
intellect and its nature and laws. To acquire this, we must first of all distinguish 
between intellect and imagination, that is, between true ideas and the other – 
fictitious, false, doubtful, and, in sum, all ideas which depend only on memory.  
To understand these things, at least as far as the method requires, there is no 
need to get to know the nature of mind through its first cause; it is enough to 
formulate a brief account of the mind or its perceptions in the manner 
expounded by Verulam. I think that in these few words I have explained and 
demonstrated the true method, and at the same time shown the way to attain it.  
It remains, however, for me to advise you that for all this there is needed 
constant meditation and a most steadfast mind and purpose, to acquire which it 
is most important to establish a fixed way and manner of life, and to have a 
definite aim in view. (Ep37.)  
 
The above citation contains much of importance regarding certain aspects of 
Spinoza’s thought that my work is focused on. Firstly, our bodies are understood by 
both Bouwmeester and Spinoza to be ‘at the mercy of chance.’ This view reflects the 
mechanist view of the material world already discussed. In this view, particular 
material things or bodies are completely determined by natural forces, largely beyond 
human control. For Spinoza, this conclusion has to do with the rationalist approach, 
that, since certain knowledge of the durational realm of particular material bodies is 




as beyond our control and therefore as contingent.
111
 Spinoza seems to have held this 
view throughout his philosophical career and argues in much the same way in the 
much later Political Treatise (TP): 
 
So if something in Nature appears to us a ridiculous, absurd or evil, this is due 
to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that we are for the most part 
ignorant of the order and coherence of Nature as a whole, and that we want all 
things to be directed as our reason prescribes. Yet that which our reason 
declares to be evil is not evil in respect of the order and laws of universal 
Nature, but only in respect of our own particular nature. (TP2 S: 685.)   
 
In his letter to Henry Oldenburg of the Royal Society, Spinoza makes a similar point:  
 
As to knowing the actual manner of this coherence and the agreement of each 
part with the whole, I made it clear in my previous letter that this is beyond my 
knowledge. To know this it would be necessary to know the whole of Nature 
and all its parts. (Ep32.)    
 
Recall from letter 37, quoted above, that the kind of knowledge associated with the 
durational existence of the body, the imagination, is also seen to ‘depend to highest 
degree on chance’. This kind of knowledge is associated with the body and stems 
from it being affected in many ways by external forces. The sensory ideas of these 
affections are seen to be confused and partial, in that they reflect more of the affected 
state of our body than that of the bodies affecting us. For Spinoza we cannot have 
adequate knowledge of our own body nor of other bodies. Our mind has seemingly 
little or no control over the whole process of sense perception and is not able to make 
clear sense of these body based ideas. For this reason, Spinoza claims that we do not 
have certain knowledge of an influential part of our mind, i.e. the imagination 
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 Spinoza says as much in the TTP4: ‘Furthermore, we plainly have no knowledge as to the actual co-
ordination and interconnection of things – that is, the way in which things are in actual fact ordered and 
connected – so that for practical purposes it is better, indeed, it is essential, to consider things as 
contingent’ (S: 427).  Spinoza says, in even stronger terms, that the chain of causes that bring about the 
existence of natural bodies is ‘hidden’ from us (1p33sch1). In Spinoza contingency boils down to 
having inadequate or partial knowledge of things. In reality for Spinoza, however, there is no 
contingency whatsoever (1p29). It is only our knowledge of this realm that is partial and, therefore, 




(2p29sch). For Descartes and Spinoza, there is no certainty to be found in sense 
perception and experience and it receives a rather low rating. The human passions are 
also closely associated with our inadequate ideas. I argue then, that the pursuit of 
certainty in early rationalist epistemology, had to change its course of direction to 
focus on the ideas of the essence of things, which, could be known with complete 
certainty.  
Another point, worth highlighting in Spinoza’s letter to his friend, is that the nature of 
thought is seen to be quite different
 
 to that of extension and also as governed by 
different laws. Spinoza writes there that the laws of motion-and-rest are not only 
‘unknown’ to our minds, but are also ‘foreign to our nature and power’. Spinoza is 
here clearly propounding the early rationalist theory of the intellect and also that our 
highest human good is not associated with the body, but with the mind. As claimed 
earlier, this statement is in accordance with Spinoza’s view as found in his other 
works and in the Ethics, that ‘the essence of man’ is not to be sought in the body, but 
in ‘modes of thinking’ (2p11dem).
 
 I argue that the early rationalist view that human 
essence is closely related to the intellect is best understood against the background of 
the new mechanist theory of corporeality. Because the body is regarded as highly 
insecure, the intellect is seen by Spinoza to be man’s better part and, indeed, as his 
essence, i.e. the best means of finding his highest good in the true contentment that 
only certain knowledge can offer. Not surprisingly this line of thinking in Spinoza’s 
correspondence is also found in the TdIE:  
 
…as far as I know, they never conceived the soul, as we are doing, as acting 
according to fixed laws, a sort of spiritual automaton.  
For we know that the operations by which imaginings are produced are subject 
to laws which are quite different from the laws of the intellect,
 
and that in 
relation to imagining, the soul has only a passive role. (TdIE§85, 86.) 
 
Spinoza makes it quite clear in his letter that the correct method of emending the 
intellect has to do with clear and distinct ideas, only:  
 
Our aim, then, is to have clear and distinct ideas, such as originate from pure 





I argue that the pursuit of certitude in Descartes and Spinoza has by and large turned 
its back on ideas based on sense perception alone and is mainly focused on attaining 
true and certain knowledge of the universal and common essence of things, by means 
of the intellect.  
 
4.2. Reflexive knowledge 
 
In line with early modern mechanism, Spinoza regards all particular things, human 
beings included, to be a part of nature and therefore determined by external forces to 
follow a passive kind of existence. For Spinoza, human beings are mostly not able to 
live in accordance with reason and to actively employ their intellect at all times. This 
is not seen to be their fault and is mostly the outcome of the influence of forces 
beyond their control. In the Political Treatise Spinoza writes ‘…that it is no more in 
our power to have a sound mind than to have a sound body’ (TP3 S: 684). This view 
is also found in the TdIE:  
 
…we shall have to declare that there are men whose minds are also blinded 
either from birth or by reason of their prejudices, that is, through some accident 
that has befallen them. For they are not even aware of their own selves. If they 
affirm or doubt something, they do not know that they are doubting or 
affirming. (TdIE§47.) 
 
If a proof is presented to them, they do not know whether the argumentation is 
valid or not. If they deny, grant or oppose, they do not know that they deny, 
grant or oppose. So they must be regarded as automata, completely lacking in 
mind. (Ibid.§48.) 
  
Nevertheless, Spinoza does seem to think that some of us, with the necessary resolve, 
are able to undertake the EIP successfully, to live in accordance with reason and to 
find true contentment and even eternal joy. It has been discussed that the process of 
becoming rational is not seen by Spinoza to be something that develops naturally and 
of its own accord in humans. To the contrary, for Spinoza humans are mostly inclined 




Therefore, in order to make progress in the EIP and to successfully emend our 
intellect we need to follow a certain method. A haphazard approach to the EIP is 
doomed to failure. Recall Spinoza’s closing thoughts in letter 37: 
 
It remains, however, for me to advise you that for all this there is needed 
constant meditation and a most steadfast mind and purpose, to acquire which it 
is most important to establish a fixed way and manner of life, and to have a 
definite aim in view. 
 
The method required to achieve our highest human good, will be the focus of the 
following section. As said, the hallmark of early modern rationalist thinking is the 
view that the human mind is naturally endowed with true ideas and, not surprisingly, 
it is to these innate tools that Spinoza turns to form the indubitable basis for his 
method of emending the intellect. 
    
4.2.1. The idea of an idea 
 
The first aspect of Spinoza’s method as found in the TdIE is his notion of reflexive 
knowledge or the idea of an idea: 
 
… method is nothing but reflexive knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and 
because there is no idea of an idea unless there is first an idea, there will be no 
method unless there is first an idea. So a good method will be one which shows 
how the mind is directed according to the standard of a given true idea. 
(TdIE§38.)  
 
The method of reflexive knowledge in Spinoza involves distinguishing between the 
many different ideas that constitute our minds.
112
 For Spinoza, some of the ideas in 
our minds are clear and distinct, whereas others are confused and obscure. His method 
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 Spinoza’s method of reflexive knowledge is, in my view, quite different to Descartes’s method of 
radical doubt. Doubt plays little or no part in Spinoza’s method. He does not seem to think that we can, 
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aims to develop our ability to differentiate between our adequate and inadequate ideas 
and to understand the essential difference between them. A crucial first step in the EIP 
is to become aware of our true ideas and to understand their nature and what they 
signify. Once this basic step has taken place, the mind will certainly know what a true 
idea is and, by this standard, will be able to distinguish between its true ideas and 
others in the mind that are inadequate: 
 
… there must first of all exist in us a true idea as an innate tool, and together 
with the understanding of this idea there would likewise be an understanding of 
the difference between this perception and all other perceptions. Herein 
consists one part of our method. (Ibid.§39.)  
 
In Spinoza’s method, the given true ideas of the mind are the key intellectual tools 
used in the process of emending the intellect and in purifying it of the influence of its 
uncertain sensory notions. As argued earlier, the true ideas of the intellect, include the 
adequate ideas of God’s essence, the attributes and the common notions. Inadequate 
ideas refer to sensory ideas that arise in the mind as the body is affected by outside 
forces. The first goal of the method of idea reflexiva: 
 
…is the understanding of what is a true idea, distinguishing it from other kinds 
of perceptions and examining its nature, so that we may thereby come to know 
our own power of understanding and may train the mind that it will understand 
according to this standard all that it needs to be understood, laying down 
definite rules as aids, and also ensuring that the mind does not waste its energy 
on useless pursuits. (Ibid.§37.)  
 
For Spinoza becoming aware that our minds do possess true ideas and understanding 
what this signifies, amounts to having certainty about such ideas. Certainty in Spinoza 
is not something that is later added to our true ideas.
113
 Having certitude and 
possessing true ideas amounts to the same thing: 
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And from this again it is evident that for the certainty of truth no other sign is 
needed but to have a true idea. For as we have shown, in order to know, there is 
no need for me to know that I know. From this, again, it is clear that no one can 
know what the highest certainty is unless he has an adequate idea or the 
objective essence of some thing. For certainty and objective essence are the 
same. (Ibid.§35).  
 
4.2.2. Simple ideas    
 
Spinoza’s theory of given true ideas, is clearly an indispensable element in his method 
of emending the intellect. However, strange as this may seem, this theory appears to 
not really play an important role in the interpretation of his philosophy.
114
 A possible 
reason, for the theory of simple ideas seemingly not being taken seriously in 
scholarship, is that Spinoza does often use different terminology in this regard, such 
as the term common notions, which is used in the Ethics. This has, perhaps, resulted in 
this theory not being easily recognizable in his later works. I argue that the theory of 
simple ideas plays a crucial role in Spinoza’s philosophy throughout his writings and 
is especially important for his method of emending the intellect. I will attempt to 
justify this claim in this section. The theory of simple natures and ideas has been 
introduced and discussed in the preceding chapters and I will not repeat anything 
unnecessary in here. My aim is to give some textual evidence in support of my claim. 
I will firstly highlight this theory in Descartes’s Regulae and thereafter refer to 
Spinoza’s TdIE.  
      Descartes’s theory of simple natures and ideas is one of his most important 
foundational theories and forms the backbone of his rationalist method. I will firstly 
give a presentation of Descartes’s theory, which will be brief, seeing that this theory 
has already received some attention. Descartes gives an important summary of his 
rationalist method in Rule 6 of the Regulae: 
 
In order to be able to do this (devise a method, my addition) correctly, we 
should note first that everything with regard to its possible usefulness to our 
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project, may be termed either ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’ – our project being not to 
inspect the isolated natures of things, but to compare them with each other so 
that some may be known on the basis of others.  
   I call ‘absolute’ whatever has within it the pure and simple nature in question; 
that is, whatever is viewed as being independent, a cause, simple, universal, 
single, equal, similar, straight, and other qualities of that sort. I call this the 
simplest and the easiest thing when we can make use of it in solving problems. 
   The ‘relative’, on the other hand, is what shares the same nature, or at least 
something of the same nature, in virtue of which we can relate it to the absolute 
and deduce it from the absolute in a definite series of steps. The concept of the 
‘relative’ involves other terms besides, which I call ‘relations’: these include 
whatever is said to be dependent, an effect, composite, particular, many, 
unequal, dissimilar, oblique, etc. (CSM I: 21-2.)   
 
The theory of simple natures and ideas is also found in Rule 12:   
 
That is why, since we are concerned here with things only in so far as they are 
perceived by the intellect, we term ‘simple’ only those things which we know 
so clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the mind into others 
which are more distinctly known. Shape, extension and motion, etc. are of this 
sort; all the rest we conceive to be in a sense composed out of these. (Ibid.: 44.)  
 
Those simple natures which the intellect recognizes by means of a sort of innate 
light, without the aid of any corporeal image, are purely intellectual. (Ibid.: 45.) 
 
The ideas of these simple natures are:  
 
… self evident and never contain any falsity … For this reason, it is evident that 
we are mistaken if we ever judge that we lack complete knowledge of any of 
these simple natures … For if we have even the slightest grasp of it in our mind 









To this Descartes then adds: 
 
…it is not possible for us ever to understand anything beyond those simple 
natures and a certain mixture or compounding of one with another. (Ibid.: 46.)  
 
The upshot of this situation is that:  
 
…we need take no great pains to discover these simple natures, because they 
are self evident enough. (Ibid.: 48.) 
 
His conclusion then is: 
 
…the whole of human knowledge consists uniquely in our achieving a distinct 
perception of how all these simple natures contribute to the composition of 
other things. (Ibid.: 49.)
 
   
 
The main points of Descartes’s theory can be summarized as follows. Firstly, there 
are certain features in natural things that are universal and common to all things, such 
as being extended, having a certain size and shape and being in motion and at rest. 
These common features or simple natures and their properties are, secondly, 
expressed in all natural things and also in our ideas of them. Seeing that these simple 
ideas are necessarily involved in all our ideas of things, such ideas will be complete in 
the mind and will be clear and distinct. Such ideas cannot be discovered by sense 
perception and are only conceived by the intellect, to which they are innate and, in a 
sense, self-evident. It is only of such simple natures that the mind can form clear and 
distinct ideas, which are also termed simple ideas. In Descartes the focus of scientia 
or scientific knowledge is to attain certitude by discovering and employing these 
                                                        
115
 This aspect of the theory of simple ideas is especially important for Spinoza’s EIP. It has been 
discussed that the EIP is deemed necessary because the mind is negatively influenced by inadequate 
ideas that have even obscured its true ideas. However, this does not mean that the innate light of reason 
has been completely distinguished. For Descartes and Spinoza it is impossible that we do not have any 
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adequate ideas. Thirdly, simple ideas are not mere entities of reason (entia rationis), 
but are conceived to be adequate ideas of simple natures that really exist, but in a 
different way to things that exist durationally. The conviction that such simple natures 
exist is an intellectual insight. This conclusion is in line with the early rationalist 
dictum that whatever is true is something. Simple natures have a self-subsisting type 
of nature and are referred to in theological terms as true and immutable, divine natures 
or essences. As argued in Descartes and Spinoza, God’s essence is conceived to be 
completely simple.
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 It is to these simple natures that the intellect relates when it 
knows clearly and distinctly (Carriero 2009: 5).  
      I have no doubt that a very similar theory is found in Spinoza’s TdIE and that his 
rationalist method of emending the intellect employs a Cartesian type theory of 
simple natures and ideas. To support this claim I will firstly give a selection of the 
many references in the TdIE to the doctrine of simple natures and ideas. This theory 
has been discussed in some detail already and my purpose here is only to present 
some textual proof of the strong presence of this theory in Spinoza’s early treatise on 
the emendation of the intellect: 
 
Then again, since a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct but only 
confused, and since all confusion arises from mind’s having only partial 
knowledge of a complete whole or a unity composed of many constituents – 
failing to distinguish between the known and the unknown, and also attending 
at the same time without any distinction to the many constituents contained in a 
single thing – it follows, first, that if the idea is of a thing completely simple, it 
can only be clear and distinct. For such a thing would have to be known not in 
part, but either wholly or not at all. Secondly, it follows that if a thing 
composed of many constituents is divided in thought into all its simplest parts, 
and attention is given to each part separately, then all confusion will disappear. 
Thirdly, it follows that a fictitious idea cannot be simple, but is formed by the 
blending of various confused ideas of various things and actions existing in 
nature; or, as better expressed, fiction results from attending at the same time, 
without assent, to various ides of this kind. For if fiction were simple, it would 
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be clear and distinct, and consequently true. And if it were formed from the 
blending of distinct ideas, their composition would also be clear and distinct, 
and therefore true. (TdIE§63-4.)      
 
I specifically refer, at this point, to the terminology used in the above citation, which 
mostly accompanies the use of the theory of simple natures and ideas in early modern 
rationalist thought. This refers to the description of something as being equal in the 
part as in the whole. For Joachim, Spinoza conceives an idea as ‘simple if its ideatum 
is simple; for then it is the commensurate apprehension of a reality indiscerptibly 
single, i.e. such that it must be conceived entirely or not at all’ (1940: 130). Joachim’s 
description of something simple as indiscerptibly single is very important and correct, 
in my view. It is telling that the phraseology referred to above is also found in the 
second part of Spinoza’s Ethics:  
 
That which is common to all things (see Lemma 2 above) and is equally in the 
part as in the whole does not constitute the essence of any one particular thing. 
(2p37.) 
 
Those things that are common to all things and are equally in the part as in the 




Therefore, that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God is common to all things, and equally in the part as in the whole. And so this 
knowledge will be adequate (2p38). (2p46dem.)   
 
Note moreover, that the above citations from the Ethics are taken from the section in 
which Spinoza presents his theory of adequate ideas. I regard this all as strong support 
for my contention that the theory of simple natures and ideas does continue to be 
employed by Spinoza in the Ethics and throughout his writings.
 
As does Descartes, 
Spinoza also distinguishes simple ideas from sensory ideas and also associates the 
former exclusively with the intellect: 
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… a completely simple thing cannot be the object of fiction, but only of 
intellect. (TdIE§65.)  
 
Spinoza, as did Descartes, forges a strong association between adequate or clear and 
distinct and simple ideas and for both it is only of simple natures that adequate or 
clear and distinct ideas can be formed. I claim that the early rationalist for attaining 
certitude in our knowledge includes the theory of simple natures as one of its core 
doctrines and that this is also so with regard to Spinoza’s method.
 
 I suffice with a last 
quotation from the TdIE: 
 
But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false; for ideas of things 
which are clearly and distinctly conceived either are absolutely simple or are 
compounded of absolutely simple ideas – that is, deduced from absolutely 
simple ideas. But that an absolutely simple idea cannot be false is obvious to 
everyone, provided he knows what is truth or understanding, and likewise what 
is falsity. (Ibid.§68.)  
  
The best examples of such simple ideas in Spinoza’s system are the adequate ideas of 
the attributes, which express God’s simple, i.e. his indiscertibly single essence.
 
 For 
example, the idea of extension
118
 is such a simple idea and is self-evidently true 
because the idea of extension is completely present in each and every idea of a body, 
or a part of it or the affections thereof, that the mind has (2p38dem).
 
  
      To end this section, I refer to an interesting explanation that Spinoza gives of how 
such simple ideas can be put to work to produce adequate knowledge, i.e. his example 
of the rotating semi circle (TdIE§72). In this case the cause of a sphere is conceived to 
be a rotating semi circle and, for Spinoza, this can then be considered to be a true 
idea, formed by the mind combining two different simple ideas (that of a semi circle 
and of motion) adequately. The idea of a rotating semi circle would be false if it were 
seen in isolation from its cause (Joachim 1940: 96). This is because the idea of motion 
is not contained in the idea of a semi circle, when regarded on its own, nor does the 
idea of motion include the idea of a semi circle. However, when these two simple 
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ideas, i.e., the idea of motion and the idea of a semi circle, are combined by the 
intellect to be the cause of a sphere, then this compounded simple idea is adequate 
and certain.       
 
4.2.3. Deduction  
 
In the Regulae Descartes distinguishes between two basic actions of the intellect, that 
of, intuition and deduction (CSM I: 14). For Descartes, the first act of intuition is the 
indubitable conception of the mind, which is easy and distinct and leaves no room for 
doubt about what is understood. This action, he says, proceeds solely from the natural 
light of reason. As seen in the previous section, such intuitive knowledge pertains to 
simple ideas and this type of knowledge, for Descartes, has a direct nature, that is, 
without reasoning taking place.
 
    
      The second act of deduction is described by Descartes as ‘the inference of 
something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known 
with certainty’ (ibid.: 15). This second action is deemed necessary since there are in 
actual fact very few absolutely simple ideas from which one can proceed. Absolutely 
simple ideas are seen to contain other true ideas, which can be inferred or deduced 
from the former by the intellect. This is another very important element in early 
modern rationalist method and is used quite extensively by Spinoza. A good example 
is that he perceives the idea of motion in matter to be contained in and therefore to 
follow necessarily from the idea of an extended substance (TdIE§108). As argued 
earlier, the principle applied by Descartes in deduction is that ‘some things can be 
known on the basis of others’ (CSM I: 21). This method entails, further, that the 
natures of such things, which cannot be known through themselves, i.e. in isolation 
from one another other, can only be known in relation to each other or, which is the 
same, on the basis of others, (ibid.). In Spinoza, for example, God’s essence, i.e. his 
power, is known directly. All created things will receive their essence from God, who 
is the proximate cause of such essence. The latter does not refer to the individual 
nature of some created thing. Something’s essence, as I mainly use the term in this 
work, denotes its simple or inmost nature and it is this nature that is inferred or 
deduced from God’s essence. Spinoza infers the simple or inmost nature of all things 




contained in the idea of God’s essence, i.e. his power, from which it can be deduced. 
This type of action clearly has more of an indirect nature and some reasoning is 
required. The notion of an intellectual order is also important in deduction. Absolutely 
simple ideas cannot be divided into ideas that are more basic and have an absolute 
character and rank the highest. Such ideas are the basic building blocks for a system 
of indubitable knowledge. From such ideas the intellect or reason is able to deduce 
other ideas that are contained in the absolute ones and to connect all the true ideas in 
an intellectual order, in such a manner that the first can be reached by passing through 
all the intermediate ones from bottom to top and vice versa:  
 
The ‘relative’, on the other hand, is what shares the same nature, or at least 
something of the same nature, in virtue of which we can relate it to the absolute 
and deduce it from the absolute in a definite series of steps. The concept of the 
‘relative’ involves other terms besides, which I call ‘relations’: these include 
whatever is said to be dependent, an effect, composite, particular, many, 
unequal, dissimilar, oblique, etc. The further removed from the absolute such 
relative attributes are, the more mutually dependent relations of this sort they 
contain. This rule points out that all these relations should be distinguished, and 
the interconnections between them, and their natural order, should be noted, so 
that given the last term we should be able to reach the one that is absolute in the 
highest degree, by passing through all the intermediate ones. (Ibid.: 21-2.)  
   
I have argued throughout that Spinoza employs the basic method developed by 
Descartes in his own philosophy. I will attempt to further justify this claim by 
showing that Spinoza also employs the second element of deduction in his method as 
developed in the TdIE. Some clear statements of this are the following (my 
emphasis):  
  
It is evident that, for the human mind to reproduce a faithful image of Nature, 
it must draw all its ideas from that idea which represents the source and 
origin of the whole of Nature, so that this may likewise become the source of 





But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false; for ideas of things 
which are clearly and distinctly conceived either are absolutely simple or are 
compounded of absolutely simple ideas – that is, deduced from absolutely 
simple ideas. (Ibid.§68.)  
 
For the nature and virtue of that light consists essentially in this, that by a 
process of logical deduction that which is hidden is inferred and concluded 
from what is known, or given as known. That is exactly what our method 
requires. (TTP7 S: 467.) 
 
From the above I think it is quite clear that Spinoza follows Descartes’s basic 
method
119
 quite closely and that he includes deduction as an integral part into his own 
method. However, this second element in the method of reflexive knowledge, namely, 
deduction, applies only to our adequate ideas. Inadequate ideas are mutilated, partial 
and fragmentary and cannot be deduced from true ideas nor can they be connected in 
any intellectual order. As argued (my emphasis): 
 
Thus we have distinguished between the true ideas and other perceptions, and 
we have established that the fictitious, the false, and other ideas have their 
origin in the imagination, that is, in certain sensations that are (so to speak) 
fortuitous and unconnected, arising not from the power of the mind but from 
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external causes, in accordance as the body, dreaming or waking, receives 
various motions. (TdIE§84.)   
 
4.2.4. Other innate tools 
 
Apart from the given true ideas discussed above, there are also other important 
intellectual tools that Spinoza develops in the TdIE, which play an important role in 
his rationalist method. Spinoza regards the intellect as able to produce a variety of 
intellectual tools for itself in order to make progress ‘until it reaches the summit of 
wisdom’ (ibid.§31). In the TdIE, Spinoza refers to such other tools of the intellect as 
basic principles or axiomatic truths
120
, of which he gives the following description: 
  
For a thought is also said to be true when it involves as its object the essence 
of some basic principle which is uncaused and is known through itself and in 
itself.  
Therefore the specific character of a true thought must be intrinsic to the 
thought itself without reference to other thoughts. Nor does it acknowledge its 





Such universal axiomatic truths are highly regarded in Spinoza and he seems to regard 
them as even more important and evident than the idea of God. In the chapter on 
miracles in the TTP he states that: 
 
Since God’s existence is not self-evident, it must necessarily be inferred from 
axiomatic truths which are so firm and incontrovertible that there can neither 
be, nor be conceived, any power that could call them into question…For if we 
could conceive that these axiomatic truths themselves can be impugned by any 
power, of whatever kind it be, then we should doubt their truth and 
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 To this class belong the many principles and axioms used by the early rationalists, such as the 
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consequently the conclusion following therefrom, namely God’s existence; 
nor could we ever be certain of anything…and all our apprehensions of every 
kind must be called into doubt. (TTP6 S: 447.)  
 
For Spinoza, ‘such a belief would cast doubt on everything, and would lead to 
atheism’ (S: 448).  It is notable from the above citation from the TdIE, that Spinoza 
describes such axioms as uncaused, and ideas known through itself and in itself, 
which are all terms usually reserved to conceive God’s essence. Evidently, such 







The second part of Spinoza’s method of emending the intellect has to do with ‘getting 
to know the conditions of a good definition, and then devising a way to discover 
them’ (TdIE§94). It seems that reflexive knowledge on its own, cannot produce the 
adequate starting point that Spinoza seeks and that some help from reasoning is 
needed. Definitions
122
 play a very important role in Spinoza’s rationalist method and 
become especially so in the production of the all - important starting point for his 
philosophical system. In this respect, Spinoza develops his method quite differently 
from that of Descartes, who does not assign the same role to definitions in his work 
and advocate their use.
 
In the Principles of Philosophy Descartes writes:  
 
I have often noticed that philosophers make the mistake of employing logical 
definitions in an attempt to explain what was already very simple and self – 
evident; the result is that they only make matters more obscure. (CSM I: 195-6.) 
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 Descartes also mentions other intellectual tools, such as axioms, that are required in his method. In 
Rule 12 of the Regulae we find the following: ‘To this class (simple natures) we must also refer those 
common notions which are, as it were, links which connect other simple natures together, and whose 
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122
 Spinoza seems to have been influenced with regard to the use and nature of definitions that he 




In the TdIE the true idea of God is seen to play a crucial role in getting Spinoza’s 
rationalist system underway. For Spinoza his method ‘would be most perfect when we 
possessed the idea of a most perfect Being. So at the outset this must be our chief 
objective, to arrive at the knowledge of such a Being as speedily as possible’ 
(TdIE§49). This requirement of an early rationalist method, i.e. the possession of an 
anchoring perfect idea, is repeated towards the end of the treatise: 
 
As to the ordering of all our perceptions and their proper arrangement and 
unification, it is required that, as soon as is possible and reason demands, we 
should ask whether there is a being – and also what kind of being – which is 
the cause of all things so that its essence represented in thought is also the 
cause of all our ideas. Then our mind, as we have said, will reproduce Nature 
as closely as possible; for it will possess in the form of thought the essence, 
order and unity of Nature. (Ibid.§99.)     
 
However, as mentioned, Spinoza did not regard the idea of God to be completely self 
- evident. Spinoza’s solution to this problem is quite different to that of Descartes in 
that he does not resort to the cogito ergo sum solution
123
, but takes the route of 
employing true definitions: 
 
So the correct path to discovery is to develop our thinking from the basis of 
some given definition, and progress will be more successful and easier as a 
thing is better defined. (Ibid.§94.)  
   
For Spinoza then the best method of initiating his philosophical project is by means of 
true definitions, which are Spinoza’s absolute starting points (Nadler 1999: 227). The 
use of definitions becomes especially important towards the end of the TdIE, where 
Spinoza moves toward discovering the idea of the most perfect Being or God to start 
and anchor his system. 
      Spinoza firstly deals with the nature of definitions and says that a good definition 
must ‘explain the inmost essence of something and must take care not to substitute for 
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this any of its properties’ (TdIE§95).
 
 To illustrate this requirement he uses the 
example of a geometrical figure, a circle.  He writes (my addition) that ‘if this (a 
circle) is defined as a figure in which the lines drawn from the centre to the 
circumference are equal, it is obvious that such a definition by no means explains the 
essence of a circle, but only one of its properties’.  If however, he says a few lines 
later, a circle is defined ‘as a figure described by any line of which one end is fixed 
and the other movable. This definition clearly includes the proximate cause’ 
(ibid.§96).
124
  Recall in this regard the example, discussed earlier, of a sphere 
constructed by use of a rotating semi circle. The conception of a rotating semi circle 
can also be regarded as an adequate definition of a circle, seeing that it includes its 
proximate or efficient cause. Now, as we have become accustomed to, we here again 
find the notions of cause and adequate knowledge working close together in Spinoza. 
With regard to the use of definitions in Spinoza, there is a close relation between a 
good definition and the notion of cause. Something whose nature involves existence, 
i.e. is the cause of itself, is defined through its own essence, whereas something 
whose nature is distinguished from its existence, i.e. is not the cause of itself, must be 
defined through its proximate cause. This method is the same as that found when 
Spinoza considers the best kind of knowledge, which is to know something through 
its essence alone or through its proximate cause (ibid.§19). 
      Therefore, when Spinoza moves on to set out the requirements for a good 
definition of created things, the first condition he stipulates is that a good definition 
must include the proximate cause of the created thing.
125
 In the case of the circle it 
involves a line and the rotation of this line around a fixed point. In the case of the 
sphere it included the semi circle and the rotation of this. Spinoza’s method of 
defining created things adequately requires, that the nature of the efficient cause of 
such things must be included in the definition. The method applied is that the 
definition or essence of the created thing will be inferred from the definition or 
essence of its proximate cause. In terms of Spinoza’s rationalist method this 
requirement makes complete sense. Created things are defined as modes that are in 
something else and conceived through something else (1def5). An adequate definition 
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 Hobbes uses these same requirements and also the same example of a circle in his discussion of 
definitions (De Dijn 1996: 156).  See also footnote 216 to letter 60, where Morgan says: ‘From an 
axiomatic perspective, this claim amounts to the requirement that all definitions be constructive. 
Spinoza’s understanding of geometrical construction follows closely that of Thomas Hobbes.’ (S: 913).   
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 I have argued earlier that I understand proximate cause here to refer to God, the efficient cause of 




of created things must therefore involve the idea of God’s essence, which is the first 
and sole cause of all things (1p25). If this is done correctly, the properties of the 
created thing can be inferred or deduced from its conception, which is Spinoza’s 
second condition for such definitions.
 
 In the case of the correct definition of a circle 
‘…we can clearly deduce that all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference 
are equal’ (TdIE§96).  
Spinoza’s requirement for a good definition of created things seems quite 
straightforward regarding geometrical objects, but how should this requirement be 
understood in the case of particular things? What would the definition of a particular 
man, say Peter, look like, and how is it possible that the properties pertaining to Peter 
can be inferred from the definition of Peter? In my view Spinoza’s letter 34 is quite 
helpful in this regard. Spinoza states there that: 
 
1. The true definition of each single thing includes nothing other than the 
simple nature of the thing defined. Hence it follows that: 
2. No definition involves or expresses a plurality, or a fixed number of 
individuals, since it involves and expresses only the nature of the thing as it is 




The interesting point from the above citation is that, for Spinoza, a good definition 
can only express something’s simple nature, which refers to the things nature or 
essence, as it is in itself.  Seeing that it is only to God that a simple nature is 
attributed, the requirement for a good definition of created things refers us to the 
nature of the thing’s efficient cause, which is to God’s nature or essence. In 4pref, 
Spinoza writes that ‘nothing belongs to the nature of anything except that which 
follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause’. If we apply Spinoza’s 
rule for the definition of a created thing, then the true definition of a particular thing 
must express the nature of its efficient cause, which is God’s nature. A good 
definition of a particular thing, in Spinoza, would then perhaps be, that such things are 
finite modes of God’s very essence, which is his power.
127
 From this definition, its 
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 This matter is also addressed in 1p8sch2 and the argument presented is much the same as in Ep34. 
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 The few definitions in Spinoza, relating to particular things all seem to capture that which all such 
things have in common. For example, in 1def5 the dependent nature of finite modes is defined. That all 




properties, such as its conatus or striving nature, can be inferred. In my view then, the 
role of definitions in Spinoza, with regard to particular things, is not aimed at 
conceiving the individual natures of created things, for example, of a certain human 
being. This is not a controversial claim and follows quite clearly from Spinoza’s 
method, which states that particular things are not in themselves and cannot be 
conceived through their own natures. Consequently, in my view, the individual nature 
of a created thing can also not be defined adequately. In my view Spinoza did not 
intend that definitions be used for this purpose in his system. The individual nature of 
a particular thing to exist in a certain manner is determined by other finite things and 
this nature cannot be inferred from the nature of its proximate cause to be known 
adequately. In accordance with letter 34, cited above, it is my view that only 
something’s simple nature, that is, the nature of its efficient cause (God), which all 
particular things express, that can be defined adequately.
128
 As argued throughout it is 
only the common essence of things, i.e. their simple or inmost nature that can be 
adequately known and defined. This matter is a very good illustration of how the 
notions of essence and method work together to produce good definitions and 
adequate knowledge of all things. Spinoza completes his rules for a definition of 
created things with the third condition, which is that a good definition of a created 
thing must also be affirmative.   
      In the case of uncreated things the requirements for a good definition are: 
  
1. That it should exclude every cause; that is, that the thing should need 
nothing else for its explanation besides its own being. 
2. That, given the definition of the thing, there should remain no room for the 
question: Does it exist?  
                                                                                                                                                              
2def1. In 2def7 the determined existence of all particular things is defined and in the Definitions of 
Emotions the very essence of man is defined as desire (S: 311).  
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 As discussed earlier, it is not my intention to suggest that particular things do not have individual 
natures and that we cannot have any adequate knowledge at all about them. For Spinoza much can be 
adequately known about individual things. We can know with certainty that they are contained in God, 
follow from God and are continuously dependent on him and that they do express God’s essence. We 
can also certainly know that all finite bodies do have individual natures, i.e. ratios of motion and rest. 
As argued previously, because we cannot fully comprehend how the individual nature of a body is 
actually produced, our idea of it will always be partial or inadequate. Our finite minds cannot contain 
an adequate idea of the whole causal nexus involved in producing particular bodies. I argue in the 
following chapter that Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge of the third kind is mainly tasked with knowing 





3. That, as far as the mind is concerned, it should contain no substantives that 
can be put in adjectival form; that is, it should not be explicated through any 
abstractions.  
4. And finally (although it is not really necessary to make this observation), it 
is required that all its properties can be deduced from its definition. 
(TdIE§97.)  
 
      Spinoza seems then to have made good progress and has produced the rules or 
conditions that true definitions must comply with. He seems then to have devised a 
way to produce the foundational definition of the most perfect Being or God, which 
will anchor his philosophy and supply the indubitable starting point from which true 
and certain ideas of the essences of all things can be deduced. In the TdIE this point 
was never reached, as the treatise remained unfinished. The foundational definitions 
of his system are however present in his other works and the most mature example is 
found in the Ethics:  
 
By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. 
(1def6.)  
 
      We should now be in a position to put the different elements of Spinoza’s 
rationalist method together. His method utilizes, firstly, simple or given true ideas that 
are combined with certain universal axiomatic truths to form foundational definitions 
which function as the absolute starting points for his system. These definitions are 
seen to contain certain knowledge of God’s essence as expressed in his attributes and 
the immediate infinite modes. From this indubitable inception it can be deduced with 
certainty that all particular things are modes of God’s essence and that their very 
essence is contained in God’s nature. In this way the essence, order and unity of the 
whole of nature can be known adequately (TdIE§99). In the section (§99-103) of the 
treatise Spinoza gives an overview of the method he has developed in the preceding 
sections. It is worthwhile considering this section in some detail as it gives quite a 






As seen, Spinoza’s method starts with the indubitable knowledge of 
God’s essence, which is the cause of all things and which essence represented in 
thought, is also the cause of all our ideas. Spinoza adds to this (my emphasis): 
 
…that it is above all necessary for us to deduce our ideas from physical things, 
i.e. from real beings, advancing as far as we can, in accordance with the chain 
of causes from one real being to another real being, and in such a manner as to 
never get involved with abstractions and universals, neither inferring something 
real from them nor inferring them from something real. For in either case the 
true progress of the intellect is interrupted.  
 
As argued earlier, Spinoza mostly uses the term real when referring to God’s essence 
as expressed in his attributes (STapp1p4dem; 1p15sch; 1p29sch; Ep83). In this 
section under consideration, Spinoza actually confirms this and says that by real 
beings
130
 he does not have mutable particular things in mind, but the fixed and eternal 
things, which refers to God’s essence as expressed in his attributes and immediate 
infinite modes. The first element in his method is the discovery of the true ideas of 
God’s essence, which are, the most universal features that are common to the whole 
of nature, that is, its fixed and eternal order and the laws through which Nature or 
God constantly and consistently acts. The intellect has these ideas innately and knows 
them to be certainly true. The second step is to deduce the essences of all other things 
from the true ideas of the essence of the most perfect Being or God. Spinoza makes it 
quite clear that the natures of particular things cannot be known empirically, that is, 
‘from their series or order of existing, which would furnish us with nothing but their 
extrinsic characteristics, their relations, or, at the most, their circumstances’ 
(TdIE§101). For Spinoza knowledge of the latter is ‘far from the inmost essence of 
things’. In the following sentence he then says quite clearly that this inmost essence of 
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 This can be compared to the section in the TTP7 (S: 460) in which Spinoza also gives an outline of 
his method. They are quite similar, in my view.  
130
 There is a close correlation in Spinoza’s rationalism between real existence and truth. In early 
rationalism a completely true idea is regarded to be of something real, that exists in the highest degree. 
The highest form of reality is attributed to God, whose essence is causa sui, that is, something whose 
existence pertains to its essence. God’s essence cannot be distinguished or separated from his 
existence. Modes are not self-conceived and have, therefore, a lesser essence and existence and 
therefore reality. It is only in modes that essence and existence are distinguished from one another. To 
say that finite things have a lesser level of reality is not to say they are illusionary. In Spinoza, all 
things are conceived to express reality in proportion to their nature. See Della Rocca (2008: 254-274) 




things ‘is to be sought only from the fixed and eternal things.’ He then adds that 
particular things depend intimately and essentially on the fixed and eternal things and 
‘can neither be nor be conceived without them.’ The essences of particular things are 
to be deduced from the adequate knowledge of the essences of the fixed and eternal 
things, that is, from their efficient cause, which is God. All things involve and express 
the eternal and infinite essence of God in proportion to their own nature. This 
knowledge, that God’s very essence is expressed in all things, according to their 
nature, is for Spinoza true knowledge of the eternal essences of things and this 
completes the task he set out to achieve. As he says, then ‘our mind…will reproduce 
Nature as closely as possible; for it will possess in the form of thought the essence, 
order and unity of Nature’ (TdIE§99).  
      With regard to certain knowledge of the durational existence of particular things, 
Spinoza adds that this ‘appears to be no small difficulty’ and seemingly beyond the 
powers of the human intellect (ibid.§102). To attain true knowledge of the durational 
existence of particular things, that is, over and above certitude of their essence, ‘we 
must resort to other aids apart from those employed in understanding the eternal 
things and their laws.’ Spinoza ends this section by saying that this project of 
acquiring adequate knowledge of particular things, albeit important, falls beyond the 
scope of his own enquiry, which is to acquire certainty with regard to ‘the eternal 
things and their infallible laws’ (ibid.).
 
 It seems that Spinoza thought that knowledge 
of the particular natures of things depended on empirical experimental research. His 
priority is clearly adequate knowledge of the eternal and fixed essence of things (De 





4.4. The properties of the intellect 
 
Spinoza’s final step in his unfinished treatise is to enumerate
131
 the properties of the 
intellect.     
  
1. That it involves certainty, that is, it knows that things are in reality as they 
are contained in the intellect in the form of thought.  
 
This property refers to the early rationalist theory of ideas and forms the heart of early 
rationalist thinking. I would only emphasize again, the close link between the intellect 
and certainty in early rationalism and in Spinoza. Since this matter has been discussed 
in quite some detail earlier, I will proceed to the following property.   
 
2. That it perceives some things, or forms some ideas, independently, and 
some ideas it forms from other ideas. To wit, it forms the idea of quantity 
independently without attending to other thoughts, but it forms the ideas of 
motion only by attending to the idea of quantity. 
   
The above refers to the notion of absolutely simple ideas. Such ideas are the most 
fundamental true ideas and are seen to contain other true ideas, such as the ideas of 
the modes, which can be deduced from them. The example is of the idea of extension, 
which idea is seemingly formed independently. The idea of extension or of quantity 
contains the idea of motion, which can be deduced from the former. The ideas of the 
essences of particular bodies, that they are all just a certain proportion of motion, 
follows from the idea of motion, I would assume.  
  
3. The ideas that it forms independently express infinity, but determinate ideas 
are formed from other ideas. For if it perceives the idea of a quantity through a 
cause, then it determines that idea through the idea of a quantity, as when it 
perceives that a body is formed from the motion of a plane, a plane from the 
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 In the Regulae ‘enumeration’ is one of the rules for directing the intellect that Descartes sets out. 
See, for example Rule 7: ‘We maintain, furthermore that enumeration is required for the completion of 
our knowledge. The other Rules do indeed help us to resolve most questions, but it is only with the aid 
of enumeration that we are able to make a true and certain judgment about whatever we apply our 




motion of a line, and a line from the motion of a point. These perceptions do 
not serve for the understanding of quantity, but only to determine it. This is 
evident from the fact that we conceive these quantities as formed, as it were, 
from motion, whereas motion is not perceived unless quantity is perceived; 
and again we can prolong the motion to form a line of infinite extent, which 
we could not do if we did not possess the idea of infinite quantity. 
 
I understand this property in much the same way as the previous one. The idea of 
extension is perceived as causa sui, whereas motion is perceived as caused or 
determined by the idea of extension. The idea of motion determines the idea of 
extension and does not add anything to its conception. 
 
4. It forms positive ideas before negative ones.  
 
As discussed earlier it was Descartes who introduced the quite revolutionary idea that 
the human intellect could have some affirmative or positive knowledge of God’s 
essence. Any knowledge of the nature of God was previously described in negative 
terms only. Spinoza refers to this earlier in the treatise: 
 
This is evident from the fact that men have often devised negative terms for all 
those things that are only in the intellect and not in the imagination (e.g. 
incorporeal, infinite, etc.), and they also express negatively many things that 
are really affirmative, and conversely (e.g., uncreated, independent, infinite, 
immortal, etc. (TdIE§89.)  
 
I understand this property to refer to the early rationalist positive understanding of the 
nature and power of the intellect. For them, the intellect had a true and positive 
cognitive grasp of the essence of things. 
 
5. It perceives things not so much under duration as under some form of 
eternity, and as being of infinite number. Or rather, in its perception of things, 
it attends neither to number nor duration. But when it imagines things, it 






This property of the intellect has already been discussed in some detail. The 
expression ‘under some form of eternity’ is used by Spinoza when referring to the 
conceptions of the intellect, that is reason or intuition.
132
 For example, when 
conceiving particular bodies in this manner the intellect conceives their efflux from 
eternity. All particular things are understood to be contained in God, to follow from 
God and to involve and express his essence.    
 
6. The clear and distinct ideas that we form seem to follow solely from the 
necessity of our nature in such a way as to seem to depend absolutely on our 
power alone. But with confused ideas the contrary is the case; they are often 
formed without our consent.  
 
This property has also been discussed in detail earlier.  
 
7. There are many ways in which the mind can determine the ideas that the 
intellect forms from other ideas. …There are innumerable other ways. 
 
Spinoza here refers to the active ability of the intellect to adequately form new ideas 
in many different ways, such as in the example of the rotating semi circle (TdIE§72).   
 
8. Ideas are the more perfect as they express a greater degree of perfection of 
an object. For we do not admire the architect who has designed a chapel as 
much as one who has designed a splendid temple.  
 
The intellect is able to produce a vast array of adequate ideas. As we have seen, the 
intellect produces the true definition of the most perfect Being or God, which is its 
greatest and most perfect achievement, for Spinoza.     
 
Then, as the editors of the treatise say: ‘The rest is lacking’ (S: 30).
133
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 See also the use of this expression in 2p44cor2 and 5p22. This matter will be dealt with in more 
detail in chapter six. 
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 Some scholars are of the opinion that Spinoza runs into difficulties in the final passages of the 
treatise and therefore abandons it. I do not intend adding to this speculation. For a brief discussion of 




5. Knowledge and Essence 
 
I argue that Spinoza’s project of emending the intellect is related to the supposed 
early modern philosophical quest for certitude. The response of some early rationalist 
philosophers, such as Descartes and Spinoza, to this challenge came in the form of an 
innovation in their epistemology that is aimed at adequately conceiving the inmost 
essence of things. I claim that Spinoza’s TdIE is aimed at devising the best way or 
method of undertaking this task, which includes the search for the kind of knowledge 
best suited for this purpose. In Spinoza, the idea of emending or perfecting the 
intellect has then clearly much to do with his theory of knowledge, which is the 
subject of this chapter. The explication of the close association between the notions of 
essence and certainty in his theory of knowledge will be an important area of focus. I 
contend that the best kind of knowledge in Spinoza, i.e. intuition or knowledge of the 
third kind also represents the attainment of the highest level of certainty in human 
knowledge.  
      In Spinoza’s TdIE, the task of discovering the kind of knowledge best suited for 
the purpose of attaining certitude, starts with the historiola mentis or the survey of 
knowledge types. Early on in this treatise Spinoza writes: 
 
To this end our natural order of exposition requires that I should here 
recapitulate all the modes of perceiving which I have hitherto employed in 
confidently affirming or denying something, so that I may select the best of all, 
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 In Ep37 Spinoza also refers to this survey of knowledge types and describes it as ‘a brief account of 
the mind or its perceptions in the manner expounded by Verulam’. This method of historiola mentis 
seems to have been propagated by Francis Bacon and was quite widely known and used in 








Spinoza describes this first knowledge type as follows:  
 
There is the perception we have from hearsay or from some sign conventionally 
agreed upon. (TdIE§19.)  
 
Examples that Spinoza gives of this knowledge type, is to know such things as the 
date of one’s birth and who one’s parents are, received from some kind of report. 
Such information is passively received from various sources, through hearsay, general 
opinion, gossip, and is found by most people to be quite trustworthy and is seldom 
doubted. For Spinoza, however, this type of knowledge is uncertain and does not 
perceive the essence of things, which is what his method aims to do. For Spinoza, 
from hearsay ‘we perceive nothing of the essence of the thing … and since a thing’s 
individual existence is not known unless its essence is known … we can clearly infer 
from this that any degree of certainty that we have from hearsay must be excluded 
from the sciences’ (ibid.§26 emphasis added). It is notable that the pursuit of certainty 
is apparent in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge from the very beginning. The exposing 
of knowledge that is based on hearsay, opinion and custom as uncertain is an 
important task of the EIP. As discussed, for Spinoza, the illness of the mind can partly 
be attributed to it being infested by inadequate ideas based on hearsay, opinion and 
the like. The individual wanting to make progress in Spinoza’s EIP needs to recognize 
the unsure nature of knowledge based on such perceptions and reject it as unsuitable 
for the purpose of attaining certainty. Spinoza thought that most people are quite 
happy to live by general hearsay and opinion and that it is extremely difficult to 
reduce one’s dependency on this type of knowledge. To do so demands some self – 
initiative, determination and courage. The importance of this point should not be 





5.1.2. Casual experience   
 
The second type of knowledge that Spinoza evaluates in terms of producing certitude 
is casual experience:  
 
There is the perception we have from casual experience; that is, experience that 
is not determined by the intellect, but is so called because it chances thus to 
occur, and we have experienced nothing else that contradicts it, so that it 
remains in our minds unchallenged. (Ibid.§19.) 
 
Hereafter Spinoza gives some examples of this kind of knowledge: 
 
By casual experience I know that I shall die; this I affirm because I have seen 
that others like me have died, although they have not all lived to the same age 
nor have they died from the same disease. Again, by casual experience I know 
that oil has the property of feeding fire, and water of extinguishing it. I know 
too that a dog is a barking animal and man a rational animal. And it is in this 
way that I know almost everything that is of practical use in life. (Ibid.§20.)  
 
Spinoza then draws the following conclusion:  
 
As to this second mode, again it cannot be said to contain the idea of the 
proportion
135
which it seeks. Besides its considerable uncertainty and 
indefiniteness, no one will in this way perceive anything in natural things 
except their accidents, which are never clearly understood unless their essences 
are first known. Hence this mode too must be excluded. (Ibid.§27.)  
 
In a footnote commenting on this type of knowledge, Spinoza likens it to ‘the method 
of proceeding of Empiricists’ (ibid.). As argued earlier Spinoza rejects the empiricist 
approach as unsuitable for attaining truth and certainty. In his view, certainty or 
scientia can only be found in an a priori type of knowledge of the essence of things. 
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For the likes of Descartes and Spinoza, empirical observation and experimentation 
could only deliver accidental knowledge, which, cannot be clearly understood ‘unless 
their essences are first known’ (ibid.). The term accident used here seemingly refers 
to the Aristotelian notion of a certain property that is seen to be non-essential to the 
nature of the thing.
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 I think it important to note that Spinoza does not have an all-
or-nothing approach when surveying the different kinds of knowledge. Although he 
does deem the first two knowledge types to deliver only uncertain ideas, that are 
unsuitable for his purpose, these kinds of knowledge are not regarded as completely 
worthless. He says in this regard, that it is mainly through such casual experience that 
we know ‘almost everything that is of practical use in life’ (ibid.§20). However, for 
Spinoza’s purpose of emending the intellect, the first two knowledge types are clearly 
inadequate. Perceptions of the second type do not fit Spinoza’s rationalist bill for 
certain knowledge. The most important reason for this inadequacy is that they do not 
produce knowledge of the essence of things.   
 
5.1.3. Inadequate inference 
 
Spinoza then moves to a third type of knowledge, which he describes as follows:  
 
There is the perception we have when the essence of a thing is inferred from 
another thing, but not adequately. This happens either when we infer a cause 
from some effect or when an inference is made from some universal which is 
always accompanied by some property. (TdIE§19.)  
 
This type of knowledge differs quite a bit from the previous and does aim at knowing 
the essence of things, but goes about this in the wrong way and consequently falls 
short. In this case, the essence of something is inadequately inferred from something 
else. Although Spinoza regards this mode of perception to be more reliable than the 
first two types, it is still not adequate for the purpose of truth and certainty. As 
discussed earlier, the method of knowing something on the basis of another is a key 
element in early modern rationalism and in this regard some progress is seemingly 
made and a higher ranking is assigned to this third type of knowledge. As said, the 
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problem here is that the inference is done inadequately. The correct way of 
conceiving the essence of a thing is to infer or deduce it from the true idea of its 
cause. The correct method is to proceed from cause to effect and not from an effect to 
its cause. Spinoza gives some interesting examples of this inadequate method of 
perceiving the essence of a thing: 
 
We deduce one thing from another as follows. When we clearly perceive that 
we sense such-and-such a body and no other, then from this, I say, we clearly 
infer that the soul is united to the body, a union which is the cause of such-and-
such a sensation. But from this we cannot positively understand what is that 
sensation and union. (Ibid.§21.)  
 
Spinoza’s example of inadequate inference here is that the ideas we have of the 
affections of a certain body can be used to infer the mind-body union, but from this 
sensation alone the nature or cause of this union cannot be known with any certainty. 
Spinoza’s rationalist procedure is that something can only be clearly and distinctly 
known, either through its essence alone, or through something else that is understood 
clearly and distinctly: 
 
For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either 
through itself or through something else which is conceived through itself. 
(5p28dem.)  
 
In this third type of perceiving the attempt is to proceed from an unclear idea of an 
effect to knowledge of the cause. This is contrary to Spinoza’s method and this kind 
of knowledge is consequently also deemed unsuitable for the EIP and rejected. In 
three footnotes (S: 7) to this first example Spinoza gives some more interesting detail 
as to why he rejects this type of knowledge. Firstly, in footnote f he says:  
 
In such a case, we understand nothing about the cause except what we consider 
in the effect. This is sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is then 
explained only in very general terms: e.g., ‘Therefore there is something; 
therefore there is some power,’ etc. Or again from the fact that the cause is 




something clearly conceived is ascribed to the cause by reason of the effect, as 
we shall show by an example. But it is only the properties, not the particular 
essence of the thing.   
  
In footnote g, which refers to the body-soul example discussed above, he says:  
 
For by this union we understand nothing beyond the sensation itself; that is, the 
effect from which we inferred a cause of which we know nothing.  
 
In this third mode of perceiving we are aware of the effects or properties of things, 
which we then deem to be caused by something. However, we have actually learnt 
very little or nothing about the cause itself. This method of inadequate inference 
produces only obscure perceptions of causes and effects but does not render any true 
and certain knowledge. In the third footnote h Spinoza warns that this type of 
inferential knowledge ‘is not to be relied on without great caution. When things are 
conceived in this abstract way and not through their true essence, they are at once 
confused by the imagination’. Spinoza also gives a second example of this inadequate 
type of inferential knowledge:  
 
After I have come to know the nature of vision and realize that it has the 
property of making us see one and the same thing as smaller at a distance than 
if we were to see it near at hand, we infer that the sun is bigger than it appears, 
and other similar instances.   
 
The third type of knowledge seems to only provide inadequate ideas of causes and 
effects, acquired through partial knowledge of the properties of something. The 
reason for rejecting this type of knowledge is quite clear and in accordance with 
Spinoza’s rationalist method. The nature of the cause or essence of something cannot 
easily be adequately inferred from its effects or properties if the latter are unclear. 
However, the method applied by this type of cognition, that of knowing something 
through its effects or properties is not to be entirely dismissed. We will later see that 




can be adequately known through its properties, if the ideas of its properties are clear 
and distinct.
137
   
  
5.1.4. Certainty and essence 
 
For Spinoza the only way or method of discovering certitude in knowledge is through 
the fourth way of perceiving things: 
 
Finally, there is the perception we have when a thing is perceived through its 




Much has already been said about this type of knowledge in previous chapters and, to 
avoid repetition, I will not discuss this in any more detail here. Spinoza does give 
some more information of this type of knowledge in this regard in two rather short 
passages that is worth briefly discussing:  
 
Finally, a thing is perceived through its essence alone when, from the fact that I 
know something, I know what it is to know something; or, from the fact that I 
know the essence of the soul, I know that it is united to the body. By the same 
kind of knowledge we know that two and three are five, and that if two lines 
are parallel to a third line, they are parallel to one another
138
, and so on. 
(Ibid.§22.)  
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 Towards the end of the TdIE (§107) Spinoza deems it possible to discover the definition of the 
intellect by considering its properties that are clear and distinct.  See also the TTP4: ‘… since the 
knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing other than the knowledge of a property of that 
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Spinoza’s remark in the above citation that ‘from the fact that I know the essence of 
the soul, I know that it is united to the body’ is a good example of what he has in 
mind with regard to this fourth kind of cognition. I argued earlier that Spinoza 
conceives the essence of thought as the affirmation of the object of which it is the 
idea. From the true idea of the essence of thought, i.e. affirmation, we can know the 
nature of the mind, that it is united with its body or that it affirms its body. Any actual 
mind will necessarily strive to affirm the existence of its body and to preserve its body 
as far as it can (3p10dem). This idea of the essence of the mind cannot be discovered 
by sense experience, but can only be known through the true idea of God’s essence. 
Such knowledge, that is attained either through a direct intuition of its essence or by 
means of adequate inference, is deemed to be certain. Spinoza also compares the 
fourth kind of knowledge to a mathematical knowledge:  
 
By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three are five, and that if 
two lines are parallel to a third line, they are parallel to one another, and so on. 
(TdIE§22.)
 
   
 
This fourth type of perception is regarded as the best type of knowledge for the reason 
that it delivers certain knowledge. It is only of the essence of things that we can have 
complete certainty, according to Spinoza. In closing, it is quite interesting to note 
some different formulations of this basic rationalist method that are found throughout 
Spinoza’s writings:   
 
The perception we have when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or 
through knowledge of its proximate cause. (TdIE§19.)  
 
For by substance they would understand that which is in itself and is conceived 
through itself; that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the 
knowledge of any other thing. By modifications they would understand that 
which is in another thing, and whose conception is formed from the thing in 





Now since all things are in God and conceived through God, it follows that 
from this knowledge we can deduce a great many things so as to know them 
adequately. (2p47sch.) 
 
For whatever we clearly and distinctly understand must become known to us 
either through itself or through some other thing that is clearly and distinctly 
understood through itself. (TTP6 S: 447.) 
 
The important outcome of this survey of knowledge types is that, for Spinoza, 
certitude is closely associated with the knowledge of the essence of things. We have 
then established that the best method of emending the intellect and achieving certitude 
is to perceive things solely through their essence or through the essence of their 
proximate or efficient cause. This method of perceiving things delivers true and 
certain knowledge of the essence of our world.  
        In the following section I will consider the further development of Spinoza’s 
theory of knowledge in his other writings and the attention will mainly fall on his 
Short Treatise, the Ethics and to an extent also on the Theological-Political Treatise. 
In his unfinished TdIE, Spinoza undertakes the historiola mentis, which is only a 
survey of knowledge types and does not represent his own fully developed theory of 
knowledge. In my view one of the most important later developments in his theory of 
knowledge has to do with the distinction he makes between the two actions of the 
intellect, that of reason and intuition. These two elements in Spinoza’s theory of 
adequate knowledge both play important roles in his method of emending the intellect 
and my main task in what follows is to clarify the role that our adequate ideas play in 
the project of emending the intellect. An important aim here will be to clarify how our 
ideas guide us towards our highest good and unite us with it. I argue that, although 
reason and intuition both employ adequate ideas, there seems to be an important 
difference between them and this has much to do with finding the highest form of 
certainty. Whereas the former proceeds by means of sound reasoning and the forming 
of clear concepts or definitions, the latter is based on an inner sense of certainty that 
arises from our innate ideas, which is akin to feeling. I will firstly outline Spinoza’s 
theory of inadequate knowledge as found in his other writings and thereafter consider 





5.2. Inadequate knowledge       
 
In the following paragraph I give a brief overview of Spinoza’s theory of inadequate 
knowledge as found in the TdIE, the Short Treatise and the Ethics. I argue that this 
theory is basically unchanged in these works. The most important aspect of Spinoza’s 
view of this type of knowledge is that the mind is understood to be largely inactive, 
passive or receptive. This type of knowledge is based on our sensory ideas, related to 
the body and its affections. Spinoza consistently refers to this knowledge type as the 
‘imagination’
139
. This view of the first kind of knowledge in the TdIE is evident: 
 
Or if you wish, you may here understand by imagination whatever you please 
as long as it is something different from the intellect, and the soul has a passive 
relation to it. It matters not how you understand it, now that we know that it is 
something random, and that the soul is passive to it, while we also know how 
we may be delivered from it with the aid of the intellect. (TdIE§84.)  
 
Thus we have distinguished between the true idea and other perceptions, and we   
have established that the fictitious, the false, and other ideas have their origin in 
the imagination, that is, in certain sensations that are (so to speak) fortuitous 
and unconnected, arising not from the power of the mind but from external 
causes, in accordance as the body, dreaming or waking, receives various 
motions. (Ibid.)  
 
In spite of what he says in the above, Spinoza does not have a completely negative 
attitude towards the body and does not consider the body to be the cause of 
inadequate knowledge (ST2/19 S: 90).
140
 Inadequate knowledge, in Spinoza’s view, 
stems from obscure and partial ideas in the mind that arise from the body’s affections. 
The presence of such ideas in the mind is quite natural and follows from the body 
being inevitably part of the natural world (4p4). A finite human mind is not able to 
fully comprehend the infinite chain of finite causes that precede the affections of 
bodies and the ideas arising from them. As argued, the reason for this seems to be that 
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 See for example TdIE§84; 1p15sch; 2p40sch2; Ep12. 
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 In this Spinoza differs from Descartes, who does regard the body to be a powerful source of the 




bodies are embedded in and form part of a larger body of motion and rest and sensory 
ideas can, consequently, only be clearly conceived if the body’s relation to the whole 
of nature is understood. As said, this is deemed by Spinoza to be beyond the reach of 
a finite mind and the reason why Spinoza deems this kind of knowledge to be made 
up of ideas that are partial, mutilated or fragmentary (TdIE§73; 2p29cor; 2p40sch2). 
Sensory perceptions are however not completely worthless and much useful 
information can be acquired from them. Sensory ideas and common sense knowledge 
based on them is however unsuitable for the rationalist project of attaining truth and 
certainty. As suggested previously, Spinoza does not have a negative idea of the body 
and thinks that the affections of the body by external forces is, in fact, necessary to 
get the activity of reflective thinking in the mind underway (Koistinen 2009b: 187).
 
     
      Moving on to the Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being we do find a 
more comprehensive theory of knowledge. In this work we already find Spinoza’s 
well-known distinction between three types of knowledge, which are here named 
opinion, true belief and clear knowledge (ST2/1,2 S: 62,3). First level knowledge or 
opinion is also understood in the Short Treatise to be based on hearsay and experience 
and ‘commonly subject to error.’ For Spinoza, this type of knowledge, furthermore, 
has ‘no place when we are sure of anything’. It is notable that Spinoza also 
emphasizes here that the passions have their origin in inadequate knowledge and that 
the body is not the principle cause of the passions. It seems that Spinoza here also 
employs the idea that knowledge based on sense perception gives rise to nothing more 
than opinion and that it does not produce adequate ideas. In the Short Treatise we find 
the same theory with regard to inadequate knowledge as in the TdIE.  
      In the Ethics, Spinoza continues with his theory of three types of knowledge and 
continues to employ the notion of the first kind of knowledge, which he also refers to 
as opinion and the imagination (2p40sch2). Spinoza also clearly associates sense 
perception with this first grade of knowledge and confirms the sentiments found in his 
earlier works with regard to its inadequacy. For Spinoza, inadequate knowledge arises 
from ‘individual objects presented to us through the senses in a fragmentary 
(mutilate) and confused manner without any intellectual order (2p29cor); and 
therefore I call such perceptions “knowledge from casual experience”’(2p40sch2). 
This is the lowest level of knowledge and, unfortunately, the level that most people 
are comfortable with. There is also a certain kind of lifestyle that relates to this level 




and sensual pleasure related to bodily existence.  Spinoza describes human beings 
who live by this kind of knowledge as ‘carnal man’ (TTP4 S: 428). For Spinoza this 
kind of life can only, eventually, be deeply unsatisfying. This is because such a life is 
mostly determined externally and breeds passivity and follows the common order of 
nature. People living such lives are deemed by Spinoza to be slaves of their passions 
and to lead a life of bondage. This dream-like world of the first level of knowledge is 
however extremely powerful and can eventually be very damaging.
141
 This world of 
carnal man is also very difficult to change, according to Spinoza (TdIE§1-10). 
Spinoza’s EIP is, in my view, aimed at helping us escape from the bondage of the 
imagination by discovering the power of our own intellect and employing its 
intellectual tools to develop our minds and lives in accordance with the dictates of 
reason.   
  
5.3. Adequate knowledge  
 
In the following section I attend to Spinoza’s theory of adequate knowledge and focus 
mainly on the two actions of the intellect, namely reason and intuition. Spinoza does 
not present a complete theory of knowledge in his unfinished TdIE and I argue that it 
is specifically his conception of adequate knowledge that evolved further in his later 
writings.
142
I contend that the supposed development in Spinoza’s theory of adequate 
knowledge is that he conceives two actions of the intellect, namely reason and 
intuition, which have each their own role to play but also work together to reach the 
highest level of certainty in human knowledge.
 
In my view Spinoza’s mature theory 
of knowledge incorporates a Platonist notion of progression in the levels of adequate 
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 Spinoza writes in this regard, that under the sway of the imagination ‘there is no end to the kinds of 
omens that they imagine, and they read extraordinary things into nature as if the whole of Nature were 
a partner in their madness’ (TTPpref S: 388).  He also refers to reason as ‘the light of the mind, without 
which the mind sees nothing but dreams and fantasies’ (TTP15 S: 523), which is a reference to the first 
kind of knowledge or the imagination that is based on hearsay, opinion and casual experience. In the 
TP1, Spinoza writes that most people conceive things ‘not as they are, but as they would like them to 
be…and their theories ‘border on fantasy’ and are only relevant ‘in Utopia’ (S: 680).  
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 In the TdIE Spinoza uses the term intellect when referring to adequate knowledge and he does also 
use the term reason (TdIE§99) but does not refer to intuition. In the Ethics he uses the terms intellect, 
reason and intuition interchangeably, which does give rise to some interpretation difficulties. For 
example in 4app4 Spinoza writes ‘intellect or reason’ and refers to them both as leading to the highest 
happiness or blessedness, which are terms he mostly reserves for intuition. In the TTP and TP Spinoza 
mostly uses the term reason or the natural light of reason and it is quite notable that the term intuition 






Reason, or knowledge of the second kind, is the first grade of adequate 
knowledge, which precedes intuition and lays the foundation or prepares the way for a 
higher form of certainty. Intuition, the second grade of adequate knowledge, follows 
from reason and is seen by Spinoza to represent the highest degree of certainty in 
human knowledge. I claim that intuitive knowledge is also the end goal of the EIP and 
represents the very pinnacle of human intellectual perfection. For Spinoza, this third 
kind of knowledge is our summum bonum and the only incorruptible source of joy 
and self-contentment.   
      In the Short Treatise Spinoza already distinguishes between two actions of 
adequate knowledge, although he does use somewhat different terminology in this 
regard. In this treatise, human nature is conceived to consist of different modes of 
ideas, which are ‘differentiated as Opinion, true Belief, and clear and distinct 
Knowledge, produced by objects, each in its own way’ (ST2/1 S: 62).
144
 The three 
different types of ideas mentioned above are produced in the following way, ‘… 
either merely through belief (which belief arises either from experience, or from 
hearsay, … or, in the second place, we acquire them by way of true belief
145
, … or, 
thirdly, we have them as a result of clear and distinct conception’ (ibid.). Spinoza 
says, furthermore, that these different types of ideas represent ‘different grades’ of 
knowledge (ST2/2 S: 63). Importantly, he then continues and says that ‘the first is 
commonly subject to error. The second and third, however, although they differ from 
one another, cannot err’ (ibid., my emphasis). In the Short Treatise then, both the 
second and third kinds of knowledge are seen to be adequate. Spinoza continues to 
hold this view in the Ethics:   
 
Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; knowledge of the 
second and third kind is necessarily true. (2p41.)  
 
                                                        
143
 In Spinoza’s system of knowledge there cannot be a progression from inadequate to adequate ideas, 
that is, from the first level of imagination to the adequate second and third levels. For Spinoza a true 
idea is either conceived through itself or it is inferred from another true idea. For Spinoza, a true idea 
cannot follow or progress from an inadequate idea (2p41; 5p28dem).    
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 The notion that man’s essence consists of modes of thinking is also found in 2p11dem: ‘The essence 
of man is constituted by definite modes of the attributes of God, to wit, modes of thinking.’ See also 
2ax2: ‘Man thinks’. It is important to note, with regard to the EIP project, that knowledge based on 
inadequate ideas (opinion, experience) is included in this conception of human essence. Although 
Spinoza states that ‘man thinks’ this does not mean that all humans naturally use reason adequately. 
For Spinoza, adequate thinking must be actively developed and this makes room for his EIP.  
145




I argue then that in the Short Treatise and the Ethics Spinoza conceives two actions of 
the intellect and sees them to both produce and work with adequate ideas. How should 
the difference between the true ideas of reason and those of intuition be understood?  I 
believe that his distinction between two levels of adequate knowledge commits 
Spinoza to two different kinds of adequate ideas and that this difference has much to 
do with the respective level of certainty attained. Although the ideas of reason are 
true, intuition seems to surpass reason by attaining the highest possible form of 
certainty in knowledge, which is an inner conviction.    
 
5.3.1. The dictates of reason 
 
The first distinction that Spinoza makes between reason and intuition is that the 
former is seen to precede the latter in some way:  
 
The conatus or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot 
arise from the first kind of knowledge, but from the second. (5p28.)  
 
To make sense of this contrast, I suggest that this matter be associated with Spinoza’s 
project of emending the intellect, which he sees as a process that must follow a certain 
order or procedure. It seems that in the EIP we must first learn to use reason aright 
before progressing to the higher level of intuitive knowledge.
 
 The important notion of 
medicina mentis, discussed earlier, should also be kept in mind here. Most early 
modern thinkers regarded the human mind as somewhat incapacitated by inadequate 
ideas, which rendered it ill and unable to apply reason correctly. That said, they did 
not however think that the natural light of reason was completely extinguished, as did 
most reformist theologians. In the Regulae and the TdIE we find certain prescriptions 
or methods, rules and procedures, which are all meant to assist the mind in regaining 
its natural ability to reason in a sound way. I argue, that it is reason that takes the 
initial role in the process of emending the intellect. As mentioned above, our given 
true ideas, being simple in nature, are not extinguishable and this makes it possible for 
reason to initiate the process of emending of the intellect.   
      The important task of reason in the EIP is to expose the contingent nature of the 




ideas and to also redirect us toward those things that are good and in our best interest. 
For Spinoza there is a close association between reason and virtue (4p24). In the EIP 
we can confidently follow reason and know that by doing so we are furthering our 
own interest in the best possible way. It is reason that produces the ideas of virtues 
such as strength of mind, courage, nobility, self control, sobriety, courtesy, mercy and 
the notion of the common good, that function as its dictates to guide and discipline us 
in our struggle against the passions (3p59sch; 5p10sch). It is reason that assists us in 
understanding our passive emotions so that we can become more independent of their 
detrimental influence. For Spinoza, the purification of the mind is a long and difficult 
process and its highest level is not easily attainable (5p42sch). The first stage in this 
undertaking then, is for us to become responsive to the admonitions of reason. 
Developing our ability to use reason correctly is the first crucial stage in this process 
of emending the intellect.  
      One of the ways in which reason directs us towards objects that are best for us is 
by producing a system of indubitable knowledge, an example of which is Spinoza’s 
philosophical masterpiece, the Ethics. The latter is clearly intended to make a much- 
needed contribution toward the intellectual development of mankind and to assist the 
establishing of a rational society (TdIE§17). Although there are, without doubt, many 
intuitive elements in the Ethics, it is in my view, mainly the product of reason 
(5p36sch). Its foundational definitions and axioms are produced by reason and it is 
reason that deduces all the propositions and demonstrations, etc. that follow from the 
absolute starting points. The whole work is a product of sound philosophical 
reasoning, done in accordance with a certain geometrical order and procedure in 
which rules are laid down and followed.
146
 In the following citation Spinoza refers to 
the important and demanding work of reason:  
 
Now the process of deduction solely from intellectual axioms usually demands 
the apprehension of a long series of connected propositions, as well as the 
greatest caution, acuteness of intelligence, and restraint, all of which qualities 
are rarely to be found among men. So men prefer to be taught by experience 
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 Reason establishes an intellectual order in the mind, which is lacking in knowledge based on 
imagination. An important aspect of the early modern notion of the illness of the mind is that it has 
become accustomed to follow the common order of nature, which is to live in accordance with the 




rather than engage in the logical process of deduction from a few axioms. 
(TTP5 S: 441.)  
 
In a passage from the Short Treatise, Spinoza refers the task allotted to reason (which 
he refers to as true belief) and also indicates how he sees it to differ from clear 
knowledge or, to what he later terms, intuition: 
 
Belief is a strong proof based on Reasons, whereby I am convinced in my mind 
that the thing is really, and just such, outside my understanding, as I am 
convinced in my mind that it is. I say, a strong proof based on Reasons, in order 
to distinguish it from both Opinion, which is always doubtful and liable to error, 
and from Knowledge which does not consist in being convinced by Reasons, 
but in an immediate union with the thing itself. I say, that the thing is really and 
just such outside my understanding – really, because reasons cannot deceive me 
in this, for otherwise they would not be different from opinion. Just such, for it 
can tell me what the thing ought to be, and not what it really is, otherwise it 
would not be different from Knowing. Outside, for it makes us enjoy 
intellectually not what is in us, but what is outside us. (ST2/4 note 11 S: 66.) 
 
A little further on in ST2/26 Spinoza describes reason metaphorically as a stairway 
that makes it possible for us to reach our highest intellectual destination: 
 
Lastly, we see also that reasoning is not the principal thing in us, but only like a 
staircase by which we climb up to the desired place, or like a good genius 
which, without any falsity or deception, brings us tidings of the highest good in 
order thereby to stimulate us to pursue it, and to become united with it; which 
union is our supreme happiness and bliss. (S: 100.)     
 
A basic difference then between reason and intuition seems to be that the former 
convinces us of our highest good by means of strong proofs based on reasons, 
whereas intuition produces conviction by uniting us with truth itself, i.e. with our 
summum bonum or the idea of God. Another point of contrast is that reason teaches 
us what our true good ought to be, but is unable to determine what it really is. Lastly, 




argue that this has not yet been fully internalized, whereas intuition brings about a 
stronger inner feeling of conviction, self-contentment and intellectual joy. This is all 
rather difficult to understand and explain, but one thing that is clear, is that reason or 
knowledge of the second kind, is not the end goal in the EIP. I argue that reason’s task 
is to awaken the mind to its true ideas and to restore its ability to make use of these 
innate tools, which then leads to the later full enjoyment of the highest form of 
certainty in knowledge. As mentioned earlier, it seems that for Spinoza, the highest 
certainty in knowledge, must come to the mind in a direct manner, without any 
reasoning taking place. The third kind of knowledge has then a divine connotation 
attached to it.  
      It is important in Spinoza’s theory of emending the intellect to understand why he 
deems reason to fall short of attaining the highest level of certainty. Spinoza’s EIP 
does clearly need some form of initial reasoning to get underway, which he 
accommodates in the second kind of knowledge. This should not come as a surprise 
as I have consistently argued that the human mind is seen to be in need of emendation 
and that this project entails a process of education. It should be kept in mind though, 
that the ideas that reason employs in this first level of adequate knowledge are seen to 
be true.
147
 If this were not the case, the early rationalist project of true and certain 
knowledge could not get off the ground. In my opinion, reason’s first step, is to 
discern or extract certain notions from natural phenomena that all things have in 
common. A good example of this method of reason is found in the following passage:  
 
Now in examining natural phenomena we first of all try to discover those 
features that are most universal and common to the whole of Nature, to wit, 
motion and rest and the rules governing them which Nature always observes 
and through which she constantly acts; and then we advance gradually from 
these to other less universal features. (TTP7 S: 460.)  
 
As discussed earlier with regard to the theory of simple ideas, reason is able to 
recognize that which is common to all things, that is, the true ideas, which express 
God’s essence (2p40sch2). These are reason’s common notions and are adequate 
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 This matter has been discussed earlier. Recall, for Spinoza our given true ideas can never be 
completely overpowered by inadequate ideas and the ensuing passions. We will seemingly always have 
some adequate grasp of them. As argued earlier, in early rationalism, even the slightest grasp of a 




conceptions of nature’s universal features, but they seem to fall short in convincing us 
of what such things really are in themselves, i.e. that they express God’s eternal and 
infinite essence. Spinoza seems to think that our ideas of the attributes are entities of 
reason (entia rationis), without which God’s essence cannot be conceived. In CM2/5 
he says:  
 
Finally, what is termed a distinction of reason is that which arises between a 
substance and its attribute…from the fact that such a substance cannot be 
understood without its attribute. (S: 195.)  
 
As seen earlier, Spinoza does define an attribute as ‘that which the intellect perceives 
of substance as constituting its essence’ (1def4). This view is also found in Spinoza’s 
letter 9 to Simon de Vries in which he writes that an ‘attribute is so called in respect 
to the intellect, which attributes to substance a certain specific kind of nature’ (S: 
782). Now the true ideas of the attributes are natures that we, i.e. our minds seem to 
attribute to God. However, for Spinoza, it is only God himself who can reveal or 
communicate what he really is, i.e. his inmost essence to us. In order for us to have 
complete certainty of God’s essence, his idea must seemingly be given to us in a most 
direct way. A second consideration for Spinoza’s lower grading of the ideas of reason, 
is that reason’s ideas are its dictates that guide us toward the objects to which we 
ought to, in a sense of obedience, attach ourselves. In this sense, reason’s ideas do not 
yet reflect our full self-determination:    
 
And first of all, the effect of what we have called True Belief. This shows us 
indeed what a thing ought to be, but not what it really is. And this is the reason 
why it can never unite us with the object of our belief. I say, then, that it only 
teaches us what the thing ought to be, and not what it is; between these two 
there is a great difference. (ST2/4 S: 66.)   
 
It seems then, that at this first level of adequate knowledge, our own intention seems 
to not yet be fully realized and in this sense these ideas do not express our own 
activity. These ideas, although certainly true, do not express our self-determination to 
the highest degree. This lack seems to be the reason that these ideas are unable to 




power. If we had our own strong inner conviction in this regard we would necessarily 
attach ourselves to these objects:        
 
And from what we have now seen of the effects of all these, it is evident that 
the fourth, namely clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all. For opinion often 
leads to error. True belief is good only because it is the way to true knowledge, 
and awakens us to things which are really lovable. So that the final end that we 
seek, and the highest that we know, is true knowledge.  (ST2/4 S: 67.)  
 
Reason directs us towards those objects that are indeed good for us and in this way 
surpasses opinion, in which there is no such direction. However and strange as it may 
seem, the true ideas of reason seem to lack the ability to bring about complete 
certainty. In Spinoza we can only be truly active, or certain of something if this 
conviction follows from our nature alone (4app1). Ideas based on opinion, experience 
or even reason, are all conceived through something else and not through the things 
themselves: 
 
But this last one is never (merely) opinion, nor a (mere) believer, but sees 
things themselves, not through something else, but through the things 
themselves. (ST2/2 note 7 S: 63.) 
 
I argue that when we actively employ our innate ideas we know things through 
themselves, which is the highest form of knowledge and certainty in Spinoza.   
 
5.3.2. Intuition and inner certainty 
 
Although Spinoza’s philosophy is an example of the early rationalist approach, he 
does frequently describe the highest form of adequate knowledge, namely intuition, in 
terms of feeling or even taste. I argue that it is mostly when considering the highest 
certainty in our adequate ideas that he turns to notions that express feeling. It is reason 
that proceeds by convincing us, in a somewhat external way, by putting forward its 
arguments, proofs and dictates in language, whereas the way of intuition is through an 




feeling or experience of certainty that is related to or arises from our innate ideas (my 
emphasis): 
 
For, as I have just pointed out, all that we clearly and distinctly understand is 
dictated to us by the idea and the nature of God – not indeed in words, but in a 
far superior way and one that agrees excellently with the nature of the mind, as 
everyone who has tasted intellectual certainty has doubtless experienced in his 
own case. (TTP1 S: 395.) 
 
For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either 
through itself or through something else, which is conceived through itself. That 
is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us or which are related to the third kind 
of knowledge. (5p28dem.) 
 
In the first citation above, Spinoza says that certainty in our adequate ideas cannot be 
found in words, i.e. in language, but must be tasted and also that this way is somehow 
superior. Note in the second quote that Spinoza associates conceiving something 
through itself with our innate ideas and the third kind of knowledge. At the very start 
of the TdIE, Spinoza says that he: 
 
… resolved at length to enquire whether there existed a true good, one which 
was capable of communicating itself and could alone affect the mind to the 
exclusion of all else, whether, in fact, there was something whose discovery and 
acquisition would afford me a continuous and supreme joy to all eternity. 
(TdIE§1.)  
 
As suggested earlier, for Spinoza, the idea of our highest good communicates itself to 
us and affects the mind to the exclusion of all else. In my reading of Spinoza, God 
communicates his essence to us by means of his innate idea: 
 
We may quite clearly understand that God can communicate with man without 
mediation, for he communicates his essence to our minds without employing 





God’s innate idea of his essence in our minds seems then to differ quite significantly 
from reason’s ideas of the attributes, which are ideas that we attribute to God. When 
we become fully aware of our innate ideas and actively partake of them, the direction 
of this action is from and through our innate ideas themselves. When we know things 
by the third kind of knowledge, we proceed from the innate ideas of God’s essence to 
the knowledge of the essences of things (2p40sch2). This is clearly different to the 
procedure of reason, where we first discern that which is common to all things and 
then form conceptions of the universal features of things, which we deem to express 
God’s essence.
148
 The citation from the TdIE above, suggests that our innate idea of 
God also affects us in a powerful way and this indicates that some form of feeling is 
involved when we experience the certainty of God’s idea in us (my emphasis): 
 
But we call that clear knowledge which comes, not from our being convinced 
by reasons, but from our feeling and enjoying the thing itself, and it surpasses 
the others by far. (ST2/2 S: 63.)   
 
It is quite true that (when there are reasons which prompt us to do so) we can, in 
words or by some other means, represent the thing to others differently from 
what we know it to be; but we can never bring it so far, either by words or by 
any other means, that we should feel about things differently from what we feel 
about them; that is impossible, and clearly so to all who have for once attended 
to their understanding itself apart from the use of words or other significant 
signs. (ST2/16 S: 82.) 
 
The convictions of reason are based on arguments and demonstrations that take place 
outside the mind (so to speak) and, seemingly, do not strike the mind with the same 
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 In order for reason to be able to produce true ideas it must, in some way, also make use of our innate 
ideas. It does however seem that we are not fully aware of this and that reason does therefore not yet 
fully partake of our innate ideas. Arnold Geulincx, the Flemish contemporary of Spinoza, develops a 
form of logic in which the highest form of knowledge has much to do with the inner intellectual 
activities of the mind, of which we are immediately conscious, without any help or dependence on the 
body. Geulincx also distinguishes logic from mathematics, which he sees as still having some 
dependence on the senses and the imagination (Nuchelmans 1988: 8-13). This notion of an immediate 




force as when the mind experiences an inner intuitive certainty.
149
 Intuition appears to 
produce a more powerful and immediate inner
 
 sense of certainty and in this it differs 
and surpasses reason. In Spinoza, complete certitude depends on our own inner sense 
or feeling of conviction, which arises from the inner teaching of our innate ideas. Our 
innate ideas, when fully conscious, are clear and distinct and the mind is unchecked in 
its consent of these ideas. The mind feels no pain with regard to these ideas, only its 
unrestricted activity and joy (5p18dem; 3p11).  
      I argue that, although both reason and intuition work with true ideas, there seems 
then to be an important difference between them. God’s innate idea is much different 
from reason’s ideas of God’s attributes, which are likened to ideas based on 
distinctions of reason. Intuitive knowledge seems to also differ from reason in that it 
does not, like reason, have a bottom-up approach, but rather seems to proceed in a 
top-down manner, proceeding from its innate ideas of God’s essence to the essences 
of things (2p40sch2). Another difference is that Spinoza attributes a higher sense of 
certainty to follow from intuition. The sense I can make of this, is that once reason 
has produced the true idea or definition of God, this leads to the realization that the 
source of this true conception must be the given idea of God in us. This insight fully 
activates the innate idea of God and unites us with God. Our innate true ideas seem to 
bring with them their own sense of intuitive certainty and this is, for Spinoza, the 
highest form of knowing, which he also refers to as the third kind of knowledge.
150
   
      The outcome of the above should not seem out of place in Spinoza’s rationalist 
system and the two actions of the intellect, reason and intuition, should be seen to 
interact and complement each other, in my view. It is, however, important to keep in 
mind that intuitive certainty follows from reason. In Spinoza, certainty cannot be 
achieved, without reason first having established its true ideas, in accordance with his 
rationalist method of knowledge. Intuitive knowledge in Spinoza is, in my view, 
never cut loose from reason. The certainty of intuition can only follow from the 
conviction of reason, which is based on clear concepts and logical rational 
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 Van Ruler (2008: 169-173) aptly describes Spinoza’s notion of intuitive knowledge as the ‘adequate 
knowledge of internal states’ and also likens knowledge of the third kind to the Platonist notion of 
reason as the inner teacher.  
150
  Descartes seems to have a similar theory of a highest form of knowledge. This is knowledge of the 
innate idea of God, which produces the awareness of our total dependence on him for every single 
moment of our entire existence. Descartes says in the fourth Meditation that the idea of our continual 
containment in God surpasses all other ideas and ‘that the human intellect cannot know anything that is 




argumentation: Spinoza confirms this critical point in the following citation (my 
emphasis):  
 
For the love of God arises from the knowledge of God, a knowledge deriving 




However, it seems then that reason, on its own, is not able to lead us to the highest 
good, i.e. our intellectual perfection (Youpa 2009: 245). It is up to the knowledge of 
the third kind or intuition to unite us to the highest good, which is the most perfect 
idea, the idea of God, or God himself. This unification with the divine truth in thought 
has much to do with Spinoza’s theory that our intellect is involved in God’s eternal 
and infinite intellect. Reason demonstrates the truth of this doctrine but it is by 
intuition that we experience this to be indeed true. From this intuitive experience the 
highest degree of certainty follows, accompanied by a feeling of intellectual joy. This 
intuitive insight leads to the highest level of knowledge, to which Spinoza mostly 
refers in terms of love. This Platonist-Augustinian theme of intellectual love for God 
is quite beautiful and found throughout Spinoza’s writings and reaches its highest 
point in the second part of E5. This continuous theme in his writings is illustrated in 
the following citations:  
 
…all happiness or unhappiness depends solely on the quality of the object to 
which we are bound by love. For strife will never arise on account of that which 
is not loved…But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with 
joy alone, unmixed with any sadness. This is greatly to be desired, and to be 
sought with all our might. (TdIE§10.)  
 
Since, then, Reason has no power to lead us to the attainment of our well – 
being, it remains for us to inquire whether we can attain it through … the last, 
kind of knowledge. Now we have said that this kind of knowledge does not 
result from something else, but from a direct revelation of the object itself to the 
understanding. And if that object is glorious and good, then the soul becomes 
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 Spinoza, in my opinion, employs this distinction between reason and intuition to restrict human 
reason to an extent. For Spinoza, our certain knowledge of the essence of things depends on God’s 




necessarily united with it, as we have also remarked with reference to our body. 
Hence, it follows incontrovertibly that it is this knowledge which evokes love. 
(ST2/22 S: 93.)  
 
From the third kind of knowledge there necessarily arises the intellectual love 
of God (amor Dei intellectualis). For from this kind of knowledge there arises 
pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause…And this is what I call the 






Spinoza consistently uses the example of proportion in his writings to illustrate the 
difference between the types of knowledge that he distinguishes in his system.
153
 This 
example, however, seems to have baffled interpreters more than helping to explain the 
difference he conceives between the three knowledge types and especially between 
reason and intuition. The example involves an arithmetic puzzle in which the ratio 
between numbers must be solved in the best manner. The main gist of the example, 
                                                        
152  The theory of the two actions of the intellect, in Spinoza, seems to have some religious undertones. 
The way of reason, in Spinoza is also likened to the obedience or obligation shown towards a law. This 
needs to be supplemented by the inner realization of the truth of the law and an inner desire to comply 
with the law. The latter refers to the action of the mind when it truly understands. A very interesting 
text in this regard is found in TTP4, which is titled Of the Divine Law. The main points in this text can 
be outlined as follows: Firstly, Spinoza says that the natural light of reason is the Divine law or the 
method ordained or legislated by God in order for man to achieve his highest perfection. For Spinoza, 
as we have seen, mankind’s highest perfection is the knowledge of God. The best way of doing this, in 
the terminology of the TTP, is ‘to love God not through fear of punishment nor through some other 
thing such as sensual pleasure, fame and so forth, but from the mere fact that he knows God, or knows 
that the knowledge and love of God is the supreme good. So the sum of the Divine law and its chief 
command is to love God as the supreme good; that is, as we have said, not from fear of some 
punishment or penalty nor from love of some other thing from which we desire to derive pleasure. For 
this truth is told us by the idea of God, that God is our supreme good, i.e. that the knowledge of God is 
the final end to which all our actions should be directed (S: 428). Secondly, Spinoza thought it 
impossible to truly love God on the basis of an inadequate idea of him. Mankind, in his view, had 
developed many inadequate anthropomorphic ideas of God that had not led to the true love of God, but 
had rather resulted in a most bitter hatred and conflict between people. We have discussed the role of 
philosophy as a medicine for the mind (medicina mentis), which is aimed at healing the mind of 
mankind by developing, first and foremost, a true idea of God, devoid of all inadequate 
anthropomorphic notions. This, as we have seen, is the task allocated to reason. It is only after this true 
idea of God has been established and the nature of God is truly known, that the idea of God is affirmed 
and God can be loved. Spinoza says: ‘Nor can the belief in historical narratives, however certain, give 
us knowledge of God, nor consequently of the love of God. For the love of God arises from the 
knowledge of God, a knowledge deriving from general axioms that are certain and self-evident (my 
emphasis)’ (ibid.: 429). In the terminology of the TTP, the love of God (understanding) follows from 
the knowledge of God (the rational proof), which is the same as saying that the third kind of knowledge 
follows from the second kind of knowledge.   
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with regard to reason and intuition, is that whereas reason solves the puzzle correctly 
by applying certain rules, intuition sees the ratio or proportion between the given 
numbers directly and finds the missing number without any reasoning 
involved.
154
One of the reasons for this example being rather unclear is that Spinoza 
gives very little additional explanation. In the Short Treatise, however, Spinoza does 
say something more about this subject that is not found in the other sections, which 
deal with this topic. In the section of the Short Treatise he considers the difference 
between the second and third kinds of knowledge and says the following about the 
latter (my emphasis):   
 
But when he comes to see the proportion in the way which we have shown in 
the fourth example, then he says with truth that the thing is so, because then it is 
in him and not beyond him. (ST2/4 S: 66.)  
 
As I have argued, the highest form of knowledge has much to do with our innate 
ideas. However, intuition has also much to do with conceiving particular things 
adequately and one wonders what the notion of proportion has to do with knowing 
particular things adequately?  Perhaps the notion of proportion in Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge can be better understood if its relation to knowing particular things is 
explained. The citation below confirms, that intuition is favored by Spinoza, when it 




I have thought this worth noting here in order to show … the superiority of that 
knowledge of particular things which I have called ‘intuitive’ or ‘of the third 
kind’, and its preferability to that abstract knowledge which I have called 
‘knowledge of the second kind’. (5p36sch.) 
 
In the first part of the Ethics reason proves that particular things are affections of 
God’s attributes or modes of God, which cannot be or be conceived without God 
(1def5; 1p15).
 
However, conceiving particular things intellectually as modes or 
proportions of God’s essence is seen by Spinoza to be quite a difficult challenge 
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 In the puzzle three numbers are given and it is required to find a fourth, which is related to the third 
as the second is to the first. In the case of the numbers 1,2,3, the missing proportional is 6.  
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(1p15sch; Ep12). This difficulty stems in part from Spinoza’s system, which requires 
that particular things cannot be seen to follow directly from God’s absolute nature. 
Particular things are determined to exist in a certain manner by other things, which are 
also determined and finite (1p28dem). However, this conception could lead to the 
conclusion that God is only a remote cause of particular things, which seems to 
contradict Spinoza’s view that all things are wholly and continuously dependent on 
God’s concurrent essence or power, for both their essence and their existence. Whilst 
the proofs of reason regarding particular things, that they cannot be or be conceived 
without God is true, it ‘does not strike the mind as when it is inferred from the 
essence of each particular thing, which we assert to be dependent on God’ (5p36sch).  
      Intuition seems then to overcome the somewhat abstract nature of reason, when 
we intuitively know or sense, firstly, our own dependence on God and then assert 
with certainty that all particular things do indeed depend on God’s concurrent power
 
(2p45sch). This close relation between the highest form of knowledge and the inner 
experience of our total dependence on God is already found in the earlier Short 
Treatise: 
 
…so long as we have not such a clear idea of God as shall unite us with him in 
such a way that it will not let us love anything beside him, we cannot truly say 
that we are united with God as to depend immediately on him. (ST1/2
nd
 
dialogue S: 50.)  
 
The crucial point here is that our total dependence on God for our essence and 
existence, is best experienced intellectually, i.e. by becoming fully conscious of the 
innate idea of God’s essence.
 
In my opinion, this occurs when we become aware of 
the significance of our own innate true ideas and realize that, such ideas can only 
originate in God and must therefore also be continuously sustained by God’s thinking 
force. The conclusion that follows is that our finite intellect, in which these most 
certain ideas reside, must therefore be a proportion of God’s infinite intellect. Our joy 
stems from the realization that our finite intellect inheres directly and continuously in 
the very essence of Thought, i.e. in God. Seeing that the intellect is regarded as our 
human essence, the important insight is that our essence and existence follows 






And since God has produced it (true understanding) immediately and he is only 
an inner cause, it follows necessarily that it cannot perish so long as this cause 
of it remains … Now this cause of it is eternal, therefore it is too. (ST2/26 S: 
101.)  
 
I argue that Spinoza’s EIP is aimed at leading us to the conscious discovery of the 
innate idea of God, through which we are intimately united with God in a most direct 
and certain manner. Whereas reason argues for and proves this (1p21dem), intuition 
experiences and feels this to be true with certainty. The action of reason is more 
external, whereas intuition produces an inner certainty and in this surpasses reason.
 
  
Based on our own experience of the dependence of our mind on the inner idea of God 
we can assert with confidence that all particular things do indeed follow from God 
and depend continuously on his eternal power. In my view then, the somewhat 
mysterious role of proportion in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge has to do with the 
early rationalist notion that the best kind of knowledge follows from the inner 
conviction of the mind. This kind of knowledge is seen to be in us and not beyond us. 
This is also the best way of knowing that particular things, all depend wholly on 
God’s concurrent power for their being.      
      In this section Spinoza’s theory of adequate knowledge has been considered and I 
have mainly attended to the two actions of the intellect, that of reason and intuition. I 
have argued that both the above actions of the mind work with and produce true ideas. 
In the project of human perfection, i.e. the EIP, it is reason that directs and identifies 
the objects to which we ought to attach ourselves. It is however intuition that unites us 
with these objects, the most important being God himself. I have argued, finally, that 
these actions of the mind work together and complement each other. Reason precedes 
intuition and presents the mind with demonstrations as to what the true essence of 
things ought to be. It is then the task of intuition to confirm these proofs as certainly 
true. This leads to an inner certainty, with which the active emotions such as joy and 
self – contentment co-occur. The highest intellectual perfection and final goal of the 






5.4. The passions 
 
Spinoza makes it quite clear that the EIP is not to be understood as a purely 
intellectual affair. The emendation of the intellect involves certain demanding real life 
struggles
156
, one of which is against the passions, which is quite a common theme in 
early modern philosophy.
 
 For Spinoza there is a close relationship between the 
emendation of the intellect and the passions, because, for him, the cause of the 
passions
157
 does not lie in the body, but rather in inadequate knowledge (ST2/19 S: 
90). Spinoza’s remedy against the passions is true and certain knowledge, which must 
be applied to an ailing mind as a medicina mentis. I argue that, although both the 
actions of the intellect, that is, reason and intuition, are employed in this struggle 
against the passions, that intuition, once again, seems to deliver the more potent and 
decisive blow. The main cause of the passions, for Spinoza, is that the mind attaches 
itself to transient things (such as honor, riches and pleasures) and this leads to 
disappointment, confusion and subsequent passions: 
 
He, therefore, is indeed always wretched who is united to transient things. For 
since these are beyond his power, and subject to many accidents, it is impossible 
that, when they are affected, he should be free from these affects. (ST2/5 S: 69.) 
 
And since we find that, when we pursue sensuousness, pleasure, and worldly 
things, we do not find our happiness in them, but on the contrary, our ruin. 
(ST2/26 S: 100.)  
 
In Spinoza’s system, all things are contained in and follow from God and nothing can 
be regarded to be really bad or evil, but the attachment to particular material things is 
seen to not bring lasting joy and contentment, due to their uncertain nature. For 
Spinoza the life of carnal man, which is mostly attached to and fixated on a sensual 
life related to the body, will eventually be found to be unsatisfactory, because of its 
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 It is clear that the EIP is a difficult undertaking and we need to look after many practical issues, 
such as our health, and also seek the support of like-minded, friends. The role of the state is also 
required if the EIP is ever to become realized in society. See in this regard in the TdIE§14-17. The 
fourth part of the Ethics also deals with such matters, for example 4p73; 4app7; 9; 12 and 27.  
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 Spinoza’s theory of the passions is sometimes compared to that of Plato and found to be similar, for 
example James (2009: 223). Spinoza’s theory is in my view quite different in that he does not think 




transitory nature. Because we are necessarily part of nature (4p4), no matter how 
diligent we are, our individual aspirations are continually thwarted and inevitably 
threatened by forces beyond human control (4app32). When our worldly goods, to 
which we are attached, are negatively affected, the passions ensue. The realization of 
our externally determined existence and vulnerability to forces beyond our control 
also leads to sadness and despair. As said earlier, for Spinoza, things are seen to be 
beyond our control to the extent that we have knowledge of their causal nexus and 
sense perception cannot assist us much in this regard. 
 
5.4.1. Reason and the passions 
 
How does reason then assist us in our struggle against our passive emotions? For 
Spinoza, reasons’s important task is to guide us towards the objects that are best 
suited for our wellbeing. Our best interest depends largely on the type of objects for 
which we strive and to which we attach ourselves in love. In Spinoza, we necessarily 
attach ourselves to those things that the mind judges or affirms to be good. As said, 
our minds consist of many ideas, some of which are inadequate. When we follow 
ideas based on opinion, hearsay or on casual experience, that is, notions received from 
the senses in a confused manner, we attach ourselves to things that are transient and 
cannot give us lasting joy and self-contentment. For Spinoza, the task of reason is to 
lead us away from such things and towards intransient objects to which we ought to 
join ourselves. Spinoza’s method is based on becoming aware of those things that are 
in our best interest by distinguishing between the different kinds of ideas in our mind. 
Whereas inadequate and uncertain ideas signify the contingent nature of their objects, 
our true ideas indicate intransient essences, which we should love. Our minds are 
purified and our intellect is emended insofar we cease to follow and utilize our 
inadequate ideas. Our adequate ideas are of intransient essences (God’s attributes) 
that do really exist outside of the mind. For Spinoza the highest and most perfect 
object to which we ought to attach ourselves is, of course, God himself. However, as 
argued earlier, the dictates of reason, which are likened to moral laws can only 
externally direct or admonish us toward the objects to which we ought to attach 
ourselves. Although the ideas of reason are true and can be trusted, they seem not able 




something to be good through our own inner affirmation or conviction. This seems to 
happen, for Spinoza, when reasons’s true ideas resonate with our innate ideas.  
      Reasons further role is to assist us in reducing the influence of our passive 
emotions. Through reason we can form adequate ideas of the passions and 
consequently bring it about that we become less passive in respect of them (Def. of 
the Emotions; 5p3; 5p4sch). By applying reason ‘we have the ability to arrange and 
associate affections of the body according to the order of the intellect’ (5p10dem) and 
‘to conceive a right method of living, or fixed rules of life, and to commit them to 
memory and continually apply them to particular situations that are frequently 
encountered in life, so that our casual thinking is thoroughly permeated by them and 
they are always ready to hand’ (5p10sch). In addition to this, it is also the task of 
reason to develop certain rational virtues that can be followed by those undertaking 
the EIP. Such virtues are strength of mind (fortitudo), courage (animositas), nobility 
(generositas), courtesy (modestia) and mercy (clementia). These are the virtues that 
we should follow ‘according to the dictates of reason alone’ (3p59sch). These 
principles play a crucial role in steadying and guiding our lifeboat when ‘we are in 
many respects at the mercy of external causes and are tossed about like the waves of 
the sea when driven by contrary winds unsure of the outcome and of our fate’ (ibid). 
Reason then plays an important role in bringing some order and discipline in our 
lives, to avoid excess, which often leads to the passions and impedes our progress in 
the EIP (4app30).   
 
5.4.2. Intuition and the passions 
 
However, reason seems unable to bring about the desired unification with our highest 
perfection and summum bonum:   
 
I think, now, that I have already shown and proved sufficiently that it is only 
True Belief or Reason that leads us to the knowledge of good and evil. And so 
when we come to prove that knowledge is the first and principal cause of all 
these passions, it will be clearly manifest that if we use our understanding and 
Reason aright, it should be impossible for us to ever fall prey to one of these 




think that Reason alone is competent to free us from all these: as we shall 
afterwards show in its proper place. (ST2/14 S: 78.)  
 
Spinoza assigns an important role to intuition or knowledge of the third kind in the 
struggle against the passions.
 
 The basis for this theory has much to do with Spinoza’s 
notion of affirmation or intellectual love. Recall that it is the attachment to uncertain 
transient things that, in Spinoza’s view, leads to the passions. In his view, the 
attachment to an object, even to something of a contingent nature, can only be broken 




Love, then, arises from the idea and knowledge we have of a thing; and 
according as the thing shows itself greater and more glorious, so also is our love 
greater. In two ways is it possible to free ourselves from love: either by getting 
to know something better, or by discovering that the loved object, which is held 
by us to be something great and glorious, brings in its train much woe and 
disaster. (ST2/5 S: 68.)    
 
We find a similar argument in the Ethics where Spinoza actually says that the third 
kind of knowledge is very effective against the passions: 
 
…we can readily conceive how effective against the emotions is clear and 
distinct knowledge, and especially the third kind of knowledge whose basis is 
the knowledge of God. (5p20sch.)  
 
I argued earlier in this section that intuition is closely associated with the innate idea 
of God’s essence. For Spinoza, God’s idea in us is the most perfect true and certain 
idea. Our true ideas are of the God’s essence and it is by becoming aware of such 
ideas and understanding their significance, that we become attached to God. The love 
of God, which must necessarily follow from the true idea of God, is a love that is 
much more powerful than the love of or attachment to any idea of a transient thing. A 
human being, whose mind is attached to the true idea of God, is necessarily filled with 
the love of God and cannot, it seems, succumb easily to the passions. For Spinoza, 
when someone has progressed to the threshold of intellectual perfection, it is 




in love (ST2/5 S: 69; ST2/19 S: 89). For Spinoza we will necessarily attach ourselves 
to something, which we regard with certainty as our highest good. The third kind of 
knowledge, which is based on the innate idea of God, also produces the highest 
pleasure (5p32def) and this also helps to reduce the seductive power of transient 
objects. Spinoza adds to this that the innate idea of God enables us to produce many 
other true ideas and increase the amount of adequate ideas in our minds. This results 
in a greater part of the mind being ‘unimpaired, and consequently less subject to the 
emotions’ (5p38def). It seems then that intuitive knowledge is a more powerful tool in 
fighting the passions than reason. Reason does play an important role, but it does not 
seem to have the power base that intuition has, to unite us with God in a most direct 
way. Reason is seen to dictate to us, whereas intuition or the innate idea of God, can 
be likened to an inner teacher by which we are able to have complete certainty of our 
true ideas, which we then follow with total confidence. The important role of intuition 
in combating the passions becomes very clear in the final proposition of the Ethics 
where Spinoza writes his famous words: 
 
Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. We do not enjoy 
blessedness because we keep our lusts in check. On the contrary, it is because 
we enjoy blessedness that we are able to keep our lusts in check… Again the 
more the mind enjoys this divine love or blessedness, the more it understands; 
that is the more power it has over the emotions and the less subject it is to 
emotions that are bad. (5p42; 5p42dem.) 
 
I conclude then, that also in the struggle against the passions, both the actions of the 
intellect, reason and intuition, play an important but different role. The roles of the 
two actions can be distinguished from one another but not separated. They seem to 
always work together and to complement each other.
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 It is notable that Spinoza seems to work with a characterization of mankind that fits his theory of 
different stages or kinds of knowledge. In this regard we find the distinctions in Spinoza between 
carnal ignorant man, rational free man and intuitive wise man in his works. To this we can add that 
Spinoza regards the first to be unconscious of himself (5p42sch), the second to be self-conscious and 




6. Certitude and Eternity 
 
I argue that, for Spinoza, the discovery of the innate idea of God’s essence is regarded 
as mankind’s highest intellectual perfection and supreme good and the attainment of 
eternal joy and self-contentment. Recall Spinoza’s words in the opening paragraph of 
the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: 
 
I resolved at length to enquire whether their existed a true good, one which was 
capable of communicating itself and could alone effect the mind to the 
exclusion of all else, whether in fact, there was something whose discovery and 
acquisition would afford me a continuous and supreme joy to all eternity. 
(TdIE§1.) 
 
For Spinoza, the source of the mind’s discontent is its sensory ideas, which are partial 
and mutilated and consequently restrict its conatus or affirming essence, which leads 
to the loss of force and the feeling of pain (3p11). Adequate ideas, on the other hand, 
agree fully with their ideatum and can be completely affirmed or consented to by the 
mind without restriction. Because adequate ideas do not check the mind’s affirming 
force, this leads to the highest active emotion, the feeling of intellectual certainty and 
joy. For Spinoza, the mind can only be content if it has the assurance that its clear and 
distinct ideas are true. It has been established that, for Spinoza, having clear and 
distinct ideas amounts to the mind possessing adequate ideas of God’s essence.  
 
The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect…Therefore, insofar as 
we contemplate God, we are active…Consequently, there can be no pain 
accompanied by the idea of God; that is, nobody can hate God. (5p18dem.)  
 
…all that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us by the idea and 
nature of God – not indeed in words, but in a far superior way and one that 
agrees excellently with the nature of the mind, as everyone who has tasted 
intellectual certainty has doubtless experienced in his own case. (TTP1 S: 395.) 
 
And since true salvation and blessedness consist in true contentment of mind 





      As argued, Descartes and Spinoza both align our perfection with the mind, insofar 
as it has adequate ideas, that is, ideas of God’s essence. In this sense, the mind is seen 
as our better part. However, Spinoza only associates our true ideas with a part of the 
mind, the intellect, which consists of two actions, that of reason and intuition. The 
other part of the mind, the imagination, has to do with incomplete sensory ideas 
arising from sense perception.  In the previous chapter Spinoza’s theory of knowledge 
was discussed and the attention was drawn to his distinction between the second and 
third kinds of adequate knowledge, that of reason and intuition. I argue that the 
important difference between these two types of adequate knowledge is that the latter 
unites us intellectually with God, when we become conscious of the idea of God in us 
and start to actively employ it in our thinking. In Spinoza, intuition is regarded as the 
highest form of knowledge, which leads to the intellectual love of God and the highest 
level of joy and self-contentment that mankind can attain. I argue that the third kind 
of knowledge also delivers the highest form of certitude, which is to experience and 
enjoy the bliss of intellectual certainty.  
      Now, this highest form of knowledge or the amor dei intellectualis, which is also 
the highest achievement of the emendation of the intellect, is closely associated with 
Spinoza’s quite famous theory of the eternity of the mind. In my view, the successful 
completion of the EIP hinges crucially on the discovery of the mind’s eternity. I will 
show in this chapter that Spinoza’s theory of the mind’s eternity is an indispensible 
element in his search for epistemological certitude (my emphasis): 
 
…the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, suffers scarcely any 
disturbance of spirit, but by being conscious, by virtue of a certain eternal 
necessity, of himself, of God and of things, never ceases to be, but always 
possesses true spiritual contentment. (5p42sch.)  
 
That said, it is however well known, that Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the mind 
is quite obscure and troublesome.
159
 Nevertheless, an explication of Spinoza’s theory 
of emending the intellect, which I undertake in this work, should include an attempt, 
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 Spinoza scholars have encountered many difficulties with this doctrine of the minds eternity as 




at least, to clarify his theory of the mind’s eternity.
160
 This undertaking is however a 
demanding task in its own right and something that I cannot do full justice to in this 
chapter. I will not present an in-depth and detailed discussion of this matter, but will 
only attempt to clarify the important role of this theory for Spinoza’s EIP. My aim is 
to explicate the role that this theory plays in his pursuit of epistemological certitude, 
the continuous theme of this work. I argue that certainty with regard to our adequate 
ideas depends crucially on the intuition of God’s concurring thinking force and I 
claim that the function of the theory of the eternity of the mind in Spinoza is to 
support the project of attaining epistemological certitude and not to produce some 




6.1. The nature of the intellect 
 
Towards the end of the TdIE, Spinoza asks the important question: 
 
… whether there is a being – and also what kind of being – which is the cause 
of all things so that its essence represented in thought is also the cause of all our 
ideas. (TdIE§99.)  
 
He then goes on to say, that in order to investigate this question as to ‘the first of all 
things’ we need to first ‘enquire what we understand by the faculties and power of the 
intellect’ (ibid.§105,106). In order for the intellect to confidently produce the 
definition of God, we need to first have an adequate idea of its own nature. What 
Spinoza seems to be saying is that, before the definition of God is attempted, we must 
ascertain if the intellect is indeed able to successfully undertake such an important 
intellectual task. The answer to this question should become apparent if we have an 
adequate idea of its nature. The last passages of the treatise are then intent on 
discovering an adequate idea of the nature of intellect. In accordance with the method 
that Spinoza develops in the TdIE, the best way of investigating the nature of 
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something is by means of a good definition. However, Spinoza seems to think that 
there is a difficulty in defining the intellect at this point: 
 
Now since the chief part of our Method is to achieve a good understanding of 
the powers of the intellect and its nature, we are necessarily constrained 
(through considerations set out in this second part of our Method) to deduce 
these simply from the definition of thought and the intellect. But so far we have 
not had any rules for finding definitions; and since we cannot treat of these 
rules without knowing the nature or definition of the intellect and its power, it 
follows that either the definition of the intellect must be self - evident or we 
cannot understand anything. But that definition is not absolutely self-evident. 
(TdIE§106,7.)  
 
In accordance with Rule seven of Descartes’s Regulae, if the nature or definition of 
some object of our investigation is not readily at hand, the next best step to take is to 
enumerate the properties of that which we seek to know or define.
162
 Spinoza follows 
the same procedure:   
 
Nevertheless, since its properties – like everything we have from the intellect – 
can be clearly and distinctly perceived only if their nature is known, the 
definition of intellect will become self-evident if we attend to its properties that 
we do understand clearly and distinctly. (TdIE§107.) 
 
The argument seems to be that if we do have adequate ideas of something, this then 
implies that the nature of the thing is already, perhaps latently, known to us. As 
discussed in chapter four on Spinoza’s method in the TdIE, he hereafter proceeds to 
list the clear and distinct properties or ideas of the intellect (ibid.§108). The treatise 
ends shortly hereafter with Spinoza seeking to establish some ‘common basis’ from 
which the properties of the intellect necessarily follow. In his words such a basis that 
‘when given, necessarily entails these properties, and when removed, removes them 
all’ (ibid.§110). As is known, the TdIE is unfinished and, unfortunately, Spinoza does 
not get round to do this.  
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      Following the early rationalist method, for us to perceive something clearly and 
distinctly, the nature of the thing investigated must be known or given to us. If, 
however, the nature of the thing is not clearly evident we should then consider if its 
properties are not perhaps clear and distinct. If this is the case, then its nature will be 
clearly apparent through its properties.
 
 For Spinoza, the properties of the intellect are 
indeed clear and distinct.  One of the intellect’s clear and distinct properties is: 
 
It perceives things not so much under duration as under some form of eternity, 
and as being of infinite number. Or rather, in its perception of things, it attends 
neither to number nor duration. But when it imagines things, it perceives them 
as being of fixed number, with determinate duration and quantity. (TdIE§108.)   
 
It is notable that Spinoza seems to follow the method that he developed in the TdIE in 
the second section of the fifth part of the Ethics, in which he explicates his theory of 
the eternity of the mind.
163
 In this section he seeks to discover the nature of the 
intellect and to do so he investigates one of its properties, that, when the intellect 
conceives things, it does so in the light of eternity or sub quadam specie aeternitatis 
(5p29sch).
 
The role of this notion in Spinoza’s theory of the mind’s eternity will be 
the subject of the following section.  
 
6.1.1. Perceiving things sub quadam specie aeternitatis 
 
For Spinoza, the human mind consists of two parts, i.e. the imagination and the 
intellect.  The former is associated with sense perception and the latter with the 
adequate idea of God and also other true ideas that can be inferred from the former. 
The two so-called parts of the mind conceive things in quite different ways. Whereas 
the imagination perceives things under a form of duration, the intellect conceives 
things under some form of eternity or sub quadam specie aeternitatis. The sensory 
ideas in the mind, formed by the imagination are incomplete and therefore inadequate. 
The ideas of the intellect however are possessed in full and are therefore regarded as 
adequate. Recall from the previous chapter that Spinoza conceives two actions of the 
intellect, i.e. reason and intuition and I argue that the adequate way of perceiving 
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things in the light of eternity is employed by both reason and intuition, but in different 
ways, which I will explicate in what follows.
164
  
      This dual way of perceiving things is already found in the second part of the 
Ethics where it is firstly attributed to the way in which reason conceives things: 
 
Furthermore, the basic principles of reason are those notions, which explicate 
what is common to all things, and do not explicate the essence of any particular 
thing, and therefore must be conceived without any relation to time, but in the 
light of eternity. (2p44cor2dem.)   
 
This way of perceiving things is especially prominent in the second section of the 
fifth part of the Ethics, where a somewhat different aspect of this way of conceiving 
is, I argue, assigned to intuition: 
 
We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them 
as related to a fixed time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be 
contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Now 
the things that are conceived as true or real in this second way, we conceive 
under a form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence 
of God … (5p29sch.)   
 
Before attending to the possible different ways in which reason and intuition conceive 
things in the light of eternity, I will here point out what seems basic to both reason 
and intuition in this so-called second way of perceiving things. Firstly, when we 
perceive things in the light of eternity we necessarily employ our adequate ideas of 
God’s essence, irrespective of whether it is reason or intuition that is doing it. 
Secondly, when we employ our adequate ideas, i.e. the idea of God’s eternal and 
infinite essence, it is only that which things have in common that is conceived, and 
not the ‘essence of any particular thing’.
165
 As argued earlier, when a particular thing 
is conceived adequately, the aspects pertaining to its durational existence are 
necessarily left out. The certain manner in which particular things exist, such as their 
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individual natures, where or when or for how long they exist and so forth are not 
attended to. Ideas of the aspects pertaining to the durational existence of things are 
assigned to sensory ideas and not to adequate knowledge. I argue that when the 
intellect (reason or intuition) perceives a particular thing it necessarily conceives it in 
the light of eternity, and that which is common to all things is conceived 
(2p44cordem).
 
   
      Now, I argue that reason and intuition differ when perceiving things under a form 
of eternity. In my view when reason conceives particular things in the light of eternity 
the ‘basic principles of reason’ (2p44cor2dem) are applied, i.e. the true ideas of the 
attributes and the common notions and this does produce an adequate, albeit a rather 
abstract way of conceiving particular things (5p36sch). However, when intuition 
conceives things in the light of eternity it seems to rather focus on the inmost essence 
by which particular things exist and continue to exist as far as they can, i.e. God’s 
very essence or his power:  
 
Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of 
this or that human body under a form of eternity. (5p22.) 
 
God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body but also of 
its essence, which must therefore necessarily be received through God’s essence 
by a certain eternal necessity, and this conception must necessarily be in God. 
(5p22dem.)  
 
As I read the passages cited above, what intuition conceives in the light of eternity is 
the essence of this or that human body…which must necessarily be received through 
God’s essence by a certain eternal necessity. As argued, the essence to which Spinoza 
refers in the above, seeing that it is conceived in the light of eternity, cannot refer to 
anything individual pertaining to a particular thing, and should in my view, rather be 
seen to refer to something basic which all particular things have in common. In my 
view, Spinoza seems to here have something more fundamental in mind than the 
rather abstract common ideas or notions of the attributes and the immediate infinite 
modes. As I see it, the notion of essence, that is involved when intuition perceives 
things in the light of eternity, refers to the very core of reality, to that which is most 




essence of things is necessarily received through God’s essence.  I think it is perhaps 
helpful to refer here to a similar line of thinking found in the preface to the fourth part 
of the Ethics (my emphasis): 
 
For nothing belongs to the nature of anything except that which follows from 
the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause; and whatever follows from the 
necessity of the nature of its efficient cause must necessarily be so.  
 
For Spinoza, God is the efficient cause of the essence and existence of things (1p25) 
and it seems that the essence common to all things must follow directly from God’s 
very essence. For Spinoza, God’s very essence is his eternal and infinite power and 
the something which the knowledge of the third kind perceives, that is common to all 
things and is contained in God and follows from the necessity of the divine nature and 
involves the idea of God’s essence, is the conatus, i.e. the endeavor of all things to 
persist in their own being (3p6dem).  God’s power ‘whereby he and all things are and 
act’ (1p34dem) is the fundamental essence that is common to all things and it is this 
essence, I argue, which the knowledge of the third kind conceives, when it 
understands things in the light of eternity. This very essence is contained in God’s 
essence and follows from the necessity of the divine essence and must necessarily be 
so for all things. When it perceives things in the light of eternity, intuition conceives 
the inmost nature of our universe, i.e. the one, eternal and infinite essence of God or 
his power. This reading will be explored further a bit later in this chapter. 
      To reiterate, how should the two different actions of the intellect - that of reason 
and intuition - be understood with regard to conceiving things in the light of eternity? 
Firstly, both reason and intuition conceive things adequately and in the light of 
eternity and are focused on perceiving that which is common to all things.
 
 On the one 
hand, by applying the basic principles of reason, i.e. the common ideas or notions, 
reason or knowledge of the second kind, adequately conceives that which is common 
to all bodies and to all ideas. The knowledge of the third kind, on the other hand, also 
perceives things in the light of eternity but is rather focused on intuiting God’s very 
essence or power by which all particular things exist and persist in their being. 
Spinoza does, in my view, already introduce this role of intuition in the second part of 





Here by existence I do not mean duration, that is, existence insofar as it is 
considered in the abstract as a kind of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature 
of existence, which is attributed to particular things because they follow in 
infinite numbers in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God’s nature 
(1p16). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things insofar 
as they are in God. For although each particular thing is determined by another 
particular thing to exist in a certain manner, the force by which each perseveres 
in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. (2p45sch.)  
 
With regard to the citation above, it is notable that in the very next proposition 
(2p46dem) Spinoza refers to God’s eternal and infinite essence or power as ‘common 
to all things, and equally in the part as in the whole’. Moreover in the following 
2p47sch Spinoza actually refers to knowledge of the third kind.
 
 This, perhaps, gives 
some support to my reading that the role of intuition, when conceiving things under a 
form of eternity, is to conceive God’s very essence or his power, which is involved 
and expressed in all things. In Spinoza’s system, other finite things are involved when 
particular things are brought to exist in a certain manner (1p28).
 
However, the power 
by which particular things come to exist and persist in their existence, cannot be 
attributed to other finite things, nor to their own individual nature (emphasis added): 
 
Therefore, just as their coming into existence cannot follow from their essence, 
so neither can their perseverance in existing. The same power that they need in 
order to begin to exist, they also need in order to continue to exist. Hence it 
follows that the power of natural things by which they exist, and        
consequently by which the act, can be no other than the eternal power of God. 
(TP2 S: 683.) 
 
Particular things cannot be or be conceived without God. As argued modes are by 
definition ‘in something else and are conceived through something else’ (1def5). I 
argue that this invisible aspect of duration, this very nature of existence (2p45sch),
166
 
i.e. the continuous dependence of particular things on God’s eternal and infinite 
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power to exist and to persist in their being is something common to all things and is 
intuited by knowledge of the third kind (5p36sch).
 
This insight is not achieved by 
sense perception, nor it seems by reason. This most fundamental reality, i.e. the 
dependence of modes on God’s eternal and infinite power is best experienced 
intuitively. In my view, the idea of essence monism is intuitive and belongs to 
knowledge of the third kind.   
 
6.1.2. The intellect and the self 
 
What does the intellectual way of conceiving things in the light of eternity, discussed 
above, have to do with Spinoza’s theory of the mind’s eternity? I argue that the 
property of the intellect, to conceive things under a form of eternity, says much about 
its own nature, which I argue is eternal. The method of discovering the nature of the 
intellect by considering its clear and distinct properties is based on the procedure 
found in the TdIE:  
 
The definition of the intellect will become self-evident if we attend to its 
properties that we do understand clearly and distinctly. (TdIE§107.) 
 
As argued in the previous section, to perceive something in the light of eternity 
involves and expresses the adequate idea of God’s essence. When we employ the idea 
of God’s essence in order to perceive particular things adequately, we perceive them 
in the light of eternity, which is to conceive ‘their efflux from eternity’ (Ep12 S: 789). 
In this view, particular things are conceived as finite expressions of God’s eternal and 
infinite essence. As Nadler puts it: When ‘we understand things in this way, we see 
them from the infinite and eternal perspective of God, without any relation to or 
indication of time and place. When we perceive things in time, they appear in a 
continuous state of change and becoming; when we perceive them “under a form of 
eternity”, what we apprehend abides permanently. This kind of knowledge, because it 
is atemporal and because it is basically God’s knowledge, is eternal’ (2001:121).    
      Now the fact that we are able to conceive things under a form of eternity, i.e. in 
the way that God perceives things, says much about the nature of the intellect. 




In contrast to the intellect, the sensory ideas of the imagination do not reflect the way 
in which God (God’s intellect) conceives things. These inadequate ideas are only in 
our minds and are extinguished when the body perishes: 
 
It is only while the body endures that the mind expresses the actual existence of 
its body and conceives the affections of the body as actual (2p8cor). 
Consequently (2p26), it does not conceive any body as actually existing save 
while its own body endures. Therefore (2p17sch), it cannot exercise either 
imagination or memory save while the body endures (see Def. of Memory in 
2p18sch). (5p21dem.) 
 
Now for Spinoza, the human intellect is eternally part of the infinite intellect of God. 
God’s essence is the object or ideatum
 
of his idea and seeing that the former is simple, 
the idea of God, which the intellect contains, will also be simple. In Spinoza, the 
human intellect has the idea of God innately and seeing that the idea of God is simple 
(the same in the part as in the whole), the idea of God in us must be complete and 
therefore adequate. Moreover, seeing that God’s intellect is simple (by virtue of it 
containing God’s idea) and therefore equal in the part as in the whole, a human 
intellect that is part of God’s intellect must then also be equal to the whole and be the 
same as God’s intellect and all other intellects, which are part of the infinite intellect. 
For Spinoza, God’s intellect seems then to be constituted of infinite finite intellects, 
which are all eternal modes of thinking:  
 
… our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking which is 
determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and again this by another, and 
so on ad infinitum, with the result that they all together constitute the eternal 
and infinite intellect of God. (5p40sch.)  
 
I argue that, in a sense, finite intellects and God’s intellect are one and the same. 
Seeing that God’s intellect is eternal, and our intellect is indiscerptibly part of God’s 
intellect, the human intellect must then also be eternal. In my view this is the nub of 
the argument on which Spinoza’s theory of the mind’s eternity depends. As argued 
previously, the idea of God’s essence, contained in the intellect, refers to the ideas of 




which all things are created and sustained. These simple ideas are of God’s power, the 
common ideas and notions of the attributes and the immediate infinite modes.
 
 The 
Idea of God (God’s intellect) contains the ideas of the attributes and the common 
notions pertaining to each attribute. I claim then that the adequate ideas pertaining to 
God’s essence are the same in God’s intellect and in ours and in all others.
167
 These 
ideas of God are eternal and so will these ideas in a human intellect be eternal.
168
  
      What is the implication of this view for the EIP? If the suggestion above, that our 
intellect and God’s intellect are basically one and the same, it may seem that any 
notion of a human self is dissolved into a larger cosmic intellectual self and this 
outcome, would have serious consequences for the EIP, in my view. The importance 
of the notion of an individual self for Spinoza’s EIP was discussed earlier. I argue that 
Spinoza realizes this and does employ the notion of the self quite strongly, especially 
in the second section of the fifth part of the Ethics (my emphasis): 
 
Therefore, our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a form of 
eternity, necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows … etc. (5p30dem.) 
 
So the more each man is advanced in this kind of knowledge, the more clearly 
conscious he is of himself and of God. (5p31sch.) 
 
From this kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible contentment of 
mind (5p27), that is (Def. of emotions 25), the highest possible pleasure, and 
this is accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (5p30) also by the 
idea of God as cause. (5p32dem.)  
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The EIP, which is to attain the true idea of God and to conceive things in the light of 
eternity, requires the notion of a stable individual self. As Spinoza says in the citation 
above, ‘our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a form of eternity, 
necessarily has knowledge of God…’ I argue that, for Spinoza, without the notion of 
an individual self we will not be able to know God adequately and to conceive things 
in the light of eternity. I have consistently argued that although the EIP is mainly 
concerned with developing an eternal perspective of the world, sense perception does 
have an important role to play.
 
 Without some sense of self, albeit partial, which arises 
from the sensory ideas of the individual nature of the body, the mind would not have 
an idea of itself and would have no notion of having and reflecting on its own ideas, 
which, as argued, is a notion crucial to the EIP.
169
 Spinoza seems to have realized this 
quite early in his work (emphasis added): 
 
And so when it happens that the degrees of motion and rest are not equal, in all 
the parts of the body, but that some have more motion and rest than others, there 
arises therefrom a difference of feeling … And when it happens that the eternal 
causes, which bring about these changes, are different from one another, and 
have not all the same effect, then there results from this a difference of feeling in 
one and the same part … Lastly, now that we have explained what feeling is, we 
can easily see how this gives rise to an Idea reflexiva, or the knowledge of 
oneself, Experience and Reasoning. (STapp2 S: 106,7.)   
 
I argue that the idea of the individual nature of the body, albeit based on experience 
and therefore rather unclear, is crucial for the intellect having an idea of itself.
170
 I 
have argued earlier that in Spinoza’s system it is not contradictory to conceive a mode 
as having distinct parts, albeit that this perception is superficial. To conceive God’s 
intellect as made up of parts (selves) is allowed in Spinoza’s system (Ep12). 
However, when conceived in the light of eternity, God’s intellect is seen to be equal 
in the part as in the whole, i.e. as one and undivided.
171
 However, although God’s 
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intellect seems then to be constituted by infinite individual intellects, such eternal 
modes of thinking are without any personal memories.
172
 Spinoza’s theory of the 




      Lastly, although the infinite intellect is an eternal source of adequate ideas, it is so 
by virtue of it inhering directly and eternally in God. As argued earlier, the infinite 
intellect, of which our intellect is eternally part, is wholly dependent on God, without 
which it cannot be nor be conceived. As is the case with all modes in Spinoza’s 
system, our intellect is never separated from God and cannot be completely 
autonomous. As Spinoza writes in the TTP: 
 
…our intellect and knowledge depend solely on the idea or our understanding 
of God, and spring from it and are perfected by it. (TTP4 S: 434.)  
 
I argue in what follows that knowing our dependence on God is crucial in attaining 
the highest form of certainty in our ideas.  
 
6.2. Certitude and God’s concurrence 
  
In my view, Spinoza sought certainty in knowledge through the adequate ideas of 
God’s essence and the wellspring of such ideas is the innate idea of God, or which is 
the same, the intellect. It seems however that he and Descartes thought that most 
humans are largely unconscious of their innate ideas, hence the need for the 
emendation of the intellect. In Spinoza, the EIP is aimed at helping mankind 
                                                                                                                                                              
which should strictly be kept apart from personal immortality which includes memory and 
imagination’.     
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overcome the bondage of the mind to traditional credulous notions by becoming 
conscious of its own inner source of truth in the intellect. Becoming conscious of the 
intellect and its powers is a crucial aspect of the emendation of the intellect and in the 
pursuit of certitude:  
 
I shall embark upon the first and most important task, emending the intellect 
and rendering it apt for the understanding of things … so that I at the same time 
begin to know my powers and the nature which I desire to perfect. (TdIE§18.) 
 
Although all finite minds necessarily have the idea of God (1p21dem), it seems that 
not all minds are conscious of this. As argued previously, this state of unawareness 
does not completely disable the power of the intellect. Even if humans are mostly 
unaware of the existence and nature of the intellect, they still necessarily employ their 
adequate ideas and it seems that thinking is not possible without the use of them.
 
This 
refers, firstly, to the very essence of thought, namely affirmation, which is the essence 
of all ideas, even inadequate ones. Secondly, whenever we form an idea, we 
necessarily use the ideas of the attributes and the common notions to do so. The very 
fact that humans are able to form ideas and to think adequately to some degree 
indicates the continuous presence of the idea of God in our minds. Even though we do 
have confused and obscure ideas and think mostly imaginatively, our ideas of things 
are not completely inadequate. Even in our sensory ideas there is some positive and 
adequate affirmation of that which is common to all things. However, for Spinoza, we 
are mostly unaware of the indispensible role of God in our having ideas of things and 
in building a body of knowledge, albeit mostly inadequate. 
      In Spinoza’s view, we have not achieved our highest perfection if we are not 
consciously aware of the presence of God’s idea in us and understand its indispensible 
role in our ability to think adequately. Being conscious in this regard refers to 
becoming aware of the dependence of our minds on God’s innate idea to form our 
ideas and to produce a body of adequate knowledge. As argued earlier, we understand 
the very nature of existence when we become aware of the dependence of all things, 
bodies and ideas, on God’s power. In Spinoza the possibility of becoming more active 
and self-determined depends on unshackling our minds from the traditional notion 
that the human mind is deeply corrupt due to mankind’s fall into sin. Furthermore, for 




knowing with surety that our intellect is eternally part of God’s intellect. I claim that, 
for Spinoza, complete certainty in our true ideas is not possible without the equal 
certitude that our minds are continuously in God, i.e., that the intellect can never be 
separated from its source of truth.  It is this conviction that girds the certainty of our 
true ideas and enables us to apply our minds with confidence and to take positive 
action in our lives.
 
 In my view, Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the mind mainly 
serves the purpose of attaining epistemological certainty in this life and is not aimed 
at securing personal salvation.  
      Now the first step towards a greater consciousness of the intellect has do with 
becoming aware of the presence and role of the idea of God in our minds: 
 
Our mind, insofar as it knows itself and the body under a form of eternity, 
necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is 
conceived through God. (5p30.)  
 
In becoming aware that we are able to form true ideas of the essence of our body and 
mind under a form of eternity and understanding the significance thereof, leads to the 
realization that our mind is dependent on God, i.e. that it is in God and conceived 
through God. In becoming aware of our true and false ideas and understanding the 
difference between them and also what this signifies is the core of the method of 
improving the intellect. When we come to clearly understand the nature of our true 
ideas, the only explanation for us having them is by virtue of our mind being involved 
in God’s intellect. What we should become conscious of is that the idea of God in us, 
is the formal or direct cause of our adequate ideas and all our knowledge:  
 
The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause insofar as 
the mind is eternal. (5p31.)  
 
Now the more someone becomes aware of her adequate ideas the more she advances 
in the highest kind of knowledge and the more clearly conscious she is of herself and 
of God (5p31sch my emphasis). Becoming conscious in terms of the EIP includes, 





From this kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible contentment of 
mind, that is, the highest possible pleasure, and this is accompanied by the idea 
of oneself, and consequently also by the idea of God as cause. (5p32dem.)     
  
In Spinoza our certitude and ensuing joy cannot be grounded in the power of our 
intellect alone. The third kind of knowledge is consistently described by Spinoza as 
the amor Dei intellectualis, as an awareness of our mind’s continuous dependence on 
God’s thinking force:  
 
The true Understanding can never perish; for in itself it can have no cause to 
destroy itself … And as it did not emanate from external causes, but from God, 
so it is not susceptible to any change through them …And since God has 
produced it immediately and he is only an inner cause, it follows necessarily 
that it cannot perish so long as this cause of it remains … Now, this cause of it 
is eternal, therefore it is too. (ST2/26 S: 101.)  
 
Human beings are modes of God’s essence and are wholly dependent on him for 
everything. Certitude with regard to our adequate ideas is then eventually firmly 
grounded in God’s concurrent essence, which continually sustains our minds.
 
We 
have adequate and inadequate ideas only by virtue of these ideas necessarily 
involving and expressing God’s eternal essence. By means of the innate idea of God, 
our minds are never separated from God’s concurrent essence. The highest and most 
excellent way of knowing, the knowledge of the third kind, is therefore described in 
terms of love: 
 
The mind’s love, must be related to the active nature of the mind and is 
therefore an activity whereby the mind regards itself, accompanied by the idea 
of God as cause…(5p36dem.) 
 
Note in the above citation the two elements involved in reaching the highest form of 
knowledge. There is, firstly, an awareness of the activity of mind itself, which is 




then the certain awareness or consciousness of the fact that the intellect is 
continuously dependent on God for its essence and existence (5p36sch).
174
   
      As argued in the previous chapter, the role of intuition is to unite us with God and 
this happens best by means of the true ideas of the mind. Through the production of 
our own true ideas (such as the idea of a rotating semi circle) we become convinced 
of the divine nature of our minds or the continuous presence of God, through his idea 
in our minds. The realization that should eventually dawn on us is of our dependence 
on God to form all our ideas, even sensory one’s. Once we become aware of the 
nature of the intellect and that our intellect is involved in God’s intellect, we realize 
that we are directly united with God and that we are continuously dependent on 
him.
175
 In 5p36 we read: 
 
Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whose 
principle and basis is God, it follows that we see quite clearly how and in what 
way our mind, in respect of essence and existence, follows from the divine 
nature and is continuously dependent on God. I have thought this worth noting 
here in order to show by this example the superiority of that knowledge of 
particular things which I have called ‘intuitive’ or ‘of the third kind,’ and its 
preferability to that abstract knowledge which I have called ‘knowledge of the 
second kind.” The latter kind of knowledge is legitimate but it ‘does not strike 
the mind as when it is inferred from the essence of each particular thing which 
we assert to be dependent on God.  
 
I argue that what Spinoza, at bottom, seems to be doing in all of this is to bring God in 
as the eventual guarantor that our adequate ideas are certainly true, which is quite 
similar to Descartes (emphasis added): 
 
Now in order that we may conceive God’s nature clearly and distinctly, we 
have to fix our attention on certain very simple axioms called universal axioms, 
and connect to them those attributes that belong to the divine nature. Only then 
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 In my view Spinoza does not suggest a mystical type union between our mind and that of God. 
Intuitive knowledge does include a feeling component, such as joy and contentment, but this follows 
from attaining certainty of our true ideas. This is an intellectual experience.  
175
 The idea of concurrence is also very Cartesian and is an important theme in Descartes’s third 




does it become clear to us that God necessarily exists and is omnipresent, and 
only then do we see that all our conceptions involve God’s nature and are 
conceived through God’s nature, and, finally, that everything that we 
adequately conceive is true. (TTP S: 574.) 
   
      Spinoza adds to his theory of the eternity of the mind the notion that the mind can 
continue to progress in this highest level of knowledge and that we should strive 
towards increasing the eternal part of the mind by increasing our adequate ideas as far 
as we can: 
 
Therefore, the greater the number of things the mind knows by the second and 
third kinds of knowledge, the greater is the part of it that survives. (5p38.) 
 
Hence it follows that the part of the mind that survives, of whatever extent it 
may be is more perfect than the rest. (5p40.)   
  
The general consensus in scholarship seems to be that when we decrease the number 
of inadequate ideas that we have in our minds, the greater will be the role played by 
the intellectual part. By increasing our adequate ideas the mind will also be less 
disturbed by the presence of inadequate ideas, which lead to the passions. I think what 
Spinoza could also have in mind is that we should become more generally proficient 
in the application of both reason and intuition in our everyday lives as well. Spinoza’s 
EIP is not only aimed at producing knowledge that is highly philosophical in nature, 
but also at the improvement of society and in alleviating its many problems. The 
practical and social intention of the EIP is clearly included in his initial formulation of 
the task of emending the intellect: 
 
This, then, is the end for which I strive, to acquire the nature I have described 
and to endeavor that many should acquire it along with me. That is to say, my 
own happiness involves my making an effort to persuade many others to think 
as I do, so that their understanding and their desire should entirely accord with 
my understanding and my desire. To bring this about, it is necessary (1) to 
understand as much about Nature as suffices for acquiring such a nature, and (2) 




goal with the greatest possible ease and assurance. Furthermore, (3) attention 
must be paid to moral philosophy and likewise the theory of the educating of 
children; and since health is of no little importance in attaining this end, (4) the 
whole science of medicine must be elaborated. And since many difficult tasks 
are rendered easy by contrivance, and we can thereby gain much time and 
convenience in our daily lives, (5) the science of mechanics is in no way to be 
despised. (TdIE§14.)         
 
In the TTP4 we read the following: 
 
To put it another way, since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is 
nothing other than the knowledge of a property of that cause, the greater our 
knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of God’s 
essence, which is the cause of all things. (S: 428.)  
 
It is apparent from the above that, in Spinoza, the pursuit of adequate knowledge is 
not only aimed at discovering a personal inner sense of joy and happiness, although 
this seems to be the main objective. His EIP also reaches out to our practical 
wellbeing and that of human society. The task of the EIP is to adequately understand 
God’s essence and all that follows from it and this also means, quite simply, that we 
should also aspire to have adequate knowledge of the natural world. I have 
consistently pointed out that the early modern pursuit of certainty was seen to be of 
extreme importance in providing a secure epistemological base for a new science and 
morality. The conviction that the intellect supplied a sure cognitive grasp of the 
essence of things was very important in the endeavor to improve society. Insofar as 
we are successful in the EIP we increase our adequate knowledge and reduce the 
negative influence of inadequate ideas. In this way our world can become more 
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 Israel discusses Spinoza’s ‘notable absence or marginality’ from most histories of science and 
argues that Spinoza does indeed have a special place in the history of scientific thought. Spinoza’s 
most important contribution is his insistence of the universal applicability of reason to all aspects of 




6.3. Spinoza’s intellectual vision  
 
In Spinoza, self-contentment is found in the true contentment of the mind, insofar as it 
understands clearly and distinctly, which activity is unchecked and therefore 
accompanied by the feeling of pleasure (5p18dem). His pursuit of adequate 
knowledge started out in the TdIE with the enquiry: 
 
… if there existed a true good, one which was capable of communicating itself 
and could alone effect the mind to the exclusion of all else, whether, in fact 
there was something whose discovery and acquisition would afford me a 
continuous and supreme joy to all eternity. (TdIE§1.) 
 
Spinoza’s task of emending the intellect sought to uncover our highest good: 
 
Thus he urged to seek the means that would bring him such a perfection, and all 
that can be the means of his attaining this objective is called a true good, while 
the supreme good is to arrive at the enjoyment of such a nature, together with 
other individuals, if possible. What that nature is we shall show in its proper 
place, the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of Nature. 
(Ibid.§13.)    
 
How would one summarize the end result of this endeavor? What does Spinoza’s 
rationalist understanding or vision amount to?  In the last paragraph of the appendix 
to part 4 of the Ethics Spinoza writes: 
 
But human power is very limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of 
external causes, and so we do not have absolute power to adapt to our purposes 
things external to us.  However, we shall patiently bear whatever happens to us 
that is contrary to what is required by consideration of our own advantage, if we 
are conscious that we have done our duty and that our power was not extensive 
enough for us to have avoided the said things, and that we are a part of the 
whole of Nature whose order we follow.  If we clearly and distinctly understand 
this, that part of us which is defined by the understanding, that is, the better part 




For insofar as we understand, we can desire nothing but that which must be, 
nor, in an absolute sense, can we find contentment in anything but truth.  And 
so insofar as we rightly understand these matters, the endeavor of the better part 
of us is in harmony with the order of the whole of Nature. (4app32.)  
 
The above citation is an arresting summary of Spinoza’s rationalist vision and the end 
goal of his EIP.
 177
 When we are united with God by means of having his true idea, we 
then also perceive things as God does and understand the very nature of existence. In 
my view the very heart of such a vision is the intuitive awareness of the total 
dependence of all things on God.
 
 The source of our self-contentment is to know with 
complete certainty that all things are contained in God, follow from God and are 
continuously sustained by him. This vision conceives things in the light of eternity 
and understands that everything is just as it should be and that all things are in perfect 
relation, harmony and union with one another. In Spinoza’s words: 
 
The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect … there can be no pain 
accompanied by the idea of God … nobody can hate God. (5p18dem.) 
 
…the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, suffers scarcely any 
disturbance of spirit, by virtue of a certain eternal necessity, of himself, of 
God and of things, never ceases to be, but always possesses true spiritual 






                                                        
177 Spinoza’s idea of salvation or blessedness has to do with ‘the constant and eternal love toward God’ 
(5p36sch). Salvation in Spinoza seems to apply only to minds that are fully conscious of the innate idea 
of God. As seen, Spinoza does not think this to be the case for all human beings. Spinoza says in TTP4 
that ‘carnal man cannot understand these things…he has too stunted a knowledge of God’ (S: 428).  In 
the final passages of the Ethics Spinoza says that the ignorant man perishes and ‘ceases to be at all’, but 
the wise man ‘never ceases to be’ (5p42sch). Becoming aware or conscious of the innate idea of God is 
possible for all humans, but not all achieve this.  It is unclear to me if Spinoza employs a notion of 
salvation for humans as a reward of some sort for achieving the highest virtue, i.e. intellectual 
perfection and if such a reward comes after our death or if it is to be only enjoyed in this life.  See also 
TTP14 where Spinoza includes the notion of being saved in his principles of a universal faith (S: 518). 






My undertaking in this work has been to clarify Spinoza’s concept of emending the 
intellect, which is indeed a central theme of his philosophical work:  
 
Therefore it is of the first importance in life to perfect the intellect, or reason, as 
far as we can, and the highest happiness or blessedness for mankind consists in 
this alone. (4app4.)  
 
His view, that our highest joy and happiness depends so crucially on the improvement 
of the intellect, has much to do with Spinoza’s early modern view that our human 
nature is seated in the mind and specifically in our ability to think: 
 
 Man thinks. (2ax2.)  
 
The essence of man (2p10cor) is constituted by definite modes of the attributes 
of God, to wit (2ax2), modes of thinking. (2p11dem.) 
 
For Spinoza, human beings think, i.e., we naturally employ ideas in all that we do in 
our lives and this differentiates us from other things. Although all things are animate 
to a degree, only human beings think. This does not however mean that we always 
think adequately and that we naturally use reason aright. As seen, our supposed 
thinking nature is constituted by the intellect and the imagination, by both adequate 
and inadequate ideas and that the latter often gives rise to the passions, which underlie 
most of mankind’s problems. In order then for us to become more self-determined it 
is most important to learn to follow reason’s true ideas. Spinoza’s philosophy has a 
clear ethical intention, to secure an incorruptible source of joy and happiness. I have 
contended that such bliss is only to be found in our highest form of self-action, which 
is to live in accordance with the adequate ideas formed by the intellect: 
 
For the eternal part of the mind (5p23 and 29) is the intellect, through which 
alone we are said to be active (3p3), whereas that part which we have shown to 






I have argued for a close association between Spinoza’s EIP and the early modern 
quest for certitude, i.e., the search for an incontrovertible epistemological foundation 
that could form the basis for progress in science and the improvement of society. 
However, although Spinoza most certainly participated in this project, he did not 
envisage the transformation of society as the main purpose of his work. The main 
focus of his EIP is rather on discovering true peace of mind and not the establishing 
of a rational society. Spinoza’s primary focus is philosophical or epistemological and 
not political and economical. In his view, eternal joy and happiness could not arise 
from a new political or social dispensation or in the attainment of material things. A 
most crucial insight in the process of emending the intellect is that, for Spinoza, the 
world is actually perfect as it is.  Our understanding of the world is however mostly 
misguided and this is the root cause of our discontent. His main endeavor then is for 
us to discover joy and self-contentment in the world as it is and always will be. His 
philosophy aims primarily at uncovering and understanding the true idea of the 
inmost essence of things, which leads to the contentment of the mind. For Spinoza, 
this is only possible for rational man and not for those who pursue a sensual life, i.e. 
carnal man: 
 
For this truth is told us by the idea of God, that God is our supreme good, i.e., 
that the knowledge and love of God is the final end to which all our actions 
should be directed. But carnal man cannot understand these things; he thinks 
them foolish because he has too stunted a knowledge of God, and in this 
supreme good, it does only in philosophic thinking and pure activity of mind, he 
finds nothing to touch, to eat, or to feed the fleshy appetites which are his chief 
delight. But those who recognize that they have no more precious gift than 
intellect and a sound mind are sure to regard these as very substantial blessings. 
(TTP4 S: 428.) 
 
I have argued that the adequate conceivability of God’s very essence is absolutely 





Now to perfect the intellect is also nothing other than to understand God and the 
attributes and actions of God that follow from the necessity of his nature. 
(4app4.) 
 
It is by clearly and distinctly understanding the inmost essence of our world, that the 
wise man finds peace with God, himself and the world. Ignorant man, however, who 
passively follows his inadequate ideas, is always discontent and at odds with God, 
himself and other things (5p42sch). As argued, the most important intellectual insight 
that grounds this acquiescentia in se ipso is to grasp the very nature of existence; that 
all things are contained in God, follow from him and are totally dependent on his very 
essence or power (2p45sch). This is the intellectual vision of things sub specie 
aeternitatis, i.e. to perceive things in the light of eternity as God does. When we 
perceive God, ourselves and all other things as contained in God in this way, we 
necessarily discover peace of mind and joy: 
 
The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (2p46 and 47). 
Therefore, insofar as we contemplate God, we are active (2p3). Consequently 
(3p59), there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God; that is, nobody 
can hate God. (5p18dem.) 
 
As argued, the EIP is however a continuous struggle. We are very weak and are easily 
overpowered by external forces (4app32). We often succumb to inadequate imaginary 
ideas, which fuel the negative passions. Such inadequate ideas easily develop into 
powerful ideologies that hold sway over us and are very difficult to break away from. 
For Spinoza such powerful and often conflicting ideologies and religions are the main 
cause of the endless human conflict. It is apparent that Spinoza did not think it 
possible to overturn all of this and to rid the world of imaginary thinking. In fact, such 
an idea would be out of place in his fundamental notion of substance monism. As 
said, all is contained and follows from God’s very essence and nothing can ever be in 
contradiction to God’s essence - seeing that all things have the natural right to strive 
to further their existence as best they can. What can and should be improved is our 
understanding of the inmost essence of our world. However, as argued, for Spinoza 
this highest epistemological certitude is eventually achieved intuitively. This highest 




mostly to do with philosophic thinking and pure activity of mind and does not 
primarily aim to bring about political or economic change. His EIP aims to transform 
our understanding of things, if we are able and willing to undertake the challenging 
task of improving our intellect. 
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